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ABSTRACT
COMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS:
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO END TORTURE
SEPTEMBER 1998
KATHERINE H. BRANNUM, B.A., MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor M.J. Peterson
This study of state compliance with international norms
against torture focuses on the period 1979 - 1993
.
Configurations of factors are compared using the Qualitative
Comparative Approach. The first part of the study is a
cross-national analysis of government compliance in 1993 .
To elucidate the circumstances under which states that are
democracies or are in transition to democracy may improve
their records of compliance with norms against torture, the
second part of this study presents the results of a
comparison of a group of such states where the governments
improved compliance and a group of states where the
governments continued to torture at high levels.
This study shows that the record of compliance with
international norms against torture in 1993 is a weak one.
Total compliance was rarely achieved and difficult to
maintain. The states that improved from the worst levels
were still in 1993 torturing at middle levels. Both the
cross-national study and the analysis of selected
governments' behavior from 1979 to 1993, present evidence of
V
the importance of type of political regime. This study
demonstrates that in many cases the presence or absence of
armed conflict distinguishes democracies or states in
transition that complied from those that did not. However,
while there are clear patters among some states that
torture, these important factors do not alone distinguish
governments that torture from those that do not. They are
clearly not sufficient to explain government behavior. The
second part of this study, looking at behavior over time,
shows that membership in any of the torture regimes has not
had any serious impact on government behavior. An analysis
of the comparison also confirms and further develops the
importance of armed conflict as a domestic factor and
indicates the circumstances under which the presence of
minor armed conflict may be overcome. This study also
highlights the importance of foreign pressure and the more
limited circumstances under which NGOs with transnational
links may have been able to effect government practice.
VI
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study of state compliance with international norms
against torture focuses on the period 1979-1993, an era of
significant change in world politics, most notably
democratization, the breakup of a superpower, the emergence
of new states, and new internal conflicts. These changes
created additional opportunities for raising human rights
issues, intensifying a trend visible since the early 1970s.
The early 1970s were a period of increased human rights
activism and optimism. Public awareness was increased as new
large scale human rights abuses, like those in Argentina and
Chile, received widespread media attention. The work of
groups like Amnesty International and the willingness of
governments to create and sign new human rights treaties like
the conventions against torture, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
African ( Banjul ) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights inspired
greater expectations that human rights abuses could be
curtailed. Many scholars concerned with the importance of
the human rights movement argue that this is the period when
human rights activists and organizations began to affect
state practice (Donnelly, 1993; Buergenthal, 1997; Garcia-
Sayan, 1992)
1
Evaluating the Impact of the human rights movement requires
establishing whether the way governments treat their citizens
actually changed. This study explores whether governments
began to practice torture less frequently after transnational
human rights actors became active, while exploring how norms
may have altered the language of state actors and their
interactions with human rights activists is also useful, the
primary task of a study seeking to understand the
determinants of government behavior is to examine changes in
state behavior.
The first part of the study is a cross-national analysis of
government compliance in 1993. This analysis has been
included to elucidate some global tendencies. An initial
survey of the conditions present in states where the
government was complying and in states where the government
was not complying with international norms against torture
Provides a broader overview as a check on the observations
drawn from a time analysis of a smaller selection of states.
The factors, or variables, examined in this section are; the
level of prosperity, membership in one of the regimes against
torture, the level of internal armed conflict, the type of
domestic regime, and the presence or absence of state-
sponsored religion.
Because regional and universal comparison for one year is
insufficient to increase understanding of the dynamics of
choice, this study also undertakes a dynamic analysis by
looking at change in state behavior over time. To elucidate
o
the circumstances under which states that are democracies or
are in transition to democracy may improve their records of
compliance with norms against torture, chapters four and five
present the results of a comparison of a group of such states
where the governments improved compliance and a group of
states where the governments continued to torture at high
levels. Exploring systematically why some governments in
states that are democracies or in transition to democracy
reduced the amount of torture practiced while others did not
provides insight into whether, and under what circumstances,
the three additional factors, foreign pressure, active human
rights NCOS operating within the state, and transnational
links to the international human rights community could have
had an effect on compliance.
A study of state compliance with international human rights
norms is useful because it provides the sort of in-depth
study needed to assess the propositions advanced in the
literature on compliance. Examining the circumstances under
which compliance can be achieved even on a very sensitive and
traditionally domestic issue is particularly useful. Many
analysts view human rights as a difficult area in which to
achieve an acceptable level of compliance (e.g. Chayes &
Chayes, 1993, p.l97; Haggard & Simmons, 1987, p.514; Onuf &
Peterson, 1984, p.337) As Chayes and Chayes note:
The effort to protect human rights by international
agreement may be seen as an extreme case of time
lag between undertaking and performance. It is
apparent that some states adhered without any
serious intention of abiding by them. But it is
3
parties committed to thetreaties had different expectations about
a993^^p?®197^? regulatory treaties
Issues of compliance with Human Rights norms are particularly
complex because of the lack of incentive to cooperate, the
absence of inter-state damage caused by violation, the
nonreciprocal character of human rights treaties, the
difficulty in identifying human rights abuse and the problem
of demonstrating government responsibility for some human
rights abuses.
Governments do not need to cooperate with other governments
in order to improve human rights in their own country. if a
government wants its citizens to be free from torture, it can
stop torturing them. How another government behaves towards
its own citizens should not affect the first government's
choices. Direct effects of respecting or violating human
rights norms generally do not cross borders. Because of
this, cooperation in the promotion of human rights does not
rest on governments ' constraining their own actions in
exchange for the cooperation of others, as does cooperation
on many other issues.
Efforts to promote compliance with human rights norms are
limited because a government generally has no immediate
material interest in acting on behalf of citizens of another
state. There is no self interested reason for external
enforcement. Even when a government decides to act, the
problem of choosing the proper sanction is a complicated one.
4
Because human rights regimes are established to protect
individuals, it does not make sense for a government to break
a treaty in response to another's violating that treaty. The
violating state will not suffer. This is recognized in
article 60 paragraph 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties which stipulates that termination or suspension of
operation of a treaty in response to a violation "do not
apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human
person, contained in treaties of humanitarian character.”
Nor is it clear what other sanctions are available.
Governments have attempted to use economic sanctions but
issue-linkage is often controversial not only with the target
government but also with domestic opinion in the applying
state due to weak commitment to human rights values or the
urgency of competing concerns
.
Human rights regimes address an issue where it is not
always easy to decide what constitutes a violation. Because
the international system includes states with different
cultures and ideologies, there is often no common
understanding of the way human rights problems should be
addressed or how regime injunctions should be interpreted.
Therefore, a government may consider itself to be in
compliance and may even have support from some governments
but be considered to be in violation by other governments.
If a government believes the case is ambiguous, it may feel
it can risk noncompliance. The differences in cultural norms
may create more difficulty in human rights than in other
5
areas because they make human rights a hotly contested
concept
.
Assigning responsibility for a violation to a government
can be difficult in particular cases, individual officials
can act contrary to instructions. Yet, unlike international
environmental regimes where a government agrees to control
behavior of private citizens, when it comes to torture the
government is promising to keep its own officials from using
torture, not to stop citizens from hurting each other.
Therefore government officials may try to blame their abusive
behavior on private groups or individuals.
Several factors make the practice of torture a useful issue
for study. The use of torture has been widespread and severe
enough to make eliciting state compliance a major challenge.
At the same time, governments agree that freedom from torture
is a right. While the concept of torture is not without
ambiguities
,
its prohibition is more universally accepted and
its definition more common than most human rights. Since
World War II, a consensus that there are universal laws
against torture has developed; it is a norm that almost all
states have acknowledged^ As John Ruggie (1983, p.99) says;
while there is some disagreement about precise
content and more about whether any circumstance
justify their violation, the minimal standard here
are in fact more clearly understood and widely
acknowledged than those for any cluster of rights.
Finally, the norm against torture is specific enough to make
measuring compliance a manageable task. Not only is focusing
on one specific human rights abuse more feasible than looking
6
at the Whole cluster of rights covered in one of the more
general human rights covenants, but torture is easier to
identify.
Lii-Qrature Review
Only in the last several years has there been increased
attention to the study of actual compliance with
international norms
. One of the reasons for the earlier lack
of attention is that many international regimes address
coordination or assurance problems (Stein, 1982). with such
problems, the main challenge is determining the rules. Once
states have agreed to these rules, they are better off
obeying than violating; individual interest in obeying is
sufficient to elicit high levels of compliance from each
participant. For regimes dealing with collaboration
problems, in contrast, eliciting compliance is more
States have greater incentives to violate the
rules of the regime for individual gain. Therefore, only
when scholars address this type of situation, where regimes
must overcome these incentives, does compliance become an
important focus . Analysts of international institutions have
recognized the importance of the issue of state compliance to
the study of institutions (Jacobson and Weiss, 1990; Sands,
1993). For the study of cooperation to be of lasting
interest, research must elucidate the conditions under which
cooperation goes beyond merely signing a piece of paper to
action.
7
The problem of promoting compliance with international
norms has been addressed at different levels of analysis by
different streams of literature. Each has developed a
characteristic explanation of compliance. Yet very little of
the literature has addressed compliance with international
human rights norms.
Scholars have disagreed about whether the characteristics
of human rights makes it a hard case or simply an
inappropriate subject for regime analysis. A serious
challenge to the idea that regime analysis — which starts
from the premise that adherence to explicit norms,
particularly when accompanied by participation in formal
intergovernmental organizations charged with promoting
compliance, significantly increases the likelihood of
compliant behavior — is appropriate for human rights study
have been raised by Conway Henderson, who believes that
concepts associated with regime analysis such as national
interest, international interdependence, hegemony, and regime
as an intervening variable "are not conducive to the study of
human rights" ( 1988, p.543). He also pointed out that while
the concept of norms is clearly useful to the study of human
^^9hts this is a concept that human rights scholars were
using long before the beginnings of the regime approach and
can continue to use without adopting a regime approach.
John Ruggie (1983), Jack Donnelley (1986) and Nicholas Onuf
and Spike Peterson (1984) have argued that the international
regime approach can be applied to the issue area of human
8
rights
. some advocates of the regime approach have argued
that there is mutual dependence between states on human
rights issues in the form of perceived moral interdependence
(e.g. Donnelly, 1986, p. 617; Henderson, 1988, p. 529; Brysk
1993, p. 266). While Jack Donnelly has argued that value to
regime analysis is modest, he sees it as nonetheless
significant because:
By forcing us to consider norms, decision-maki nnprocedures, and their political context as parts
il
structure, regime aLlysisIS particularly conducive to capturing theinsights of realism, idealism, and legalism, whileavoiding their one-sidedness. Furthermore, itrequires us to combine them into a single coherentpackage (1986, p. 641). ^
However, until recently, much of the scholarly writing on
human rights law has focused on issues other than compliance
with human rights norms. The dominant debates have addressed
the nature of human rights and the difference between
universalist and relativist views. Universalists (Donnelley,
1986, 1989; Forsythe, 1985, 1991; Henkin, 1990; Meron, 1989;
Vincent, 1986) defend their belief that there can be a set of
human rights principals applied to all societies against
those who believe that one can only define a right within a
particular culture (e.g. Bernstein, 1992; Pollis and Schwab,
1980; Renteln, 1990). Relativists argue that the United
Nation's human rights standards have their roots in the
western tradition and that this western conception of rights
should not be forced on other cultures. In may ways this
debate has been so compelling to some authors that it has
9
as
diverted attention from other important issues such
compliance.
Many authors assessing compliance with human rights
Obligations have drawn on the juridical tradition focusing on
rnternational obligations and formal mechanisms to promote or
enforce them (Leckie, 1988; Cassesse, 1991; Kamminga, 1992).
More recently, there has been some examination of compliance
with particular human rights regimes. For instance, Sandra
Gubin (1995) has argued that patterns in the Soviet Union's
compliance with family reunification and emigration norms
rndicate the success of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation. Yet most scholars interested in compliance with
human rights norms are still discussing methods for measuring
possrble compliance rather than assessing actual compliance .
2
Domestic Factors
Several scholars have made a start on assessment by
concentrating on state repression, which includes execution,
torture, political imprisonment and disappearances
(Henderson, 1991, 1993; McKinlay and Cohan, 1975; Mitchell
and McCormick 1988; Park, 1987; Poe & Tate, 1994). Four of
the domestic factors included in this study, religion, type
of regime, income and armed conflict, have been examined in
these quantitative studies. The importance of domestic
factors in promoting or discouraging compliance with human
rights norms has received widespread attention because of the
close relation between compliance and basic definitions of
the government-population relation (e.g. Park, 1987;
10
Henderson, 1982,1991; Strouse & Claude,
1973) .
1976; Robert Jackman,
Han Park (1987) produced a study arguing that the most
important domestic factors are religion, degree of ethnic
diversity, and urbanization. He divided human rights into
three types; political rights, economic /basic needs rights
and social rights. His premise was that "the degree of human
rights violations co-varies with certain contextual
characteristics of the society (1987, p.405). The first
result he reported is a relatively strong positive
correlation between political rights and welfare spending,
proportion of Christian population, and urbanization. He
asserted that ethnic diversity, generally regarded as
counter-productive for stability and development, did not
show any degree of adverse effect on social well-being. He
also found that civil and political liberties were inversely
correlated with military and education expenditure as well as
percentage of Islamic population. He found the fewest
correlations and weakest predictive power with social rights.
Only military expenditure showed a slight negative
correlation with income equality.
Domestic Political Regime . Many scholars have considered
the type of domestic political regime (e.g. Aidoo, 1993;
Crone, 1991; Henderson, 1982, 1991). Conway Henderson (1982)
and others have found that military governments have lower
levels of compliance than civilian ones. Henderson (1991)
also finds the more democratic the government, the less the
11
likelihood that it will repress. These findings are backed
up in other major studies (Poe and Tate, 1994
; Rummel, 1995).
Though it has been consistently shown that democracies have
less torture, the context under which they may or may not
torture has not been sufficiently explained. The relation
between transition to democracy and state repression is even
less clear than that between democracy and state repression.
Helen Fein (1995) has argued that there are more life
integrity violations in states that are in transition than in
states that are not democracies. This study, therefore,
classifies governments into three types, democratic, non
democratic, and in transition to democracy.
^med Conflict
. The relationship between armed conflict
and human rights abuse is clearly an important one. This
factor has recently been given more attention in the human
rights literature. Steven Poe and C. Neal Tate (1994) pointed
out that this factor had been neglected in past quantitative
studies and found that democracy and participation in civil
war have substantively important and statistically
significant effects on repression. R.J. Rummel (1995) looked
at the effect of armed conflict on democide which is a
broader term than genocide indicating "the intentional
killing of people by governments" including such things as
starving by blockade, assassinations and creating famine. He
found that the extent to which a country was involved in war
or rebellion along with its form of government best explains
democide.
12
incoae. The Importance of Income has been much debated in
the literature with studies showing inconsistent results.
Studies have yielded some evidence of a modest relation
between level of economic development and repression. Poe
and Tate have said that "economic standing is negatively but
only rather weakly, related to regimes’ propensity to abuse
of personal integrity rights" (1994, p. 867). However
Rummel, in his examination of democide, found that "there is
virtually no relationship" of democide to socioeconomic
Standing (1995 p.21)
.
Chayes and Chayes (1993, p.i76) have argued that
noncompliance often does not reflect a deliberate decision.
Compliance with human rights regimes may not have the same
magnitude of financial cost as there is with some of the
environmental regimes where upgrading technology is often
necessary, it may nonetheless be difficult for a less-
developed state to comply. Lack of financial resources that
other states use to control populations can limit the ability
of developing states to comply. One reason often given for
the use of physical punishment rather than imprisonment is
the lack of facilities to deal with either political or
ordinary prisoners. Therefore, complying may involve a
financial outlay to improve the penal system. There are also
costs involved with training officials and monitoring the
police and the military. Some governments may find it
difficult to implement the rules of a regime without outside
assistance
.
13
Like the general human rights literature, this study does
not limit itself to domestic factors, it also looks at the
relationship between foreign pressure, membership in
international regimes, the activities of human rights
organizations and compliance with norms against torture.
Foreign Pressure
some regime approaches and a substantial portion of the
human rights literature have focused on the role of pressure
from other governments in eliciting compliance. Several
explanations of why peer pressure from other governments
would increase compliance have been advanced. First, many
commentators have argued that governments react to peer
pressure for fear of losing their reputation as a reliable
cooperator. Reputation is important in the international
arena. The claim here is that a state that is seen as
untrustworthy in one area will also be seen as untrustworthy
in other issue areas and therefore a state may risk relations
with states in these other areas if It does not comply. As
Oran Young has written, "A reputation for trustworthiness is
one of the most valuable assets that any member of
international society can acquire" (1989, p.75). Chayes and
Chayes argue that;
A state's reputation for acceptable compliance is
thus important to achieving, its aim of being an
international player (1991, p.23)
Second, governments may comply with peer pressure to avoid
deprivations
. While breaking the treaty in retaliation for
non compliance is not a viable option for human rights
14
regimes, there are other
Chayes and Chayes
( 1991 ^
attempts at ©nforcement
sanctions that states can apply.
P*19) have argued that these kind of
are not important to compliance.
Sanctions have been used only infrequently because they are
seen as too costly and because when they are used they often
fail in practice. Nonetheless, this factor has been
considered as potentially important by many scholars
concentrating on human rights
.
The foreign policy literature has focused on the role of
foreign pressure on behavior of target states (Armstrong,
1986; Escude, 1991; Forsythe, 1988). Most of the foreign
policy studies of the impact of human rights pressures have
been case studies but there have been cross-national studies
looking at overall impact. The results have been
contradictory (Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 1985; Poe, 1992;
McCormick & Mitchell, 1988).
This literature includes a long debate about the
effectiveness of foreign pressure. There has been some
discussion about what means of encouraging compliance in
other states are acceptable with the most contentious issue
being the use of foreign aid as leverage against repressive
governments. Katerina Tomasevski has argued that human
rights issues are not the only reason for conditionality and
that conditions put on foreign aid by donor states are often
mutually contradictory. For instance, structural adjustment,
decreasing public expenditure and 'privatization' may
15
negatively affect the human rights picture in a state (1993,
p. xiii).
International Recimes
Human rights organizations often call for governments to
sign human rights conventions. There has not, however, been
much attention paid to what role, if any, membership in these
conventions have in improving government practice. The
regimes against torture have not been studied to any great
extent. Peder Van Magee (1992) has examined the Bush
administration's policy in regards to the UN convention and
Ache Boulesbaa (1990) suggest the "means and interpretations"
by which the obligations under article 2 of the UN Convention
Against Torture could be attained. The European regime has
attracted attention because of its innovations. Malcolm
Evans and Morgan Ros (1992) have written on the operational
practice of the European Convention. Keightley
( 1995 ) has
looked at compliance in one state, South Africa, by examining
recent developments related to torture and cruel inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment, while James Ron has done
an interesting study on changes in the way torture has been
practiced in Israel (1997). Antonio Cassesse (1991)
evaluated the effectiveness of the existing mechanisms for
safeguarding humans and their degree of possible overlap.
Human Rights Organizations
Domestic
. This study also explores the role of domestic
and international NGOs in international efforts to fight
human rights abuse. These organizations have been studied by
16
many scholars (e.g. Green, 1978; Rodley, 1992; Sikkink, 1993-
welch, 1995, but their impact is still unclear. Some of thesl
studies have been done by area specialists who have analyzed
activities in a particular country or area in depth. Latin
American human rights organizations, have received the bulk
of attention (Alvarez s, Escobar, 1992; Brysk 1993, 1994 ;
Garcia-Sayan, 1992; sikkink 1993). Several studies have
focused on the role of women in these organizations (Agosin,
1993; Fabj, 1993; Arditti & Lykes, 1992; Bouvard, 1994 ;
Radcliffe and Westwood, 1993). NGOs in Africa developed
later and have only recently been addressed in the
literature. Claude Welch (1995) analyzed NGOs in four
countries (Ethiopia, Namibia, Nigeria and Senegal) and argued
that their efforts can be appreciated in terms of gradual
steps with cumulative effects rather than massive leaps.
Susan E. Waltz found in a recent examination of NGOs in North
Africa that:
domestic human rights groups constitute one
important vehicle by which democratizing forces
raise a call to change not just the players, but
the content of political discourse and the rules of
the games as well (1991, p.504).
Besides these regional studies there have been more general
surveys of NGO activity. David Weissbrodt (1977, 1981, 1984)
has examined their role in fact-finding, implementation and
general protection of human rights. Laurie Wiseberg and
Harry Scoble (1976, 1979, 1981) have addressed, both as
scholars and as NGO officials, the role of NGOs in human
rights struggles. Hans Thoolen and Berth Verstappen pointed
17
out the importance of NGOs to Intergovernmental
Organizations- fact-finding, saying
-Almost invariably the
direct or indirect sources of such allegations are the non-
governmental organizations..." (1986, p. vii)
Transnational Links
. . Many domestic human rights
organizations develop transnational links to increase their
effectiveness, a growing number of international relations
scholars looking at human rights have begun to focus on the
role of iNGOs and other transnational actors because they
believe it is necessary to employ a non state-centric
approach in order to understand human rights regimes. Anne
Mane Clark has argued in her study of the influence of NGOs
that they should be classified "as new international actors
that represent non-state interests (1995, p. 509)." These
scholars have paid greater attention to policy networks
operating simultaneously at the intergovernmental,
transnational, and domestic level where activist attempt to
obtain greater governmental respect for both human rights and
the environment. Kathryn Sikkink (1993) sees NGOs, global
and regional intergovernmental organizations ( iGOs ) and
private foundations as international issue-networks driven by
shared values or principled ideas rather than causal ideas or
instrumental goals. Much of the literature examining the
importance of NGOs and other non state actors has
concentrated on the way these groups affected the negotiating
process or the creation of norms but some recent studies have
focused on improvement in compliance. They argue that
18
sometimes alone, but more often now in conjunction with
domestic NGOs, INGOs that focus on human rights can affect
target governments in two ways. Pi.st, they can worK within
countries to influence the government by direct lobbying or
mobilizing the local population on human rights issues.
Second, they can operate from outside countries by drawing
international attention to a particular government's
policies
.
Sikkink has argued that foreign government pressure and
domestic political pressure cannot by themselves explain
human rights improvements in Argentina because "foreign
governments placed pressure on human rights violators only
after non governmental actors had Identified, documented, and
denounced human rights violations and had pressured foreign
governments to become involved" (1993, p. 436). Alison Brysk
(1993) has also examined the relationship between civil
society and the state as mediated by the international system
using Argentina as a case study. These studies have
emphasized improvements in certain states. Unfortunately,
it is not clear from these studies whether the cases of
improvement are representative of a larger cluster of states
or are exceptional cases
.
Sikkink has argued not only that transnational non-state
actors are important in the struggle against human rights
abuse but that this process is helping to transform
sovereignty (Sikkink, 1993). in order to really understand
the impact that the human rights movement has had on state
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sovereignty, we need to know the extent to which human rights
norms themselves are relevant and what overall impact there
IS on actual state practice. These authors have not, for the
most part, addressed the issue of how much improvement in
behavior there has been in the period since these norms have
been accepted, m part this results from their contention
that changes in the practices of repressive states is not the
only or most important way to measure the impact of non-state
actors. Alison Brysk argues that "most studies measure
outcome of International pressure in very narrow terms as an
immediate and acknowledged shift in state repressive
practices" (1993, p. 273).
IntGraction of Factors
Two scholars have recently examined specific changes in
state behavior outside of Latin America as a result of
international norms, in her article on Soviet compliance
with CSCE human rights norms, Sandra Gubin (1995) has argued
that both realist and regime analysis are lacking. She
employed transnational agenda setting which:
...employs a more systematic examination of theinteraction of international and domestic factorsin order to determine the circumstances under
^hich international norms may or may not, have animpact on the behavior of states, it focuses not
on the existence of institutions, principles or
norms but on a process by which transnational
actors including interesting groups, NGOs and
international organizations which seek to
influence the agenda and the degree to which
states are able to exhort or resist pressure to
comply with international norms (p. 279).
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James Ron looked at different levels of analysis in order
to understand
-complex interactions among the international
system, the repressive state, and the repressed population-
in Israel (1997, p.276). He did not examine how compliance
increased but how noncompliance in Israel has changed. He
argued that government officials began to use torture that
did not leave scars, that infliction was standardized, and
that these actions were acknowledged and portrayed in public
as humane. He argued that the Israeli changes illustrate
that global forces are pushing at least some states to alter
their sanctioned violence practices toward a worldwide norm
of legitimacy.
However, many studies are still limited by the fact that
they tend to focus on one level of analysis without
considering factors operating simultaneously at others. As
awareness of the connections among phenomena at the
international, the transnational, and the domestic levels
grows, it becomes more obvious that a full understanding of
government compliance with international norms requires
taking all three levels into account simultaneously.
For a discussion questioning the universality of pain see
Asad(1996) He underscores "the unstable character" of the ideas of
torture, cruelty, inhumanity, and degrading treatment ( 1082 ) .
See, for example, Robertson's discussion of the problem of
measuring state compliance with resource allocation obligations
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CHAPTER 2
qualitative comparative analysis
A deeper understanding of state compliance with
international norms requires a multilevel understanding of
how different combinations of factors influence government
behavior. This is best done not through traditional
statistical analysis of variance but through a configuarative
approach looking at different clusters of factors viewed as
distinct contexts. This study compares configurations of
ctors using the Qualitative Comparative Approach(QCA)
,
a
causal comparative methodology developed by Charles Ragin.
This method uses Boolean algebra to formalize a variation of
the logic of agreement and difference.
QCA provides a third way between case studies and
statistical studies. Lack of a sufficient number of cases
limits the use of statistics in many studies. QCA allows for
the systematic study of fewer cases than statistical analysis
and yet is not as limited to a very small numbers of cases as
is the case-oriented approach. This flexibility is necessary
in the segment of this study comparing the relatively small
number of improvers to a group of democracies that did not
improve
.
Even when there are sufficient numbers, using technigues of
statistical analysis does not allow researchers to pay
sufficient attention to context. QCA, however, does so by
allowing researchers to examine combinations of
Characteristics, with this method each factor is not taken
out Of context but is analysed in conjunction with the
presence or absence of other conditions, it is possible to
see domestic, transnational and international factors as they
Interrelate rather than simply as a list of variables. This
is important in a study Intended to understand not only
whether certain factors, like the presence of NGOs, are
important but also the circumstances under which they are
important, qca can also capture the heterogeneity of reasons
why states comply with international norms against torture
because it allows researchers to deal with more than one
distinct combination of factors that yield similar outcomes.
QCA does not require the same simplifying assumptions that
statistical studies do. Griffen et. al.(l 991
) point out that
while It IS possible to use statistical analysis holistically
by using log-linear analysis and logit and probit regression:
. . the logistical problem of incorporating and
assessing causal configurations statistically-
multicollinearity and shrinking degrees of freedominduced by the addition of "too" many interaction
terms,- are often in practice insurmountable (p.
1 1
3
^
•
Truth Table Reduction
In the QCA approach each case is treated as a combination
of conditions. Thus, the first step is to identify and
tabulate the outcome and the presence or absence of the
conditions identified as influencing the outcome in each
case. This information is then arrayed in a preliminary
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particulars of each
table laying out the
case. To use an
abbreviated example, states are coded for the presence or
absence of democracy, internal armed conflict, and membership
in a regime against torture. So countries where there is the
presence of democracy, the absence of conflict, the presence
Of membership, and a negative outcome are coded 101=0.
The resulting data provides the material for a truth table.
Each combination of factors observed in one or more oases
becomes a row of the truth table; the first columns of the
truth table are each factor, the last column is the outcome
given in the last row. The possible results of a given
configuration of factors are: a) all cases with that
combination of factors lead to the same outcome (either all
cases are positive or all negative) and b) different cases
with the same combination of factors lead to different
outcomes, if all cases with that combination have a positive
outcome, the outcome for that combination is 1; if each has a
negative, then the outcome is 0. if some cases have a
positive outcome and others a negative, the combination is
listed on the table as C for contradictory.
Assuming for the moment that all outcomes are consistent
the following steps are taken to create a minimal solution.
The truth table laying out the combinations produced by each
case is analyzed systematically through a series of
reductions to produce equations for either a positive or a
negative outcome. In the first reduction, unnecessary
factors are removed from the configuration. If two
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configurations have the sa„e outcome yet differ only on the
presence or absence of a single condition, that factor cannot
be decrsrve in producing the outcome and can logically be
dropped. For instance, if the configurations no and ill,
produce the same outcome, then the last factor is regarded as
irrelevant and is eliminated. The two configurations
therefore become a single configuration, 11, with one less
factor. This new configuration is called an implioant of the
two configurations because it logically implies each. Then
the process is repeated with the reduced combinations
combined in the same manner until there are no more
possibilities for reduction. The configurations that remain
at the end of this process are called prime implicants. They
imply all of the configurations that were selected for
minimization from the truth table.
A second stage of reduction is involved because there are
often more prime implicants than are needed to cover all the
original primitive expressions, in this reduction, a prime
implicant chart is created and then simplified. The prime
implicant chart shows the relationship between the prime
implicants and the original configurations from the truth
table. This chart is simplified by applying two rules.
First, all configurations must be implied by at least one
prime implicant in the solution. Second, all redundant prime
implicants must be removed. The prime implicant chart is
used to see which prime implicants are covering a subset of
the configurations that are already implied by another prime
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implxcant. This process permits identifying the minimum
solutron containing the least number of implicants that cover
all the configurations in the Boolean equation. For the
complex Charts used in this study computer algorithms were
used. The minimisation was done with Oualitative Comparative
Analysis, QCA 3.0 using the Quine-McCluskey Algorithm (brass,
1994), a program specifically designed to analyse data using’
Ragin' s approach.
AS mentioned above, it is possible that some configurations
yield contradictory outcomes. Because Boolean analysis
requires that each configuration have only one outcome, the
researcher has to decide how to treat combinations that do
not exhibit consistent outcomes. Whenever there are
configurations of factors that include one or more cases with
a positive outcome and one or more with a negative outcome,
they cannot automatically be assigned a 0 or a 1. in the
initial truth table these are shown by using a C for
contradiction, but deriving equations requires deciding how
to treat the configuration. There are three possible
choices. The first is to code all contradictory combinations
as having positive outcomes. The logic here is that because
some cases with this combination of factors have a positive
outcome they should all be coded in this way in order to
capture every instance of a positive outcome. The second
option is to code all contradictory combinations as having
negative outcomes on the grounds that a combination should
only be coded as positive if all cases with that combination
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of factors are positive. The third option is to use
algorithms to choose a neaativo or-g e or positive outcome depending
Oh Which produces the most logically minimal alternative.
I follow a two-fold approach to the identification of the
circumstances under which either a positive or a negative
outcome can be expected. I produce two alternate sets of
minimal solutions for each type of outcome. Thus, I first
analyze conditions yielding positive outcomes by including
only those configurations having a consistently positive
outcome. I then gain a sense of how far this approach might
understate possibilities by also treating all of the
contradictory configurations as positive, similarly, i first
analyze conditions yielding negative outcomes, then check the
degree of likely understatement by treating all contradictory
configurations as negative. The latter analyses, by
including a larger number of configurations, allow for
checking whether the more limited pools of consistent
configurations, miss anything significant.
This did not seem appropriate for the more focused
comparisons of improving and non-improving governments in
chapters four and five. Here there is only one contradictory
configurations, so the problem is less pressing. More
importantly, erring in the direction of modest conclusions
seems particularly important in an analysis seeking to
discern what conditions separate improvers and non-improvers
in democratic or transitional states.
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A decision must also be made about how to treat
configurations that are logically possible but do not
actually exist in the cases analyzed. One can Include them
rn the reduction of configurations in the same way as
described with the contradictory configurations; that is, one
can choose the outcome for these configurations based on
Which would make the equation most simple. Analysts do this
as one way to keep the limited diversity of their cases from
rnhibrtlng production of the most reduced equation. Logical
configurations are not used to further reduce the equations
rn this study because accuracy is more important to
understanding the complexities of government behavior than
greater simplicity.
Though the frequency of each combination is not as
important an issue in QCA as it is in statistical studies,
this does not mean that frequency is irrelevant. Having only
one case in a configuration is a problem because there is no
way to determine whether contradictions would occur if there
were more cases. Therefore, in this study, configurations
that had only one case are treated as contradictory. Thus
they are used only in equations that include contradictory
outcomes
.
As stated above, QCA was designed as a method of causal
analysis. However, my intention in this study is not to
arrive at causal inferences. There are still few cases of
improvement and thus very few different combinations of
factors. While QCA can address small numbers of cases, it
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can be insufficiently reductionist if one is not willing to
use logical as well as actual combinations to make
simplifying assumptions. Factors that are not relevant may
not drop out of the equations as insignificant, since my
purpose is hypothesis testing and refinement, I regard it as
more important to indicate regularities in patterns of
outcomes as various patterns of state characteristics vary in
an effort to Identify situations when efforts to end torture
could have some potential lor success. By comparing actual
contexts in which torture did not decrease to those where it
drd, I eliminate some factors that could not have had any
impact and indicate the circumstances where others factors
may have been important.
Coding
As with statistical analysis, use of QCA requires
distinguishing compliance from noncompliance and the presence
or absence of each of the various factors hypothesized as
promoting or inhibiting compliance. Thus users of QCA face
the same issues of operationalization as users of statistical
methods
.
Outcome
The first task was to code for the outcome, compliance with
international norms against torture. This task is simplified
by greater consensus about how to define torture than about
many other human rights concepts. The definition established
in Article 1 of the UN Convention Against Torture specifies
that torture includes
:
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physical or^mental^'^is^intent^^ suffering, whether
person for such purposes as
inflicted on a
from a third person him or
punishing him for any act he^or a\hi
-- i-ii
-
the instigition°of"o“SIS\h1
^L'enror""
“
ac?pnn-L%1.?efafc%-i--
(General Assembly Resolution 39/46).
This study, unlike many of the guantitative studies of
human rights abuse, did not examine repression of civil
liberties or violations of personal integrity generally; it
focuses on one particular violation of personal integrity:
torture. This adopts James M McCormick's and Neil j.
Mitchell's argument that the components of personal integrity
rights should be analyzed separately to avoid information
loss and missed analytical opportunities
( 1997 , p. 511
)
Both imprisonment and torture are methods of
P^fif-ical control that are important in
themselves, and research efforts ought to begeared to maximizing information gains about both
of these activities. Using separate indices seems
a more appropriate means for moving in thatdirection (1997, p.525).
This also study does not cover cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment short of torture even though many
international conventions cover this as well as torture.
Cruel and degrading treatment is worthy of study, but should
be appraised separately. While there is some controversy
over what constitutes torture, it is less extensive than what
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prevails regarding the definition of degrading treatment or
punishment. The United Nations Convention Against
Torture(UNCAT) does not give a specific definition of what
constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment that is
short of torture^.
Even with the relatively clear definition of what
constitutes torture, there are serious difficulties in
measuring compliance with the regimes against torture. The
methodological issues raised by such endeavors have been
discussed extensively in the human rights literature (e.g.
Barsh, 1993; Claude, 1976; Jabine i Claude, 1992; Mcnitt,
1986; Nanda, Scarritt, & Shepherd, 1981). For example,
essays in Ved Nanda et al's. book. Global Human Rights (1981)
addressed problems of definition and critiqued measures of
human rights development. Richard Claude has done important
work in this area with his study Comparative Human Rights
(1976)
.
One difficulty is categorizing the compliance of states
without being able to observe directly. Torture is
particularly hard to document (Forrest, 1996, p. 167). Even
when a government wants the population or at least certain
segments of it to be aware and afraid of the practice, it
does not want the exact incidence of torture documented or
reported. External observers cannot report fully on torture
in detention centers and the more repressive governments tend
to be the best at hiding the extent of abuse. As NGOs and
others have become more sophisticated about discovering and
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documenting the abuses, many governments have become more
sophisticated in the practice of torture. Many methods now
employed leave no or very ambiguous physical traces. The
only evidence is the testimonies of survivors and witnesses
who are often too terrorized by the process to serve as
sources for those making accusations of torture. However,
the upsurge in NGOs and monitoring by international
organizations mean that more Information is now available in
reports on individual countries and regions and in several
cross-national reports.
This study relied primarily on the annual cross-national
reports published by the State Department and Amnesty
International to assess the level of torture. These sources
are the only ones that can provide information on most states
for every year from 1979 to 1993. while Freedom House was
reporting in 1979, it did not provide sufficient information
on torture. Human Rights Watch only reports on the situation
in selected states
.
Both reports present their own particular difficulties for
creating cross-national comparisons. Assessing the extent of
torture by relying only on Amnesty reports is difficult
because Amnesty International does not divide its reports
into sections addressing different human rights. Amnesty
International often assess the more general repression and
does not address a particular right every year. When the
issue of torture is not mentioned, it is sometimes unclear
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whether this means there was no torture or the
did not address it that year.
report just
The State Department reports are divided into sections
covering particular rights so do permit more direct
comparison. However, they are also problematic. Sometiries
these reports do not convey a separate assessment but simply
restate the Amnesty International report, while a partial
explanation could be that the state Department relies on or
is in total agreement with Amnesty, one instead gets the
impression that often the human rights situation was not very
high on the US agenda in relations with that country, and the
US embassy there did not bother to check, when this happens
one does not really have two independent sources.
Some of the differences between State Department and
Amnesty International reports are minor and some seem to be
caused by differences in emphasis rather than serious
differences in opinion or belief. Others, however, are more
likely political. The reports of other NGOs were used in an
attempt to reconcile these sorts of differences. Human
Rights Watch and Freedom House are particularly useful
because these organizations are generally regarded as being
on different ends of the NGO political spectrum. However,
Human Rights Watch is not available for all years and only
highlights some countries.
A second issue when coding states for compliance is
deciding how much torture disqualifies a state from being
considered "in compliance". Norms against torture are the
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This
type of norm inspiring demands for "zero tolerance”,
requirement would, however, make it so difficult for a state
to be considered complying that almost all states would have
to be considered in violation of conventions.
Coding Levels of Torture
, it is not possible to assign
quantitative measures to levels of torture. The state
Department and Amnesty International reports rarely give
numbers of victims or percentages although they will, in some
cases, quote statistics gathered from national governments or
independent human rights organizations
. m most cases
,
given
available information, it would be irresponsible to estimate.
Thus, states were coded into places where torture was
practiced: a) never or occasionally, b) sometimes, or c)
frequently and systematically. Three categories, rather than
two, were used because I wanted to distinguish the very worst
from the rest.
Some cross-national studies examining personal integrity
rights have used five categories based on a scale created by
Raymond Gastil (1980) for Freedom in the World reports
(Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Poe and Sirirangsi, 1993,
1994) . However, in my view it really is not possible to use
categories to distinguish levels of torture for a study
examining so many states
. The main reports
,
by Amnesty
International, the US State Department and Freedom House give
only general comments about torture. Amnesty International
sometimes is more specific, but usually only reports trends
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and highlights specific cases. The Preedo™ House scale does
not distinguish particular rights of personal integrity.
Governments are reported as torturing never or occasionally
when the sources reported
of torture", "rare cases"
"no torture", "isolated incidents
or "occasional cases" of torture.
Governments which torture occasirm;=>nasionally are grouped with those
that do not practice torture for two reasons. Firstly,
current methods of gathering information cannot reliably
distinguish between the two because of difficulties in
getting accurate and specific information. Secondly, a
government can produce occasional cases of torture and yet
still be considered as complying since in those cases torture
does not appear to be a normal part of official routine. The
military and the police may be acting on their own. it is
true that governments sometimes claim this is the case even
when torture is a part of government policy. Such a claim is
not credible when there are even moderate levels of torture.
is plausible when there are only scattered cases,
as this is to accept when contemplating human
suffering as direct and extreme as that inflicted by any
instance of torture.
States that were described by more than one source as
practicing torture "frequently" or where torture was reported
as being "widespread and systematic", or "endemic" are coded
in this category. It is important to note that only the
worst offenders are coded as having frequent and systematic
torture.
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Governments are coded as torturing sometimes when the
sources report the occurrence of torture as more than
occasional but less than frequent. This coding leaves a wide
range of state behavior in the middle category. However,
this IS the best that can be done. The limitations of the
data sources do not allow distinguishing levels of torture
within the group of states that sometimes practice torture.
The nature of the reports being used means that only those
states that almost consistently comply with norms against
torture and those that are the absolute worst offenders can
be distinguished reliably from the rest. Trying to narrow
the boundaries of "sometimes" would lead to greater
inaccuracies
.
Coding for Improvement
, m addition to coding each state
for compliance in 1993, states were coded for compliance in
each year from 1979 to 1993 to see whether and how much
government levels of torture had changed in that period. All
states included in the study of behavior in 1993 with the
exception of countries that just gained independence in the
last few years or those for which information was only
available in later years were examined. Here contemporaneous
information could be supplemented with information that
became available in later years, if a report presented new
information on past torture this was used to decide whether a
state had increased or decreased compliance.
The year 19 79 was chosen as the starting point because it
is the first year that enough information was available to
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judge the level of compliance in most states with any degree
of accuracy. Though the State Department and Amnesty
International were already reporting in 1975, they covered a
relatively small number of countries and those included were
not discussed in any comprehensive way. By 1979, the reports
were far more complete. Secondary sources could not be used
to push the data collection back further because they
included information on a few states, such as Bolivia or
Chile, but not on most states.
In chapters four and five, the states where the level of
compliance improved were compared to other democracies and
transitional states that continued to torture at high levels.
Increased compliance with international norms was the
positive outcome; lack of improvement, — whether a steady
level of non compliance or an actual decline in compliance --
was the negative outcome.
My ability to determine whether states increased their
level of torture was affected by changes in the quality of
human rights reports discussed above. Most of these reports
became more detailed and more accurate over the time studied.
This meant that for some countries there would be more
discussion of torture than in previous years, even if the
government was not actually practicing more torture. It was
not always just a matter of the amount of information
discussed but the slanting of information. The level of
reporting in the State Department reports has not always been
consistent. Under the Reagan administration, they were
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widely thought to be politically motivated and came under
heavy criticism from NGOs.^ There was a change beginning in
the last years of the Reagan Administration with a greater
attempt at non-partisan reporting and these reports are now
viewed by most human rights activists and scholars as much
more reliable. This means that some changes appearing in
State Department reports are likely to be a result of more
accurate reporting rather than of changes in state behavior
(Prokosch, 1996, p. 34).
It was therefore necessary to determine that perceived
increases were not due only to greater transparency, more
careful reporting, increased NGO resources and improvements
in State Department reports. l did this in two ways. First,
I coded an increase only when more than one source reported
an increase in the amount of torture practiced. Second, i
coded a state as getting worse only when the reports actually
said that the government increased its torture as compared to
earlier years not simply because torture was mentioned when
it had not been before.
This study does not analyze all increases or decreases, but
only sustained shifts between categories. For instance,
there was a period from 1979 to 1990 when Chile decreased the
numbers tortured rather significantly but still practiced
enough torture to be categorized as "frequent and
systematic." Many states fluctuate within the category of
"sometimes" because it is such a broad category. Unsustained
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Shifts between categories are ignored: states that improved
but then reverted to earlier levels are not included.
Coding decreases in torture also poses some problems.
There is still insufficient information to know how much
torture was practiced in some states during the years 1979 to
1993. It IS not entirely clear how much torture was
practiced before the end of the Marxist-Leninist regimes in
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and therefore
whether there was decline afterward, in some states, like
Romania, there are now more reports of brutality,
particularly against gypsies, but these reports may be
accounted for by greater openness in the society. The State
Department and Amnesty International yearly reports on which
I primarily relied did not present sufficient information on
torture in these states
,
to allow coding these state as
having higher or lower levels of compliance.
It is also likely that several more states made
improvements in compliance that were not great enough to be
tracked in this study. Smaller changes occur in most states
that torture from year to year without signifying any real
change in government policy . Even with the more accurate
reports that emerged in the eighties, this study can only
assess rather large scale change. While one may be able to
pinpoint smaller change in some states, it cannot be done
consistently across states with the necessary accuracy.
The most significant absence from the list of improvers is
those governments that made fairly significant reductions in
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their level of torture but not enough to remove them from the
worst category of torturers. A government that has been
torturing at extremely high levels can torture many fewer
people and still be doing it frequently and systematically.
Several Latin American governments fall into this category in
the late seventies and eighties, so are not included as
improving compliance, i do not include them as "improvers"
because I am interested in governments that are moving
towards compliance, not governments like the Guatemalan and
Brazilian which simply came back from the very worst but have
not come anywhere near acceptable levels of compliance.
Making this distinction is important because one of the
interesting questions raised by preliminary research is why
the practice of torture still continues in some states where
there was increased respect for political rights and a
dGclin© in mass killing and disapp©arancG
.
"ImprovGrs" also do not includ© govornmonts that failGd to
sustain improvGd compliancG. If a govornmont wont back to
torturing at th© sam© IgvgI or ©v©n a high©r IgvgI than it
had during th© p©ak of abus©, it was ©xcludGd. For instanc©,
th© practic© of tortur© d©clin©d in Cam©roon from 1984 to
1988 but th©n b©cam© wors© than it had b©©n b©for©. This is
diff©r©nt than Arg©ntina wh©r© tortur© incr©as©d from its
lowGst point but stay©d w©ll b©low its p©aks in th©
s©v©nti©s. Whil© all statGS ar© vuln©rabl© to r©turn and may
at som© lat©r point hav© anoth©r cycl© of viol©nc© it is
important in ord©r to avoid coding statGs with inconsistent
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records as improvers. i am interested in states that
maintained at least some level of improvement during the
years of this study.
Conditions
Cross-national Using QCA analysis also requires
Identifying conditions relevant to outcomes. I have coded
for eight factors identified in the international regimes and
human rights literatures as possible influences state
compliance. The data used to code the independent variables
was based on an examination of government documents, reports
of intergovernmental human rights committees and commissions,
newspaper accounts and reports by NGOs
.
These factors are:
1. A state's membership or non-membership in one of the
regional regimes against torture, the universal regime
against torture or both. This is shown by ratification or
accession to the relevant treaty or treaties.
2. The level of prosperity. States that are classified by
the World Bank in the World Development Report as Low-income
or Lower-middle-income were coded as Low- income. Those that
are upper-middle-income or high-income were coded as high
income. The World Bank uses GNP per capita to classify
states in these categories. The GNP per capita cutoff levels
for 1993 were for low income economies GNP per capita of $695
or less. Middle income economies were those of more than
$695 but less than $8,626. A division of $2,785 was made
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between lower-middle income and upper middle income
economies. High income economies were those of $8,626 or
more (World Bank, 1995 pp. viii-ix). Therefore in this study
the cut off between high and low income states is $2,785.
3 & 4. Major or minor armed conflict. States are categorized
using US State Department and NGO Reports. The more severe
category includes conflicts where the conflict is described
as civil war, serious guerrilla warfare, large scale or
extensive insurgency. Minor armed conflict is conflict
described as sporadic guerrilla warfare and terrorism, even
if a few of the terrorists attacks take a large number of
lives and sporadic or low-level fighting or clashes. Not all
violence is taken into account in coding for this factor
however. One-sided violence by the government or their
agents against the population is considered political
repression rather than armed conflict. Large numbers of
murders and a society of violence, as in Brazil, may cause
many deaths but does not constitute armed conflict.
5. The presence of a multi-party democratic system. States
that have experienced two successive changes of leadership by
multi-party elections are coded as having the presence of
this factor. Though this may seem a narrow measurement of
democracy, it is better than others for the purposes of this
study. Using constitutional arrangements or other formal
criteria can result in states with authoritarian behavior
being coded as democratic. However, many of the substantive
criteria of democracy are themselves measuring human rights
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and can lead to conceptual circularity, if one includes
measurements of freedom of speech and association and other
political rights as part of the definition of democracy then
one will end up saying of course democracy is necessary for
respect of rights because democracy is respect of rights and
respect of rights is democracy. As I am interested in
whether a particular form of government is more conducive to
human rights, i decided to simply code those states that have
multiparty systems and successful elections as states with
functioning democracies. The presence or absence of
multiparty democracy will be coded using US State Department
reports and the Freedom House reports.
6.
The existence of a military regime. This factor was based
on the categorization of Freedom House Reports and the State
Department Reports,
7. Whether the government is transitional. This category
contains states that have taken steps toward a democratic
system but have not yet proven themselves to be fully
democratic, in this category is any state that has had one
democratic election. Also included are states that are even
earlier in the process, those that have just legalized
opposition parties and have scheduled elections. Therefore,
states may be coded as having a military regime as well.
States that have set up transitional governments such as
Ethiopia are also included.
8. Presence of state-sponsored religion. This factor was
based on the categorization of the Statesman's Yearbook.
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States are coded as having state-sponsored religion if one
religion is recognized by law as the state religion or if one
religion only is funded by the state.
—
-
itional Factors
. After identifying states experiencing
torture, I examined whether any of the potential factors had
changed by coding all factors year by year from 1979 to 1993.
In this way it was also possible to see how long a time
elapsed between creation of active human rights
organizations, establishment of transnational links, or
initiation of foreign pressure and the improvement in
compliance. When improvement happened in the earlier part of
the period covered it was necessary to go back to information
before 1979 to find out when these changes occurred.
In addition to the presence or absence of armed conflict,
and membership in a regime the following factors were
Q^ddressed in the more detailed analysis in the latter part of
this study:
1 . The influence of pressure from foreign governments
measured in terms of sanctions made by high-level foreign
officials directly linked to human rights abuse.
Distinguishing between passing rhetoric and genuine pressure
is necessary when coding for foreign pressure. States were
coded as recipients of foreign pressure when other states'
actions were undertaken with or after a clear message that
the reason was human rights abuse and not other political
reasons. However, distinguishing between situations where
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human rights concerns are genuine and those when they are
used as camouflage for other political goals and motivations
is not always possible. Foreign pressure against any human
rights abuse is considered in this study not just those that
have to do with torture because governments usually express
concern about the repressive practices of a regime in general
rather than focusing on particular types of abuse.
2 . The impact of human rights NGOs operating within the
state. Sources define human rights NGOs differently, i
first had to decide what groups and organizations would be
considered human rights NGOs. Wiseberg (1991, p 529) defines
a human rights NGO as "a private association which devotes
significant resources to the promotion and protection of
human rights, which is independent of both governmental and
political groups that seek direct political power, and which
does not itself seek such power" Though analytically clear,
there are difficulties in applying this definition. The
first is establishing whether an organization is truly
independent from the government. States have been known to
create organizations to discredit truly independent ones and
in some cases have even give their puppet organization the
same name as the independent one it had previously closed
down (Wiseberg, 1991, p. 529). The second is in separating
political groups from human rights NGOs. Eliminating
political groups as human rights NGOs is made possible
because other NGOs usually are able to publicize these
actions
.
45
There is also the related difficulty of deciding how
broadly to define human rights organizations. As the human
rights movement has grown, the number of organizations
seeking to use this title has increased as well. Some of
these groups focus primarily on other issues, such as
consumer protection, the environment or economic development,
in some instances these groups argue that there is a right to
a clean environment or to development. Others are
interested in human rights as a specific part of their
activities because their struggles cannot be engaged well
unless the government is respecting their rights. At a human
rights retreat sponsored by Harvard Law School's Human Rights
Program, many participants expressed that "self-perception
and self-definition by NGOs constitute the only sensible
method of identifying human rights organizations" (Steiner,
1991, p. 7). Others felt however that human rights
organizations should have clearly defined mandates based on
commonly accepted human rights norms. in this study, labor
organizations and groups promoting the interests of a
particular ethnic group are not considered to be human rights
NGOs. 3 Groups that base their actions on domestic law rather
than international norms are also considered human rights
organizations, which means that civil rights organizations
are included. The factors examined to determine the level of
NGO activity were organized protests, publication or
consultation with government or transnational organizations.
Most of this information came from NGO sources; Human Rights
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Internet's Human Rights Directories and the HRI Reporter,
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
3. Whether there are significant connections to the
international human rights community, transnational links
between the local human rights NGOs and international
organizations, or human rights iNGOs
. when coding this, i
looked for more than just the existence of local branches of
INGOs like Amnesty International. Almost all states have
received attention from INGOs, like Amnesty International or
Human Rights Watch. However, only those states where local
human rights groups actively pursued relations with
transnational actors, had their work published or
disseminated abroad, had overseas training or received funds
were coded as having transnational links. As with domestic
factors, the information comes primarily from NGO reports
with particular reliance on Human Rights Internet reports.
iCassese addresses this in a chapter "What is Human, Inhuman or
Degrading" in Inhuman States
. He argues that it is more difficult to
discover 'inhuman' or 'degrading' situations for two reasons:
1) . . .unlike torture, which takes the form of single acts against an
individual, these situations are the result of numerous acts and
circumstances combined" 2 ) "the intent to humiliate, offend or debase
the victim is almost always absent" ( Cassese 1996 p.48).
^For example, see "In the Face of Cruelty": The Reagan
administration's human rights record p. 8
^For a more in depth discussion of the definition and mandates
of human rights organizations NGOs see Steiner ( 1991 ) and
Wiseberg( 1991
)
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CHAPTER 3
COMPLIANCE IN 1993
This chapter presents a broad survey of the conditions
present in 179 states during 1993. in this part of the study
the factors used in the analysis are: major armed conflict,
minor armed conflict, presence of state religion, democracy,
membership in a regional and/or universal convention against
torture, state income, military government and government
transition.
The first section of this chapter presents the record of
state compliance in 1993. This survey shows that the record
with international norms against torture in
this year is a weak one. The second section presents the
first three truth tables, one for the world, one for the
Americas and the other for Europe, which contain only major
armed conflict, minor armed conflict, democracy, and income.
These tables are presented to demonstrate that these
important factors do not alone distinguish governments that
torture from those that do not and thus to make apparent that
they are not sufficient to explain government behavior.
The third section presents truth tables containing the
longer list of factors and discusses their ability to explain
government behavior. It demonstrates, with this second set of
truth tables, that the additional factors of state religion,
international regime memberships, and state income also did
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not distinguish between states that complied and those that
did not. This section contains five truth tables, one for
the world and two for each of the regions. Section four
presents a discussion of the equations that can be derived
from the second set of tables and which demonstrate the
conditions under which compliance occurred or failed to
occur.
The survey does bear out the view that internal conflict
raises the likelihood of torture. All the governments faced
with major armed rebellion used torture at the middle and
high levels. While it substantiates the widespread claim
that a democratic form of government or movement towards
democracy and the absence of internal armed conflict are
associated with compliance with international norms against
^®^ture, it makes clear that compliance is not always
achieved when there is a combination of democracy and lack of
such conflict. In twenty-one countries, the government used
torture more than occasionally even though the country was
not experiencing internal armed conflict and had a democratic
political system. While consistency in outcome may be
achieved by looking at other factors and thereby capturing
the complexity of government behavior, this is only feasible
when looking at a smaller number of states.
State Compliance in 1993
Despite the amount of attention given to human rights
issues and the international efforts to pressure governments
into ending torture, the majority of governments still
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practiced torture in 1993. in most of the states where
governments practiced torture, the level was in the middle
category but a significant number of governments practiced it
frequently, of the 179 states coded for compliance in the
year 1993, 76 were coded as never or occasionally torturing,
67 were coded as torturing sometimes torturing and 36 were
coded as widely torturing.
This situation was not an improvement over behavior in
X979. In the period from 1979 to 1993, there was no world-
wide reduction in the level of torture practiced by
governments. Even more disturbing is the number of
governments that increased the amount of torture they
practice; at least 15 states were marked by an increase in
the amount of torture practiced: Algeria, Brazil, Burma,
Burundi, Cameroon, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait,
Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sudan
and Venezuela, in nine of these the government was
practicing torture frequently by 1993.
While there were large differences in the number of torture
victims from year to year in the worst violators, in all of
them the practice remained widespread and systematic.
Despite the efforts of the international human rights
movement, torture was still being practiced widely and
systematically in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cameroon,
Chad, China, Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Mexico,
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Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Sri Lanka,
Turkey and Zaire throughout the period studied.
In eight states — Argentina, Bolivia, Benin, Chile,
Ethiopia, The Philippines, Suriname and Uruguay — the
government improved its compliance with norms against
torture. More governments improved some other aspect of
their human rights practice without coming into greater
compliance with norms against torture, if smaller
improvements in compliance were taken into account, many more
states, particularly in Latin America, would be included as
improving. States where the improvement was temporary or for
which there was not enough information available to track
torture in this period were also excluded from the list of
improvers
.
The finding that the number of torturing governments has
not declined is similar to that of Eric Prokosch (1996). He
compared the information in the country entries of Amnesty
International's Report on Torture covering the four and half
y®^ts from 1970 to mid 1974, Torture in the Eighties covering
from 1980 to mid 1983, and the Amnesty International Report
1994 covering the year 1993 in order to ascertain the trend
in torture worldwide. He notes a substantial increase in the
number of countries from which Amnesty International received
reports of torture but notes that is was due in part to
greater research. He found fourteen countries where torture
now appears to be serious but was not before (p. 32). His
reading is however that the number of states where torture is
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serious may have remained approximately the same. He argues
that although "it is not possible on the basis of the facts
available to say that the geographical extent of torture has
widened since 1970, it is safe to say at the very least it in
not decreasing (p. 33)."
Preliminary Truth
The first three truth tables ( 3 . 1-3
. 3 ) explore the major
factors that have been most consistently advanced as
influencing the level of torture in the human rights
literature. These truth tables demonstrate that, while where
there is major armed conflict there is no compliance, minor
armed conflict by itself or in combination with type of
domestic regime is not sufficient to explain state behavior.
Nor does type of government and conflict in combination with
income discriminate well between states where the government
complies with international norms against torture and where
it does not. The weakness of explanatory power is further
indicated by the fact that these configurations do not have
only one or two deviant cases; they show a fairly even split
between states with positive outcomes and those with
negative
.
In truth table 3.1 there are seven negative, seven
contradictory and no positive configurations. Because there
is not one configuration with a positive outcome, this table
cannot lead to equations telling what configuration of
factors leads to compliance. While there are clear patterns
of configurations where there are negative outcomes, 142
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Table 3.1
Conflict, Government Type and Income, Global
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
( 0
)
Configurations
( 1
)
Configurations
( C) Configurations
with
with
with
negative outcomes (torture)
positive outcomes (compliance)
contradictory outcomes
7
0
7
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT -
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT -
DEMOCRACY
HIGH INCOME
TRANSITION
COMPLIANCE
MA
MI
DE
HI
TR
CO
1
1
MA
+
MI DE HI TR CO
0 Cases
Freq Pct
1 Cases
Freq P(
1 0 0 0 0 0 11 100 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 6 100 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 c 17 47 19 53
0 0 1 0 0 c 9 43 12 57
0 0 0 0 0 c 13 68 6 32
0 1 0 0 0 c 8 80 2 20
0 0 1 1 0 c 11 29 27 71
0 0 0 1 1 c 1 23 2 67
0 0 0 1 0 c 6 43 8 57
0 1 1 0 0 0 3 100 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 6 100 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 6 100 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 3 100 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 100 0 0
For country names see appendix
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states are in contradictory configurations. Not only are
they in contradiction but they do not for the most part even
Show trends
. Several of the percentages in the column for
positive outcome are in the fifty percent range.
Truth table 3.2 which only contains European states,
demonstrates, as in the world wide, that the shortened list
of factors does not distinguish well between noncompliance
and compliance although it does distinguish more clearly here
than in the American or the World table.
In truth table 3.2, there is one configuration with a
positive outcome, covering two states, and there are clear
tendencies among the contradictory configurations. In the
European region, looking at only basic factors, there are
six negative, one positive and three contradictory
configurations
. The negative configurations hold eight
states, the positive only two and the contradictory thirty.
Because there is only one configuration with a positive
outcome, a reduction process to eliminate irrelevant factors
cannot be done. So while in this case there is a
configuration that can be presented as an equation, it
represents only two states.
In the American region, table 3.3, the shorter list of
factors cannot distinguish between states that comply and
those that do not . The truth table looking at only five
factors is even less useful than Europe's. No equations can
be derived from this truth-table.
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Table 3.2
Conflict, Government Type and Income, Europe
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
negative outeomea ( torture ) 6
c ConJ ontoomea oomplianoel f(C) c figuratrona with contradictory outcomea ’ 3
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
DEMOCRACY
HIGH INCOME
transition
COMPLIANCE
MA
MI
DE
HI
TR
CO
MA MI DE HI TR CO
0 Cases
Freq Pct
1 Cases
Freq Pet
— +
0 0 0 0 1 c 2 25 6 75
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 100
0 0 0 1 1 c 1 33 2 67
0 0 1 1 0 c 3 16 16 84
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 100 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 100 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 2 100 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 2 100 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
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Table 3.3
Conflict, Government Type and Income, Americas
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
i ? positive outcomes (compliance)
negative outcomes (torture)(C) Configurations with contradictory outcomes
NUMBER OF RAW DATA CASES FOR EACH TRUTH TABLE CONFIGURATION
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MA
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT - MI
DEMOCRACY
_ de
HIGH INCOME
_ gj
TRANSITION
_ tr
COMPLIANCE
_ CO
I
MA MI DE HI TR CO
0 0 1 0 0 C
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 C
0 110 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 c
10 10 0 0
0 Cases
Freq Pct
75
100
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100
100
33
IQO
1 Cases
Freq Pct
25
0
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0
0
67
0
Complete Truth Tables
Because armed conflict and democracy do not distinguish
well between states that comply with international norms
against torture and those that do not, they must be viewed in
the context of variations in the other factors examined in
this study. This section, containing truth tables 3. 4-3. 8,
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will show that it ,possible to find positive outcomes and
to derive equations when the other factors are added.
However, while they identify some factors that are important
the patterns they reveal do not fully explain government
behavior.
The worldwide table still yields many configurations with
contradictory outcomes. There are three positive
configurations, containing only nine states; thirty-two
negative configurations, containing sixty states; and fifteen
contradictory configurations containing 110 states,
seventeen of the configurations with negative outcomes and
one of those with a positive outcome have only one state in
them. These are coded as contradictory.
The positive configurations highlight the problem of using
equations from tables with so many contradictions. Clearly,
an equation based on only eight cases cannot provide a
sufficient understanding of the context in which governments
comply. However it does tell us some interesting things
about what distinguishes some states from others. Both of
the positive configurations have no regime membership. There
were many European states that were members of the regime and
whose governments did not practice torture. Yet, these
states cannot be grouped into any clearly positive
configuration. Therefore, simplifying the configurations by
using negative and contradictory configurations as
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Table 3.4
All Factors, Global
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
'®9ative outcomes (torture! ,,
(C)confi^^:ti:s: o:^tris=:orro«cS''“""’
number of raw data cases for each truth table configuration
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MA
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MI
STATE RELIGION
_ ST
DEMOCRACY
_
HIGH INCOME
_ m
MILITARY
_
REGIME RE
TRANSITION
_
COMPLIANCE
_ CO
i
MA MI ST DE HI ML CV TR CO
0 0 0
0 0
0 0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
c
c
c
0
0
0
c
0
1
c
c
0 Cases
Freq Pet
2
1
5
3
4
1
4
4
2
4
0
9
1
100
100
36
23
50
100
100
100
25
100
0
41
33
1 Cases
Freq Pet
0
0
9
10
4
0
0
0
6
0
1
13
2
0
0
64
77
50
0
0
0
75
0
100
59
67
continued next page
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Table 3.4 continued
1 cases
MA MI ST DE HI ML RE TR CO Freq Pet Freq Pet
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 100
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 100
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 c 2 29 5 71
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 100 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 c 1 50 1 50
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 c 3 75 1 25
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 c 2 18 9 82
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 c 2 67 1 33
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 c 3 75 1 25
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 100 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 100 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 100 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 c 1 50 1 50
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 3 60 2 40
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 100 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 100 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 100 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 100 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 100 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 100 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 100 0 0
Continued, next page
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Table 3.4 continued
MA MI ST DE
0 0 0 0
10 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 10
10 10
0 10 1
0 0 10
0 0 10
10 0 0
0 10 0
10 11
10 10
0 10 0
0 111
HI ML RE TR CO
1 0 0 0 C
0 0 0 0 0
0 1110
0 10 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
10 10 0
0 0 10 0
10 10 0
0 10 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 10 0 0
0 110 0
10 10 0
0 cases
Freq Pct
2 50
2 100
1 100
1 100
1 100
2 100
4 100
1 100
1 100
1 100
1 100
1 100
1 100
1 100
1 cases
Freq Pct
50
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
non-complying produces a misleading conclusion if one does
not remember the limited explanatory power. All these
configurations say is that there was an absence of regime
membership in the eight states. This does lend credence to
the idea that membership in the regimes is not important to
compliance.
The full European table, 3.5, shows improvement in the
consistency of outcome over the European truth table looking
only at type of government, income and armed conflict.
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Table 3.5
All Factors, Europe
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
(O)Configurations with negative outcomes (torture) in1 configuration, with positive outcomes compuILe) 3(C)Configurations with contradictory outcomes 2
NUMBER OF RAW DATA CASES FOR EACH TRUTH TABLE CONFIGURATION
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MA
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MI
STATE RELIGION
_ ST
DEMOCRACY
_
HIGH INCOME HI
TRANSITION
_ tr
REGIME
_
COMPLIANCE
_ CO
I
MA MI ST DE HI TR RE CO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
c
c
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0 Cases
Freq Pct
1
0
1
1
3
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
100
0
100
33
25
0
100
0
100
100
100
100
100
1 Cases
Freq Pct
0
2
0
2
9
7
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
0
67
75
100
0
100
0
0
0
0
0
Continued, next page
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Table 3.5 continued
MA MI ST DE
0 111
0 10 0
HI TR RE CO
10 10
0 10 0
0 Cases
Freq Pct
1 100
1 100
1 Cases
Freq Pct
0 0
0 0
There are ten negative configurations, three positive ones,
and only two contradictory outcomes
. Fifteen states
are in these two contradictory configurations; eleven of
fifteen have positive outcomes. Many states that complied
with international norms against torture would not be
included in the equation. There are ten negative
configurations that have only one state and so are coded as
contradictory when creating equations. This leaves no
configurations coded as negative.
In truth table 3.6, there are fewer contradictions once
all the factors are added. There are nine configurations
with negative outcomes, four configurations with positive
outcomes, and three with contradictory outcomes. The nine
configurations with negative outcomes contain ten states.
The four configurations with positive outcomes contain eight
states and the three contradictory configurations contain
sixteen states. Of those sixteen, only four are states where
the government is in compliance. There is a definite trend
in the contradictory configurations for this table. None are
split down the middle. If configurations with only one
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Table 3.6
All Factors, Americas
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
(O)Configurations with negative outcomes (torture)
positive outcomes (compliance)(C) Configurations with contradictory outcomes
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
- mA
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MI
STATE RELIGION
_ ST
DEMOCRACY
_ qe
HIGH INCOME
_ m
MILITARY
_ ml
TRANSITION
_ tR
REGIME
_ •pfT
COMPLIANCE
_ CO
I
MA MI ST DE HI ML TR RE CO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0 10 0
0 0 0 0
1110
0 0
0 0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
c
0
0
1
c
1
1
c
0
0
0
0
0 Cases
Freq Pct
0 0
1 1
4
1
1
0
5
0
0
3
2
1
1
1
1
0
80
100
100
0
71
0
0
75
100
100
100
100
100
0
1 Cases
Freq Pet
20
0
0
100
29
100
100
25
0
0
0
0
0
100
Continued, next page
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1 Cases
Table
I
MA MI ST DE HI ML TR RE CO
001000110
010100010
State are not used to create equations then eight negative
and two positive lines are no longer positive. This leaves
only two lines, made up of six states, as positive
configurations
.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 contain one additional piece of
analysis because states were coded for membership in the
regional or universal regime separately. Given the confused
results about membership in a regime it seemed possible that
membership in a particular regime would be important, when
membership in the regimes is coded separately, the resulting
truth table has only one configuration that is contradictory.
In Truth table 3.7, there are eleven configurations with
negative outcomes but only one state in each configuration.
Six configurations, containing twenty states, have positive
outcomes. The one contradictory configuration contains nine
states, six of which have positive outcomes. When the two
regimes are separated in the analysis of Latin American
states there are eleven negative configurations, six positive
configurations and two contradictory configurations which
have eight states. Nine negative and four positive
configurations contain only one state.
3 . 6 continued
0 Cases
Freq Pet
1 100
1 100
Freq Pet
0 0
0 0
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Table 3.7
All Factors with Regimes, Europe
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
positive outcomes (compliance)0 Configurations with negative outcomes j tor^urjr(C) Configurations with contradictory outcomes
6
11
1
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT MA
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT _ MI
STATE RELIGION ST
DEMOCRACY
_ DE
UN MEMBER UN
EUROPEAN MEMBER EU
HIGH INCOME
_ HI
TRANSITION
_ TR
COMPLIANCE
— CO
I
MA MI ST DE UN EU HI TR CO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0 0
1 1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
c
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0 Cases
Freq Pct
1
0
1
0
1
3
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
100
0
100
0
100
33
0
100
0
0
100
100
100
0
1 Cases
Freq Pct
0
2
0
2
0
6
6
0
3
6
0
0
0
1
0
100
0
100
0
67
100
0
100
100
0
0
0
100
Continued, next page
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Table 3 . 7 continued
0 Cases 1 Cases
MA MI ST DE UN EU TR CO Freq Pet Freq Pet
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 100 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 100 0 0
The results do not show that membership in the European or
the UN regime is more important in Europe. There are now
more configurations that contain only one state. This in
Itself would cause fewer contradictions. The equations below
do not indicate that membership in a regime is important.
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Table 3.8
All Factors, Split Regime, Americas
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
negative configurations ( torture
)
c outcomes (complancer(C) Configurations with contradictory outcomes
Variable Names by Column
11
6
2
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
STATE RELIGION
DEMOCRACY
UN MEMBER
AMERICAN MEMBER
HIGH INCOME
MILITARY
TRANSITION
COMPLIANCE
- MA
- MI
- ST
- DE
- UN
- AM
- HI
- ML
- TR
- CO
MA MI ST DE UN AM HI ML TR CO
0 Cases
Freq Pet
1 Cases
Freq
—
+
Pet
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 80 1
—
20
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 100
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 100
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 100
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 100
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 C 2 67 1 33
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 100 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 100 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
Continued, next page
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Table 3.8 continued
MA MI ST DE UN AM HI ML TR CO
0 Cases
Freq Pct
1 Cases
Freq Pct
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 100
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 100 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 100
Equations
Because truth tables 3.4 -3.8 contain fewer configurations
that have contradictory outcomes, they are more useful than
the first three for the purpose of deriving equations from
the configurations. The following tables show the equations
derived from these truth tables
. m these equations upper-
case letters designate the presence of a particular factor
and lower-case letters the absence of a factor, plus signs
r©pr©SGnt Bool©a.n "or" conditions.
Type of Government and Armed Conflict
The equations derived from truth tables 3.4 to 3.8
elucidate the multiple conditions present in states where the
government complied and where the government did not comply
international norms against torture. The equations
presented in tables 3.9 to 3.13 demonstrate the importance of
the combination of type of government and armed conflict in
distinguishing compliance from noncompliance. while the
equations which include contradictory configurations also
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indicate the importance of armed conflict and democracy, they
demonstrate that some governments of states which are not
democracies and do have minor armed conflict have complied
with norms against torture. The lack of democracy or
transition and the presence of minor armed conflict do not
always mean that torture will be practiced.
The positive equations for the world and each of the
regions contain only combinations with the absence of armed
conflict and the presence of democracy or transition to
democracy. As mentioned above, the equation derived from
truth table four, using only clearly positive outcomes,
presented in table 3.9, is by itself of limited value because
so many states that do not torture are not represented in the
equation. However, while only covering eight states, this
positive equation is worth noting because it reveals the only
situation where every state complied. This configuration
identifies complying states as high-income, democratic states
experiencing no internal armed conflict that do not belong to
a regime. Of course the lack of armed conflict and the
presence of democracy is expected but it is surprising to
find the lack of regime membership. This will be discussed
further below.
In the regional equations, all positive configurations also
include the absence of armed conflict and the presence of
democracy or transition toward democracy. The positive
equation derived from the European table (3.5), presented in
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Table 3.9
Global Comparison, Consistent Results
Compliance
Noncompliance
ma.mi .DE .HI
. re = l mi
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. hi
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. RE . tr+
MA.st.hi.ml.tr+
MI
. St .hi .ml .TR+
MI
. St . de
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. RE+
MA.st.de.hi.ml.re+
MI
. St .DE .RE+
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. mi . st
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. re
. TR+
ma.mi
. ST .de .hi .ml .RE+
ma.mi.ST.DE.hi.re = 0
Derived from Truth Table 3.4
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT MI
-MINOR
ST-STATE RELIGION DE-DEMOCRACY
RE-REGIME TR-TRANSITION
ARMED CONFLICT
hi-high income ML-MILITARY
table 3.10, contains two possible combinations of factors.
NO internal armed conflict is combined with democracy in one
and with transition to democracy in the other. The first
configuration shows that in states that were democracies
without armed conflict and with an official state religion
and membership in one of the regimes against torture, the
government did not use torture. Income is dropped out of the
equation because in both high and low income states
displaying this configuration the government did not use
^®^ture. There is also compliance in states without armed
coriflict that were in transition toward democracy with no
state religion, low income, and membership in a regime. This
configuration characterizes many of the eastern European
states such as Poland and the Ukraine that joined the
European and/or the UN regimes early in their post - Leninist
transitions
.
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Table 3.10
All Factors, Europe, Consistent Results
Compliance
ma.mi.ST.DE.RE+
ma.mi.st.hi.TR.RE = 1
Non Compliance
Derived from Truth Table 3.5
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT MI-MINOR
ST-STATE RELIGION DE-DEMOCRACY
RE-REGIME TR-TRANSITION
ARMED CONFLICT
hi-high income
Table 3.11 is derived from the truth table that
distinguished between the world and the European regime, in
the positive equation in this table, all states in these
configurations are democracies or in transition and have no
armed conflict. Three of those configurations have the
presence of democracy; one has the presence of transition to
democracy. The configuration where there is the presence of
transition has membership in one regime (the UN, not the
European) and no state religion along with the lack of
internal armed conflict.
It is interesting to note that there is movement towards
democracy in equations with positive outcomes. This
configuration shows the context in which states in transition
comply with international norms against torture. This is
important because while studies have shown that democracies
are less likely to torture, the record of states in
transition is not as clear (Fein, 1995). It is not
surprising that low income would be linked to transition in
states that complied as most states in transition were low
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as one
income states. Only two European states in transition,
Hungary and Estonia, could be coded as high income and
is in compliance and the other is not they are in a
contradictory configuration.
Table 3.11
All Factors with Regimes, Europe, Consistent Results
Compliance
ma.mi.ST.DE.EU.HH-
ma.mi.DE.un.EU.HI+
ma
. mi . St . UN . eu . TR+
ma.mi.ST.DE.UN.eu.hi= 1
Non Compliance
Derived from Truth table 3.7
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT MI-MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ST-STATE RELIGION DE-DEMOCRACY HI-HIGH
RE-REGIME TR-TRANSITION
The positive equation derived from the American region,
presented in table 3.12, has two configurations. Here too
the absence of armed conflict and the presence of democracy
or transition are present in the equation indicating
compliance with noms against torture. In this region,
democracy and lack of armed conflict are combined with an
absence of a state religion and the absence of regime
membership along with high income. Transition is combined
with the absence of state religion, the absence of military
government and with low income and regime membership.
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Table 3.12
All Factors, Americas, Consistent Results
Compliance
ma.mi.st.DE.HI.re +
ma.mi.st.hi.ml.TR.RE =1
Non Compliance
ma.mi.ST.DE.hi.re =0
Derived from Truth table 3 6
CONFLICTt)i bTATE RELIGION DE-DEMOCRACY BI-HIGH
ML-MILITAR.Y RE-REGIME TR-TRANSITION
Table 3.13
All Factors with Regimes, Americas, Consistent Results
Compliance
ma .mi
. St . DE . am. HI = 1
Non Compliance
ma.mi.st.DE.UN.AM.Hi+
ma.mi .ST.DE
.un.am.hi=0
Derived from Truth Table 3.8
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT MI-MINOR ARMED CONFLICTST-STATE RELIGION DE-DEMOCRACY HI-HIGH
SsiS' ™ Me-r^arship - American Hena.ership TR-
The contradictory equations, presented in tables 3.14 to
3.18, show most clearly that the simple combination of
presence of democracy and the absence of armed conflict
cannot explain government behavior. These equations are
important because, as the truth tables above showed, in some
tables most states that complied were not in the positive
configurations, it is the contradictory equations that
highlight factors that existed in all states that complied.
While they include situations where there were negative
outcomes as well, the contradictory equations identify all
the contexts that cover any possibility of compliance. In
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particular, they indicate the possibility of compliance in
states that are not democracies and states that have minor
armed conflict.
Table 3.14
Global Comparison, Inconsistent Results
Instances of
Compliance
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Table 3.15
All Factors Europe, Inconsistent Results
Instances of Compliance
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Table 3.16
All Factors with Regimes, Europe, Inconsistent Results
Instances of Compliance
ma.mi.DE .EU.HI+
ma . mi . St . UN . eu . TR+
ma.mi. St. DE. Hit
ma . mi . ST . DE . UN . eu . hi . tr=l
Instance of Non Compliance
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3.7Derived from Truth table
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT MI -MINOR ARMED CONFLICI
ST-STATE RELIGION
UN-UNITED NATIONS
DE-DEMOCRACY HI-HIGH
EU -EUROPEAN TR-TRANSITION
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Table 3.17
All Factors, Americas, Inconsistent Results
Instances of Compliance Instances of Non Compliance
ma.mi.st.DEt ma.mi
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Table 3.18
All Factors with Regimes, Americas, Inconsistent Results
Derived from Truth table 3.8
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT MI -MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ST-STATE RELIGION DE-DEMOCRACY HI-HIGH
ML-MILITARY UN-UNITED NATIONS AM-AMERICAN TR-TRANSITION
The equation presented in table 3.14, derived from the
worldwide truth table using all configurations where any
state was in compliance, includes eight configurations. Only
two of these have the combination of no armed conflict and
democracy or transition to democracy. Most are
configurations where there was no armed conflict and no
ma . mi . St . DE . am . mi . tr+ ma.mi.DE .UN.AM.HI+
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democracy or transition. There is one combination where the
absence of minor armed conflict is not necessary to
compliance. This configuration is with the absence of major
conflict, no democracy or transition, a civilian government
and no regime membership. Minor armed conflict drops out
meaning there could be minor armed conflict in this
situation.
The negative equations also tell us more about states in
transition to democracy, m the negative equation, two
configurations have governments in transition, one in
combinations with the presence of minor armed conflict and
the other in combination with the presence of a military
government
.
In the European table, 3.10, there are no negative
configurations once those with only one case are eliminated.
However, an equation derived from the contradictory outcomes,
shown in table 3.15, which includes those negative
configurations containing only one case, identifies contexts
in which there were any negative outcomes. Once again, many
but not all negative configurations have armed conflict, in
the European, there are two configurations with the presence
of democracy that did not comply, in one, there is a
combination of major armed conflict, high income and regime
membership. The other, however, is where there may or may
not be minor armed conflict, as it drops out of the equation.
This is a configuration where there is high income, regime
membership and no state religion.
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R0qime Membership
only in th. cases of states where the government did comply
with international norms against torture and did belong to
the regime could norms have mattered. This global survey
provides little encouragement for arguments that
international regimes matter. Clearly regime membership did
not matter in states where torture was practiced despite
regime membership and where torture was avoided even though
the state was not a regime member, m addition, there are
several instances where regimes were present in
configurations but dropped out of the final equation because,
according to Boolean logic, they were irrelevant.
In the worldwide analysis, regime membership is absent in
positive but is present in contradictory and negative
equations, in the positive, lack of membership in a regime
IS in conjunction with the presence of high income and
democracy and the absence of armed conflict. This makes a
stronger statement than if this factor just did not appear in
the equation, which would mean that it did not matter for the
outcome whether or not a state belonged to a regime. In this
equation, regime membership was actually absent. So when
there was a clear outcome of compliance, there was an absence
of regime membership in conjunction with the other, expected
factors. However, as mentioned above, this equation leaves
out many states. Regime membership is present in a positive
equation only in the European analysis, not in the world wide
or American ones. The presence of regime membership would
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Show up in more configurations than in the other analysis
simply because a higher proportion of states in Europe have
joined.
Regime membership is also present in some negative
configurations. This could easily be explained if it
appeared only in combination with armed conflict, as it is
now clearly established that armed conflict is associated
with the practice of torture. But there are configurations
where members of a regime lacked internal conflict and yet
did not comply with international norms, it is again
apparent that membership in a regime was present in complying
states in Europe. There is no indication, however, that
membership in the European regime was more important than
membership in the United Nations regime.
The question of regime impact on compliance cannot be
answered completely without doing time analysis. An argument
against their importance can be supported if there has been
no improvement in states that were practicing torture before
joining the regime. That is why it is important to look at
states that improved or did not improve their records since
197 9 to really understand the importance of these
conventions
.
Conclusion
This research identifies certain combinations of factors
present in all states complying with international norms
against torture and many more configurations present when
contradictory configurations are coded as positive to capture
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all cases of compliance with international norms. These
equations are derived from truth tables that demonstrate that
for the most part the factors cannot separate compilers from
noncompliers
.
This study finds that the same factors, armed conflict and
type of government, that Rummel showed to influence democide,
are linked to government use of torture. Yet it also
demonstrates the limits of their explanatory power, it shows
that armed conflict seems to be an even stronger factor in
torture than type of government because it reveals no cases
of compliance when there is major armed conflict but some
cases of compliance when there is a lack of democracy. Yet
it IS also apparent that democracy and armed conflict even in
combination are not enough to distinguish between compliers
and non-compliers and that other factors are necessary to
truly understand state behavior. This study also explores
the complexity of armed conflict by distinguishing between
major and minor armed conflict. Doing so shows that while in
every context states experiencing major armed conflict
governments resort to torture, the same is not true for those
experiencing minor armed conflict.
While the transnational movement to end torture is examined
in later chapters, this analysis does reveal something about
the success of one important part of this effort. The
findings in this chapter begin to build a case against the
idea that international regimes are important. Though this
case cannot be complete until we look at time analysis in
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later chapters, even in this beginning there are indications
that international regimes have not acted as constraints on
government behavior. Yet it is too early to conclude that
they are irrelevant. Regimes may be important at the
margins
.
These findings also address the question of whether
democracy is necessary for respect of human rights and
whether states that do not respect rights can even be
considered democracies. Any finding on this point is
affected by how the analyst defines democracy. Some define
democracy in a way that allows states that are not rights
respecting to be considered democracies. They point out that
states that should be considered democracies based on the
form of government do not respect rights. David Forsythe
(1995) points out, giving India as an example, that democracy
and rights- protective states are not the same thing. As
Akwasi Aidoo (1993, p. 705) argued:
The point here is that where as it is not possible
to have human rights in undemocratic conditions
democracy will not automatically guarantee human
rights"
.
Others define democracy in such a way that all democracies
must by definition respect human rights. Some argue that
states can only be considered democracies if they at the very
least, respect political rights and some include most
universally recognized rights. Kaballo argued that within
his understanding of democracy there is nothing like
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democracy without human rights. He said "democracy without
universal human rights is a contradiction in terms"
,p. 189,.
However, in order to understand the circumstances under which
hold 0l0d~'ionQ K
T
-LU erecti s and have multi-party systems
violate human rights it is useful to separate the categories
of rights respecting states and democracies. As discussed in
the methodology chapter, for the purposes of this study,
states were coded as democracies bases on a very limited and
minimal standard.
This study also addresses the impact of a transition toward
democracy on government behavior towards its citizens, while
thxs part of the study does not find that transition
necessarily leads to compliance, neither does it confirm
Fein's argument that there is "more murder in the middle"
( 1995 , p. 185 ). Configurations with transition to democracy
are present in equations with positive outcomes and
contradictory ones. Transition appears in positive
configurations when there is no armed conflict or military
control. With one exception, it appears in negative
configurations only when there is armed conflict, military
control of the transition process or with the combination of
state religion and low income.
It is clear from this study that the complexity of
government behavior makes it crucial to look beyond the
factors emphasized in the literature and undertake a closer
analysis of fewer states in order to really understand
government behavior. There are two ways that the rest of
H2
questions
.
this study can clear up some of the unresolved
The first is by looking at fewer states in more detail. The
sacrifice of detail in order to code for so many countries
may have contributed to weak explanatory powers of some
factors
. The second is by looking at state behavior over
time. In the study of states that have shown significant
improvement or decline in compliance, the additional factors
examined may show that non-domestic factors, such as
transnational networks and pressure from other states, are
important to the process
. As Chayes and Chayes pointed out
rn a discussion of regulatory treaties "a cross section at
any particular moment may give a misleading picture of the
State of compliance (Chayes and Chayes, 1995, p. 15 ).
83
CHAPTER 4
CIRCUMSTANCES OF IMPROVED COMPLIANCE
TO begin the task of elucidating the dynamics of
governments' compliance with international norms against
torture, this chapter presents results drawn from a survey of
selected states in the years 1979-93. m particular, it
compares the small group of states identified as increasing
levels of compliance to a group of states that were
democratic or in transition and yet tortured frequently.
This analysis permits an assessment of some of the dynamics
at work as states' internal conditions or exposure to
external influences change over time.
This chapter first describes in greater detail those
states that were coded as improvers, it shows that total
compliance is rarely achieved and difficult to maintain. The
states that improved from the worst levels were still
torturing at middle levels in 1993. This part of this
chapter discusses the amount and timing of the change in each
of these states and the situation in the twelve comparison
states. The second section reports the results of the
comparison between the two groups of states. This comparison
reveals several things. First, membership in any of the
torture regimes has not had any serious impact on government
behavior. Second, an analysis of the comparison confirms and
further develops the importance of armed conflict as a
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domestic factor and Indicates the circumstances under which
the presence of minor armed conflict may be overcome. Third,
it highlights the importance of foreign pressure and the more
limited circumstances under which NGOs with transnational
links may have been able to effect government practice.
Improvement in Compliance
Not only IS the number of governments that improved small;
the improvement by these governments is incomplete. As can
be seen in table 4.1, when governments improved it was, for
the most part, from very high levels of torture to moderate
levels; only a few reduced their use of torture to the level
of no or only occasional torture. Of the eight improving
states discussed in this chapter, six were previously among
the worst offenders, m these states, torture declined from
the very worst levels to moderate levels; none of those six
achieved total compliance. For some of these governments to
reach even this moderate level involved massive improvement,
but the movement clearly stalled after a certain point, in
Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay there was a period of complete
compliance before the practice of torture resumed at much
lower levels. There were vast improvements in terms of
overall human rights in these three states. Disappearances
almost stopped, democracy was restored, and those who were
tortured were more likely to survive. Yet there remains the
disturbing fact that these governments were unable to
maintain the level of compliance they achieved when civilian
rule was first reestablished. Improvement was only sustained
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in the two states who went from the middle level to
occasional or no torture.
Table 4.1
Compliance Patterns of Improver States
state Name 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 8 87 88 89 90 91
Argentina * + + - -
- + + + +
Benin -
-
-
-
-
- + + + + + + _
Bolivia ie * + + - - + + + + +
Chile k * * k k k + + +
Ethiopia * * * k k k k k
Philippines * *
•k k k k k •k k
Surincime - - + + + + - + + + + —
Uruguay
_
+
Frequent torture + Some torture
No or occasional torture
92 93
+ +
+ +
+ +
+ +
+ +
+ +
Transition to Democracy
The most obvious common factor in the eight states where
improvement occurred is a transition to democracy before the
decline in torture. Despite the development of norms against
torture in the post World War ll period, no government
remaining in power changed significantly for the better.
Only after a repressive government was no longer in power did
the practice of torture begin to decline. The Philippines is
perhaps a partial exception because the new leaders
democratically elected in 1986 continued to torture and the
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decline only
1992.
occurred after the second set of elections in
The Latin American improvers had previously been
democracies but during the worst of the abuse were under
military dictatorship. Four successive military juntas ruled
for six years in Argentina from 1976-1983. After defeat in
the 1982 Falklands War, the military lost power and civilian
rule was reestablished in 1983. When the military lost
power, the amount of torture in Argentina, which had been
declining since its peak in 1976 and 1977, decreased enough
to no longer be classified as wide or systematic torture.
Yet it was not until late 1983 that Argentina significantly
decreased torture. At this point, the new government
appeared to be heading toward total compliance but in 1988
and 1989 there was an increase in new torture reports. This
level of torture did not become and showed no signs of
becoming anywhere near the level reached under the military
regime. However, there also was no sign that further
improvements would be forthcoming.
The first country to have a significant, sustained decline
in torture was Bolivia, its difficult and complicated
transition to democracy ran from 1978 until 1982. The first
attempt at a return to democratically elected civilian rule,
following the June, 1978 elections was cut short by a
military coup in August and another in November. There was
another election in 1979, a coup in July, 1980 and another
election in 1980 (Schoultz, 1981, p. 357). The practice of
87
next
torture had declined briefly in late 1979, but with the
coup that halted the transition process, torture resumed, it
began to decline again in 1983 and was almost non-existent in
1985 and 1986. Torture increased again in 1987 but not
nearly to the point where it was frequent.
Torture was practiced widely in Uruguay until 1985. The
Uruguayan military had previously reduced its torture rate
from the peak of the late seventies. However, while there
were fewer cases than in the past, the situation was still
serious before 1985. From 1985 to 1990, there was almost
complete compliance with international norms against torture.
But, as in Argentina and Bolivia, there was eventually
resumption of low levels of torture. The almost complete
compliance lasted for six years after which torture increased
to relatively low levels.
Chile had experienced a longer period of high levels of
torture than most other states and did not at any point reach
the same levels of compliance as Argentina, Uruguay and
Bolivia. There was frequent torture throughout the seventies
and the eighties, although later in this period there was
some decrease in the number of victims, in 1978 Chile's
secret police force (DINA) was dissolved and replaced by a new
state security body, the National Center for
Investigation ( CNI ) . CNI used torture more selectively than
DINA. According to the Washington Office on Latin America,
torture was still practiced frequently but became
"institutionalized and more sophisticated" (WOLA, 1985, p.
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8). The transition fro™ military rule began in Chile in 1988
when 55% of the population voted against Pinochet's
continuing to rule (Country Report Chile, 1988.4, p. 5). A
new constitution came into effect in July of 1989 and in
December, Patricio Aylwin won the presidency (Country Report
Chile, 1989.4, p. 5). The practice of torture finally
declined significantly in 1990 and stayed at moderate levels
through 1993.
In Suriname, the pattern of torture was different than in
many of the other states: a generally lower level of torture
was punctuated by highly publicized cases of torture and
killing. For instance, on December 8-10 1982, fifteen people
were arrested and executed (O.A.S., 1983, p. 27). After
members of the International Commission of Jurists visited
from February 25 to March 4, 1983 they reported that human
rights had "deteriorated dramatically” since the previous ICJ
visit in February 1981 (ICJ, July 1983). There was some
signs of improvement in the mid eighties when an interim
government was installed, but these initial signs of
improvement did not lead to sustained change (Country Report
Suriname, 1987.2, p. 17). in November 1986 there was a
massacre at Moiwana of supposed sympathizers of the Jungle
commando (Amnesty International, 1987). The abuse continued
on New Year's Eve 1987, when twenty people were severely
tortured and six murdered (Country Report Suriname, 1987.2,
p. 18). It was not until 1990 that the real improvement in
state behavior occurred. Suriname began its transition in
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1990 but this attempt at democracy was hampered when the
military took power in a bloodless coup on December 25th
(State Department, 1990, p. 769). The military government
did very soon arrange for new elections on May 25, 1991,
These were supervised by OAS observers and generally held to
be reasonably free and fair (The Economist, June 1989, p.
48) .
in the Phxlippines and Ethiopia, transition occurred when
long-time rulers were forced to flee the country. Neither of
these states where torture was practiced frequently had
dramatic improvements in human rights practices by 1993.
Torture was reduced at the end of the period studied just
enough to move them out of the category of states where
torture is frequently practiced.
During the Mengistu regime torture was practiced routinely
in Ethiopia. Serious challenge to Mengitsu's rule began when
the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
was formed in 1988 as an alliance among insurgent groups. On
May 21, 1991, Mengistu fled the country and six days later
the U.S. convened peace talks (Freedom in the World, 1993, p.
224; Amnesty International, 1992, p. 114). The Transitional
conference was held in July 1991 and the first regional
elections followed in 1992 (Country Report Ethiopia, 1992.3,
pp. 21-22). The rate of torture only went down in Ethiopia
in 1992, dropping from frequent to lesser levels of torture.
While torture was still practiced in 1993, particularly in
areas of military conflict, it was no longer occurring as
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frequently. Human Rights Watch Reports reported that the
transitional government in Ethiopia made significant progress
and remained more accountable on human rights matters than
any other government in Ethiopian history. (Human Rights
watch, 1993, p. 10). Yet even this significant progress left
an enormous gap between Ethiopian government conduct and the
requirements of international norms.
In the Philippines, the improvement was much less and did
not occur until 1992. Many expected and hoped for an earlier
improvement in state practice after February 1986, when
Marcos was removed from power. Corazon Aquino placed human
rights at the top of her campaign platform in the February
1986 elections and the new constitution, ratified in February
of 1987, provided a number of judicial and other safeguards
including the creation of the Presidential Commission on
Human Rights ( PCHR) (Nemenzo, 1995, p. 119). There was also an
initial decrease in human rights violations. However, the
democratization process was endangered by seven coup attempts
right-wing elements of the military and when negotiations
between the government and the New People's Army insurgents
collapsed the human rights situation started to worsen
(Amnesty International Report, 1992, p. 17). Unlike in
Argentina, it was not a moderate increase but a return to
systematic abuse. Under Aquino, torture by the army and by
government-backed militia, became rampant, in 1987 the Task
Force Detainees of the Philippines ' statistics showed double
the violations of the year before. They reported that about
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27% of individuals arrested in 1988 were subject to torture
(Philippine Human Rights Update 4.3, p. 10). The situation
began to change with the peaceful transition of power in June
of 1992 when Fidel Ramos, who had been Secretary of National
Defense and Chief of staff of the Armed Forces in the Aquino
administration, became president, in 1992 and 1993, the
practice of torture finally began to lessen. The human
rights situation improved just enough for the state to be
removed from the category of frequent torturer.
The last of the eight states experiencing sustained
improvement is Benin. In the early 1980s it was a Leninist
one-party state where abuse of prisoners was practiced
throughout the country. Many political prisoners were freed
in 1984 and there seemed the potential for change (Amnesty
International Report, 1984, p. 20). However, beginning in
1985 there was a steady increase in imprisonment and torture.
The political transition in Benin began in 1989 when the
government began negotiations with exiled political
opposition. A group of Beninese leaders forced President
Kerekou to relinquish control to a transitional government in
June. On February 19-28, 1990, a national conference for
reconstruction established a multi-party democracy and in
early 1990 an interim government was set up to prepare for
democracy (Nwajiaku 1994, p. 429). Multiparty local
elections were held in late 1990 and a new constitution was
approved. Torture declined significantly after that point.
In March 1991, national elections were held and Prime
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Minister Soglo defeated General Kerekou in the election lor
President (Derryck, 1991, p. 24).
Governments Practicing Widespread TortnT-o
To explore further the conditions under which democracy or
transition is insufficient to reduce torture, i examine a
group of states that are democracies or in transition to
democracy and continue to torture frequently and
systematically. This group consists of Turkey, Sri Lanka,
India, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and El Salvador. This group of
comparison states does not include states where claims of
democratization rested only on elections which foreign
observers judged to be fraudulent or only on government
declarations of transition. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the
biniing of democratization and the level of torture.
Each of the governments in this group either continued to
use torture at roughly the same high level throughout the
period studied or actually increased its level of torture.
Table 4.4 illustrates that nine of these comparison states
had governments that were constant torturers, and the
governments of three—Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela—actually
increased the amount of torture practiced in the period
studied. In Ecuador, which did not have a history of serious
human rights abuse, torture became a significant problem for
the first time in 1985 when, under President Febres Cordera,
it began to be practiced consistently by the police and to a
lesser extent by the military. Torture also became more
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Table 4 .2
Democracy, Transition and Compliance, Improvers
Never or
Occasional
Non Democracy
Benin (79-84)
Surinam( 80,90)
Transition
Argentina( 85-87
)
Uruguay ( 85-89
)
Surinam( 90-93
Benin( 91-93
)
Democracy
Bolivia( 85-86
)
Uruguay ( 90
)
Surinam( 79
Some Surinam (81-86)
Benin( 85-90
)
Argentina( 83-
84,88)
Bolivia( 83-84
Chile( 89-92
Surinam( 87-89
Ethiopia( 92-93
)
Argentina( 89-93)
Bolivia( 87-93
Uruguay( 91-93
Chile(93)
Philippines ( 92-
93)
Frequent Chile (79-87)
Bolivia( 79-82
)
Argentina( 79-82
)
Uruguay ( 77-84
Ethiopia ( 79-90
)
Philippines (79-
85)
Bolivia( 82
)
Chile( 88
)
Ethiopia( 91
Philippines ( 86-
91)
Table 4 .
3
Democracy, Transition and Compliance, Non Improvers
Non Democracy Transition Democracy
Never or
Occasional
Venezuela 79-86
Some Ecuador( 79-83
)
Pakistan( 86-87
)
Ecuador ( 84
)
Colombia( 81-82
)
Mexico( 86-87
)
Venezuela( 87-91
)
Frequent Pakistan( 79-83
El Salvador(79-
82 )
Bangladesh( 79-89
)
Brazil ( 79-84
)
Turkey ( 79-82
Pakistan( 85 , 88-
89)
Bangladesh( 90-93
;
Brazil ( 85-88
)
El Salvador(83-
88)
Peru( 79-84
Turkey ( 83-90
Ecuador ( 85-93
)
Colombia ( 79-
1 80,83-93)
Mexico ( 79-85 , 88-
93)
Venezuela ( 92-93
India( 79-93
)
Brazil{89-93)
Peru( 85-93)
El Salvador(89-
93)
Pakistan( 90-93
Sri Lanka( 91-93)
Turkey ( 91-93
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serious and frequent in Peru, although it was a problem
throughout the period studied, in Venezuela, torture also
increased in the late eighties to the point of becoming a
systematic practice.
Table 4 .4
Compliance Patterns of Non-Improver States
state Name 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Bangladesh + + k + * k * *
Brazil * * k k k 1r
Colombia •k + + * * k
•f + k * k Hr k
Ecuador + + + + + k k k k * k k
El Salvador * + * + k + k k * k + k
India + + * * k * k k k * * k
Mexico + ie + * * + + k k k * k
Pakistan + + * + + k k k k k
Peru + + + k k * k * k
Sri Lanka * + + + k * + k + k * +
Turkey + * * * * k * k k *
Venezuela - - — _ _ _ _ + + + * *:
* Frequent torture
-t- Some torture
No or occasional torture
Circumstances of improved Compliance
The Qualitative Comparative Analysis undertaken in this
chapter elucidates the very limited circumstances under which
NGOs have possibly been part of the process of change, and
the sets of circumstances under which improvement can occur
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without the presence of human rights activists. The only
configuration in the positive equation where human rights
groups were part of a process toward greater compliance was
when major armed conflict was absent and where there was
signrficant foreign pressure on the offending government.
Such circumstances have characterized relatively few of the
states where levels of torture were high. Most governments
that were torturing extensively were engaged in domestic
armed conflict and only rarely have they been under any
serious sustained pressure to comply with international human
rights norms.
The cross-national study showed that the domestic factors
alone could not explain state behavior but it did clearly
demonstrate the importance of armed conflict and domestic
regime type in distinguishing compliance from non compliance.
Armed conflict is therefore included in this analysis along
with foreign pressure, NGOs and transnational links.
Regime membership has not been an important factor in state
compliance. The examination from 1979 to 1993 gives further
evidence that regimes have not had an impact on member
states
. Most of the states where the government improved its
human rights records were not members of the UN or regional
convention until after they had already improved compliance.
As illustrated in table 4.5, only three states, Suriname,
Chile and the Philippines, became parties to the torture
conventions before the government reduced the amount of
torture practiced. Bolivia and Ethiopia did not become
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me^^ers of these regimes in the period studied, m every
other case a new government undertook the treaty ohiigations
after torture had been reduced. So human rights activists
struggling for greater respect for rights in these states did
not have regime membership as a focal point of their
protests, but rather had to point to more general human
rights treaties and norms against torture.
Table 4.5
Regime Membership and Compliance
Member
Non Member
Improved Chile ( U88 , A88 )
,
Compliance Phil(U86) Suriname ( A88
)
*Argentina(U86 A92),
*Benin(U92), Bolivia
Ethiopia
*Uruguay(U86,A92)
Widespread Brazil (U91 A89)
Torture Mexico(U86. A87)
Peru( U88,A91 )
,
Ecuador ( U88
)
Turkey(U88,E88)
Venezuela (U91, A91)
Bangladesh, Colombia,
El Salvador, India,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka
joined convention after improvement in compliance
U - United Nations Convention against Torture and Other CruelInhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
'
A - Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
E - European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
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The importance of these international regimes is also
called into question by the fact that many states where
governments still torture are members of the regimes, it is
apparent that governments have joined them without seriously
intending to obey, m six of the twelve comparison states,
Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela, the
government continued to torture at high levels after becoming
party to a convention. Even if human rights regimes affect
governments after a relatively long timelag, after several
years of membership some signs of improvement could be
expected. Certainly the states included in this study are
not alone in this pattern.
. Therefore, membership in a
regime is not included in the QCA analysis.
Because this part of the study does not involve as large a
number of states, it was possible to do a somewhat more
extensive examination of factors, m this section, l coded
for the presence or absence of three factors that were not
included in the larger cross-sectional study: the activity
level of NCOS, the existence of links between domestic human
rights activists and iNGOs willing to assist their cause, and
foreign pressure. Each of the improving states was coded for
the factors as they existed in the period preceding the
change in outcome. The comparison states were coded for each
factor at the end of the period studied. By coding states
for conditions present at the time of the improvement and
comparing this to the conditions existing in states that did
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not improve by the end of the period studied, it is possible
to explore the context in which change occurred.
As shown in Table 4.6, the combinations of these five
factors distinguish between states where the government
improved its compliance and those where it did not in every
configuration but one. The configuration with a
contradictory outcome includes minor armed conflict, active
NGOs with links and the absence of foreign pressure. This
configuration is noteworthy because it contains the
,
one of the three improving states where human
rights organizations were active before the change. Because
it is in a contradictory configuration with Bangladesh and
Colombia, the Philippines is not represented in the equation
for improvement in compliance. The slowness of the
Philippines improvement reinforces the conclusion that in
states with this combination of factors, the presence of
minor armed conflict and the absence of foreign pressure,
governments are likely to continue torturing at high levels.
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Table 4 .
6
Conflict, NGOs and Foreign Pressure
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
Negative Outcomes ( continued torture)Configurations with Positive Outcomes ( less torture)Configurations with Contradictory Outcomes
5
4
1
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT MA
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT MI
ACTIVE NGOs NG
LINRs
FOREIGN PRESSURE FO
OUTCOME
|MA MI NG LI FO 0
0 0 1111
10 1110
0 10 0 11
0 0 110 0
0 1 1 1 0 C
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1
10 110 0
0 110 0 0
Neg. Cases
Freq Pet
0 0
2 100
0 0
2 100
2 67
2 100
3 100
1 100
Pos
. Cases
Freq Pet
2 100
0 0
1 100
0 0
1 33
0 0
1 100
3 100
0 0
0 0
CASE IDS FOR THE TRUTH TABLE
0 0 1 1 1 1 =>
1 0 1 1 1 0 =>
argentine
turkey
=1 chile =1
=0 el Salvador =0
continued next page
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0 1 0 0 1 1 =>
0 0 1 1 0 0 =>
0 1 1 1 0 C =>
0 0 1 0 0 0 =>
0 0 0 0 0 1 =>
0 0 0 0 1 1 =>
1 0 1 1 0 0 =>
0 1 1 0 0 0 =>
Table 4.6 continued
ethiopia = 1
mexico =0 brazil
Colombia =0 bangladesh
Philippines = 1
ecuador =0
venezuala =0
benin = 1
Uruguay = 1 Suriname
bolivia = 1
sri lanka =0 india
peru =0
Pakistan =0
Equation 4 .
1
ma.ng. li , FP+ma .mi .ng . li+ma.mi .NG.LI .FP = 1
Equation 4 .
2
MA. mi. NG.LI + ma.NG.fp = 0
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT MI-MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
NG-ACTIVE NGOs LI-LINKs FP-FOREIGN PRESSURE
1-IMPROVEMENT 0-Non Improvement
. indicates and + indicates or
Three combinations are present in the equations derived
from configurations with positive outcomes. The first,
ma.ng. li.FP, indicates an absence of major armed conflict, an
absence of active local NGOs and the presence of foreign
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pressure. Reduction according to the QCA procedure revels
that mrnor armed conflict drops out of the configuration. In
thrs configuration, it does not matter to the outcome whether
or not there was minor armed conflict. Either way improvement
occurred. The second combination, ma.mi.ng.li, indicates the
absence of both armed conflict and active NGOs. In this
case, foreign pressure drops out of the equation. So when
there is no minor armed conflict there might be foreign
pressure but it is not necessary to improvement. Together
these two configurations show that improvement occurs when
there is either the absence of minor armed conflict or the
presence of foreign pressure.
In the third combination, ma.mi.NG.LI .FP, there is no armed
conflict, the presence of active local NGOs with links and
the presence of foreign pressure. This tells us that the
only circumstance under which NGOs could have been part of
the process leading to improvement was when there was no
armed conflict and there was foreign pressure.
In the equation created by reducing negative outcomes there
are two configurations. In the first, there is major armed
conflict and the presence of NGOs with links. It did not
matter whether there was foreign pressure; either way greater
compliance did not occur. In the other combination there is
an absence of both major armed conflict and foreign pressure,
the presence of human rights organizations, but the absence
of transnational links. Under these conditions, minor armed
conflict drops out of the equation.
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in
The Importance of Armed Conf 1 ^n^-
This section focuses on the Importance of armed conflict
efforts to achieve compliance with human rights norms and
elucidates the circumstance under which the presence of minor
armed conflict may be overcome so that compliance can be
achieved even with armed conflict. No matter what the
context improved compliance with norms against torture occurs
only when there is no major armed conflict. There is no
context in which compliance has improved during periods of
major armed conflict and not very many situations it has
during minor armed conflict.
Armed Conflict in Improvers
One of the configurations in the positive equation,
ma.ng.li.FP, represents a situation where improvement could
occur despite minor armed conflict, when there was no major
armed conflict, there were no NGOs and there was the presence
of foreign pressure whether or not there was minor armed
conflict the outcome was compliance. Ethiopia which had
minor armed conflict is covered by this configuration. While
the worst fighting of the civil war in Ethiopia was over by
1992, there were clashes between the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) which left the government after the
elections (Amnesty International Report 1993, p. 127). In
March and April 1992, fighting erupted between EPRDF forces
and militia of the Issu and Gourgoura Liberation Front(IGLF).
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in addition, intercommunal clashes in Arsi province were
causing extensive loss of life (Country Report 92.2, p. 20).
However, there is one state that is in a configurations
with a contradictory outcome and improved despite armed
conflict and no foreign pressure, it should be noted that
the improving state in contradiction, the Philippines, is as
discussed above, the state where the government made the most
minimal improvement of those states coded as improving.
Measuring the level of violence more finely would not help
to distinguish these two improvers from non- improvers
. The
level of armed conflict in Ethiopia and the Philippines when
they improved was as high as in some states that did not
improve. However, in both the violence was a reduction from
what had been experienced before, in both the Philippines as
in Ethiopia there was at least some chance of negotiated end
to the strife. Therefore, there was more cause for optimism
among policy makers. It appeared that negotiations were
working and government officials would be well served by more
conciliatory stands.
Armed conflict that had been going on for twenty years was
still a serious issue in the Philippines. The intensity and
number of military-rebel encounters continued to be high
through 1991, with Aquino's directive that the insurgency be
crushed by the end of her term (Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights
,
1990
,
p . 3 )
.
President Ramos made efforts to negotiate an end to the
insurgencies. He set up a National Unification Commission in
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August of 1992, attempting to make peace with the Moro
National Liberation Front(MNLF) the Muslim separatist
organization, the New Peoples Army(NPA) made up of communist
insurgents and the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers
of the Filipino People-Young Officers' Union (RAM-SFP-YOU)
whose members were right wing former members of the armed
forces (Country Report Philippines, 1993.2, p. 8). He
legalized the Communist Party and offered amnesty to
insurgents. There was a decrease from 26,000 New Peoples
Army Rebels operating in 1988 to an estimated 11,000 active
in 1993 (Country Report Philippines, 1993.4, p. 8).
While these states that improved compliance during armed
conflict only improved a small amount and had armed conflict
that was declining, their improvement is not all that
demonstrates that armed conflict by itself cannot separate
improvers from non improvers. There are circumstances under
which there was no armed conflict and still widespread
torture
.
Lack of Armed Conflict in Torturers
One of the configurations in the negative eguation gives
the circumstances under which states have tortured despite a
lack of any armed conflict. That configurations is:
ma.NG.fp. Without major armed conflict and with NGOs, with or
without links, if there was no foreign pressure, whether or
not there was minor armed conflict, these governments
tortured. Minor armed conflict and links drop out of the
configuration. Four democratic or transitional states did
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not have armed conflict and yet continued to torture at high
levels: Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, and Mexico.
Venezuela was not experiencing internal armed conflict
during the period studied. Though there were two attempted
coups in 1993, I did not code Venezuela as having armed
conflict because they occurred at the end of the period
studied and obviously could not have affected government
behavior in the time studied. The first, on February 4,
involved 1,400 army and air force officers but was put down
immediately by troops loyal to the President. In the second,
on November 27, insurgents bombed military installations and
government buildings but were also quickly stopped (Amnesty
International Report 1993, pp. 131-132).
In Mexico's rural states, as in Brazil, violent disputes
over land occurred frequently. According to U.S. State
Department Country Reports, paramilitary bands, police
auxiliaries and local police controlled by political bosses
indigenous activists. As in Brazil, this was mostly
one-sided violence that did not qualify as armed conflict.
Ecuador also had torture despite a lack of armed conflict.
There was a very small group of armed insurgents and drug
traffickers operating in Ecuador. The group, Alvaro Vive
Carajo(AVC) a leftist, nationalist organization with close
ties to Colombia's M-19 guerrillas had no more than a few
hundred active members. They committed bank robberies,
kidnappings and occasionally killed a policeman. This group
reached a peace agreement with the government in February of
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1991 (Amnesty International Report 1992, p. 104). a small
guerrilla group claiming allegiance to the Maoist Shining
Path in neighboring Peru emerged in 1992 (Country Report
Peru, 1992.4, p. 89). All of these were too small to qualify
as even minor internal armed conflict.
While Brazil did not experience insurgency or organized
terrorist groups, it did experience high levels of internal
violence. Criminal activity and politically motivated
murders against indigenous people, street children and labor
organizers were common. This was not conflict between two
armed groups however, most of the violence was done by
paramilitary forces and by thugs hired by land owners to kill
and threaten squatters and organizers (Amnesty International,
Report 1992, pp. 70-71).
In these states there was violence but not internal armed
conflict and yet they continued to torture. Clearly, armed
conflict while extremely important is not enough to explain
why some states continue to torture and others do not.
Another important factor that helps provide the context in
which improvement occurs is foreign pressure.
Foreign Pressure
The equation derived from positive outcomes shows foreign
pressure as part of the context in which improvement occurs.
In the positive equation, there is no configuration that
indicates the absence of foreign pressure. Foreign pressure
is present in two of the three configurations in the equation
for improved compliance and drops out of the third. It does
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not matter for the outcome whether or not there is foreign
pressure where there is neither major armed conflict nor
minor armed conflict and no active NGOs
. Foreign pressure is
present as a condition in the configuration where there is no
major armed conflict and no NGOs where minor armed conflict
dropped out and where there is no armed conflict there are
NGOs with links.
The second configuration in the negative equation also
points out the importance of pressure. When there are NGOs
but an absence of foreign pressure, there is a negative
outcome whether or not those NGOs have links and whether or
not there is minor armed conflict. The other configuration
in the negative equation shows that when there is major armed
conflict, even in the presence of NGOs with links and foreign
pressure, there is also a negative outcome.
Six of the eight states that improved had been subjected to
foreign pressure. Of the three states that had active NGOs
with links, two, Argentina and Chile, had foreign pressure
and one, the Philippines (despite its active human rights
organizations) was never the focus of sustained pressure.
Four countries without human rights communities, Ethiopia,
Uruguay, Suriname and Bolivia, experienced foreign pressure.
Benin, like the Philippines did not have pressure. Two of
the comparison state, Turkey and El Salvador, experienced
some foreign pressure.
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Foreign Pressure on Improvers
There was significant pressure on the Argentine military
regime to improve human rights practices beginning in the
carter administration. In 1977, the u.s. government reduced
the planned level of military aid and terminated direct
economic aid for Argentina due to human rights abuses and on
September 30, 1978, a law eliminating all military assistance
to Argentina went into effect (Forsythe, 1988, p. 106). The
U.S. also froze Export-Import Bank Funds in this period.
However the restriction on arms sales was lifted in 1980.
The Reagan administration wanted to give military aid back to
Argentina in 1982 and 1983 but Congressional opposition
prevented this from happening (Mower, 1987, pp. 109-110).
Under Pinochet, Chile came close to being an international
pariah and at various times lost aid from almost every donor
country (Tomasevski, 1993, p. 96). Beginning in 1974, the
U.S. Congress placed a ceiling of $25 million on economic aid
to Chile and banned new military assistance although before
Carter took office these laws were not actively implemented
(Forsythe, 1988, p. 102). The British ambassador was
withdrawn in December of 1975 after the torture of a British
woman. Diplomatic relations were restored in January of 1980
but a ban on UK arms sales continued. In January 1975,
Australia decided to suspend wheat shipments to Chile and in
December 19 76 France, West Germany, and the UK all favored
denying World Bank loans to Chile. In 1976 the Ford
administration imposed an embargo on military sales to Chile.
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The UN established an ad hoc working group on Chile in
February 1975. it visited Chile in 1978 and was then
replaced by a special rapporteur. Under the Carter
administration, aid and Export-import Bank credits were cut
off (Tomasevskr, p. 96). Reagan lifted most of Carter's
sanctions and there was an effort to resume better relations
with Pinochet (Forsythe, 1988, pp. 103-104). The United
States, under Reagan, started asking that Chile be praised
for improvements by the UN Human Rights Commission, m
October 1980, the U.S. Senate approved an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Bill lifting the embargo on military sales
to Chile. However the amendment laid down that the president
would need to certify “significant progress" in complying
with internationally recognized standards of human rights.
Congress continued some sanctions on Chile and in 1985, the
Reagan administration began taking a tougher stance toward
Chile. In February of 1982, a delivery of French-
manufactured tanks was suspended and the French Defense
Minister said there would be no more weapon sales as long as
the present Chilean regime was in office. The U.S., on
December 24, 1987, withdrew Chile's privilege to sell certain
P^o*^uc:ts in the United States duty free under the generalized
system of preferences ( GSP ) citing violations of
internationally accepted standards of workers rights (Country
Report Chile, 1988.1, p. 6).
Bolivia and Uruguay both received pressure from the United
States. In mid-1978, the Carter administration briefly
suspended military aid to Bolivia when Asun seized power
(Schoultz, 1981, p. 266). This suspension only lasted 25
days, however, later, the Garcia Meza regime received more
pressure from the u.s. for its cocaine involvement and human
rights violations. Under both Carter and Reagan, the u.s.
followed a "nonrecognition" policy and the U.S. veto in the
inter-American Development Bank held up development funds.
The UK in 1977 denied a loan to Bolivia's state mining
industry because of the human rights situation. The UK
reconsidered in February, 1979 citing some improvement in
human rights practice. After the 1980 coup, the u.s.
withdrew its ambassador from La Paz and suspended all aid and
a U.S. military training mission was withdrawn on July 25th.
Diplomatic relations were renewed with the U.S. in 1981,
Canada in February 1982, Sweden in July 1982 and the
Netherlands in September 1982.
Uruguay, in 1977, was one of three states to which the
Carter administration denied aid (Schoultz, 1981, p. 257).
Arms and services were totally cut off and, by 1978, Eximbank
was refusing consider loan applications from Uruguay. The
U.S. in 1979 reinstates some of the military aid (Mower,
1987, p. 109). When Reagan took office he shifted the policy
to one of "quiet diplomacy". The Reagan Administration
reversed policy regarding multilateral development bank loans
and no longer opposed loans to Uruguay on human rights
grounds 1
.
Ethiopia also received foreign pressure because of its
human rights record, in 198S +-ho tt c r-the u.s. Congress mandated a
trade embargo. However, it depended on a presidential
finding that Ethiopia was deliberately starving its people
and had failed to grant its citizens fundamental human
rights. The administration decided that the country's
government was not pursuing a policy of starvation and
consequently did not impose the embargo (Ottoway, 1985). it
was difficult for foreign government to apply sanctions that
hurt the government when there was such desperate need for
food aid in Ethiopia because of severe famine. However,
Ethiopia did lose MEN status and the U.S. decided to vote
against World Bank loans to Ethiopia but the U.S. and Europe
continued to give relief aid (Tomasevski, 1993, pp. 102-103).
The pressure on Suriname to improve its human rights
practices, came mostly, but not exclusively, from the Dutch.
Suriname which had been ranked first in Dutch aid until 1982,
lost Dutch aid after a military massacre of political
opponents (Tomasevski, 1993, p. 87). The U.S. at this time
ended the $1 million per annum which it had been providing
(Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 321). The Dutch did not invoke
human rights criteria but changed circumstances when they
suspended the development co-operation treaty, however the
Dutch Prime minister stated aid would be resumed only after
concrete steps had been taken toward restoring democracy and
fundamental Rights. The Dutch resumed aid to the civilian
government in 1987 by giving $58 million for the year but did
not resume their development program (Country Report
Suriname, 1988.4, p. 19,. This was significantly less that
the $120 million that Suriname received previously. The
Dutch said they would only fully restore aid when three
conditions were met: first, serious peace talks with the
Jungle Commandos; second, a sharply devalued currency and
third, the military returning to barracks for good (The
Economist, November 10, 1990). From January 8 to 10 1985, a
special commission of the lACHR held hearings at the Hotel
Krasnapolsky in Amsterdam, Netherlands to hear testimony of
persons claiming that their human rights had been violated
since 1983. The U.S. and France were more concerned with
Surinam's relations with Libya. In 1986 and 1987 they warned
about involvement with a terrorist sponsoring state (Country
Report, Suriname, 1987.1, p. 22).
Clearly, compliance has occurred without foreign pressure.
In two states where there was improvement, Benin and the
Philippines, the government did not suffer significant
pressure in regard to their human rights record.
While donor countries put pressure on Benin, most of the
concern other states showed had to do with economic policy
and Benin's links with Libya which the Department of State
condemned in 1988 (Country Report Benin, 1988.2, p. 33).
Under Carter, the U.S. did vote against some loans and under
Reagan opposed IFI aid to Benin based in part on human rights
conditions. In 1983, however, Benin was removed from the
list of leftist-ruled countries to whom the United States had
1987, p. 110).
consistently sought to deny IFI loans (Mower,
There was some pressure from European donor countries to
grant the August 29, 1988 amnesty for those arrested for
alleged conspiracy against the government but as in other
countries dependent on loans, the major pressure was to make
agreement for structural adjustments.
The Aquino government did not suffer pressure because of
the renewal of torture. This was the continuation of a
policy of ignoring human rights abuses in the Philippines.
The Philippines enjoyed U.S. support for most of the Marcos
period primarily because of security interests. The Subic
Bay and Clark Airforce bases were an important part of U.S.
defense strategy (Steinmetz, 1994, p. 143). There really was
no foreign pressure until the U.S. withdrew support for
Marcos immediately before his ouster. Carter did not stop
aid to the Philippines in 1977 when he denied it to
Argentina, Ethiopia and Uruguay (Mower, 1987, p. 106). There
was, however, some opposition to loans to the Philippines.
Congress, during the first Reagan administration, adjusted
foreign assistance for human rights reasons but this was
fought by Reagan. Between 1980 and 1983 aid to the
Philippines actually increased 23% (Forsythe, 1988, p. 173)
The Reagan administration began to change its policy toward
the Philippines only after the murder of Benigno Aquino. In
an attempt to distance the U.S. from the Marcos
administration, a planned visit by Reagan to the Philippines
in November was canceled. The U.S. then withdrew its support
from the government but used its influence to bring down the
regime only after the massive fraud of the 1986 election
(Steinmetz, 1994, pp. 175-176).
However when the new Aquino government continued to torture
or perhaps even increase the amount of torture practiced, no
pressure was put on the government to improve its human
rights record. The United States had an interest in keeping
good relations with the Filipino government for three
reasons. The U.S. could now point to an ally that was a
democracy so it was not in its interest to look any further.
There was also fear that the new government was still
unstable and anti-governmental forces could take advantage of
any pressure. The third reason was that the U.S. was
interested in keeping its bases in the Philippines.
Foreign Pressure on Torturers
Two states experiencing foreign pressure, Turkey and El
Salvador continued to torture. One factor may be the vast
difference in levels of foreign pressure between states like
Chile, which suffered from world pariah status, and those
like Turkey experiencing smaller conseguences
. The reality
is that the pressure on these states has not been consistent
or overwhelming. However, as discussed above, there was also
inconsistent and low levels of pressure in improvers. While
there were, as in many other states, more threats than actual
sanctions, there were, eventually, some real consequences for
El Salvador and Turkey. The pressure was inconsistent but
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coded as not receiving foreign
more serious than for states
pressure.
in the early eighties, El Salvador was the focus of much
human rights related attention. The UN General Assembly
agreed to condemn the situation of human rights and
fundamental liberties in El Salvador at the end of 1983 and
the UNHRC named a special representative for El Salvador.
Both the U.S. and Canada, while reducing aid, looked for
excuses to reinstate it. In November 1980, the situation in
El Salvador had deteriorated so badly that the Canadians
suspended bilateral aid. while it was stated that the safety
of aid workers was the main reason, improved human rights was
a condition for reinstating aid. Four years later, Ottawa
restored official assistance, arguing that this was justified
by improved conditions for human rights
.
There had been conflict in the U.S. over whether to
sanction El Salvador for human rights abuse. The Reagan
administration wanted to continue aid because it wanted the
leftist guerrillas defeated. The administration, during the
worst abuses in El Salvador as in Argentina attempted to
continue its support to these governments by claiming that
things had gotten better^. In December 1981, the U.S.
Congress enacted a law requiring presidential certification
that certain human rights conditions were being met in El
Salvador before U.S. military and economic aid to that
country could go forward. The first such certification took
place on January 28, 1982. Three subsequent certifications
were required at 180 day intervals in order for u.s. aid to
continue (America's Watch, 1985, p. 3). Four times
certification occurred, m November 1983, the president
vetoed legislation adopted by congress that would have
extended the certification requirement (Americas Watch, 1985,
P-3). So, at this time efforts by Congress to pressure El
Salvador were all blocked by the White House. However, the
congress continued to tie US assistance for El Salvador to
human rights without using certification, m 1984 it
withheld 30 percent of funds until concerns were addressed
and started a new certification process. But throughout this
period aid continued to increase (Forsythe, 1988 p. 14 ).
The United states did eventually increase the pressure on
El Salvador after the murder of six Jesuit priests on
November 16, 1989 (Country Report El Salvador, 90.1, pp. 18-
19). However, diplomatic visits to the U.S. at the end of
January, the arrest of army officers involved in the murders
and a more flexible stance on talks with rebels all helped to
minimize the pressure the Bush administration felt to exert
more pressure on El Salvador (Country Report El Salvador,
1990.2, p. 20). Bush was at this time proposing an increase
in military aid and a reduction in economic assistance. In
1990, bills before both the U.S. House and Senate called for
cuts of at least 50 percent in U.S. aid to El Salvador. Bush
resisted the cuts but Secretary of State Baker had accepted
that a proportion of the aid would be made conditional on
continuing progress in the peace negotiations (Country Report
congressional
El Salvador, 1991.3, pp. 18-19). After a U.S.
team visited El Salvador and described investigations into
the murder of the six Jesuits as at a virtual standstill.
Baker accepted that some aid be linked to progress in this
case, in 1990, the House of Representatives voted to cut the
military aid allocation for 1991 by half and to make its
disbursement conditional on an improvement in the human
rights situation and progress being made in the Jesuit murder
case. Germany also indicated that its aid to El Salvador
would depend on the human rights situation. On October 19,
90, the U.S. Senate confirmed the House of Representatives
votes in May to withhold 50 per cent of u.S. military aid to
El Salvador in 1991. This would have amounted to 42.5
million (Country Report El Salvador, 1990.4, p. 22-23).
While this aid was restored after guerrillas shot down a U.S.
helicopter in January 1991. However, pressure for the
government to improve human rights conditions continued to
build after this period (Country Report El Salvador, 1991.1,
p. 26).
The pressure on Turkey came almost exclusively from
Western Europe and was limited by strategic concerns. Because
of its strategic importance and membership in NATO, Turkey
was a large recipient of foreign aid from both Europe and the
United States and throughout the period studied, remained one
of the largest recipients of foreign aid (Human Rights Watch
Arms Project, 1995, p. 30). The United States, though
beginning in 1993 to acknowledge and criticize the extent of
torture and other forms of abuse, continued to provide among
other forms of aid anti-terrorism training to Turkish police
(Helsinki watch, 1992, p. 70,. However, Turkey did receive
significant pressure from Western Europe. Most of the
pressure came in the form of denial of full membership in the
European Community. There was some other lesser pressure put
on Turkey at various times. Beginning in 1981, the European
Economic community withheld an aid program to Turkey but the
really significant pressure came with Turkey's formal
application for full membership in the European Community.
Turkey failed in its attempt to move from associate to full
member of the European community because of both economic and
human rights reasons. Turkey formally applied for membership
to the European Union in 1987 (Helsinki Watch, 1987
,
p. 135 ).
In the spring, the European Community postponed a decision on
Turkey's bid for full community membership until 1992
(Country Report Turkey, 1991 . 1
,
p. 13 )
.
The European
commission cited among other things failure to satisfy
community human rights standards. Since then the European
Union has repeatedly cited human rights problems as a barrier
to membership (Freedom House, 1991, p. 365).
The difference between those with foreign pressure who
improved and those that did not may be the presence of major
armed conflict. The comparison shows that improved
compliance did not occur when there was major armed conflict.
The two states where torture has continued despite foreign
pressure both were experiencing major armed conflict.
Foreign pressure may provide part of the context for
improvement but only in theu-L rn absence of major armed conflict.
Conclusion
The most important indication of the role of
democratization is that only in states moving toward
democracy did the government reduce torture. Armed conflict
in many cases distinguished those states from other states
either moving toward or already practicing democracy.
However this alone cannot explain why no existing democracy
improved compliance: there were democracies without armed
conflict practicing torture.
One of the strategies used in efforts to improve human
rights has been to generate foreign pressure. The QCA
analysis indicates that foreign pressure may be important in
promoting compliance. The only configuration in the positive
equation where NGOs with links were present was when it was
in conjunction with the presence of foreign pressure and the
absence of armed conflict. However foreign pressure was also
part of the context leading to change in the absence of NGO
activities. This chapter has shown that NGOs could only have
been part of a process of change under particular
^^^^‘-^^^tance
. The next chapter will look at how limiting
these circumstances are.
^ For a discussion of changes in human rights policy between the
Carter and Reagan administrations see Rossiter, C. 1984 p.25
For a discussion of claims of improvements in El Salvador see
Managing the Facts: How the Administration Deals With Reports of Human
Rights Abuses In El Salvador pp . 28-38 or Americas Watch 1985.
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CHAPTER 5
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
An analysis of states where the government continued to
torture despite democracy or transition to democracy shows
that greater success for the human rights movements requires
more than the movement spreading to and becoming increasingly
active in more states, while NGOs with transnational links
may have been helpful in decreasing the practice of torture
in the Philippines, Argentina and Chile, lack of improvement
in other democratic or transitional states indicates their
limited role. Even when human rights groups had
transnational links to other parts of the human rights
movement, they were often unsuccessful in pressuring
governments to change repressive practices. The first part
of this chapter demonstrates that the lack of progress in the
comparison states cannot in most cases be explained by weaker
or newer human rights organizations. The difference between
successful cases of improved compliance and failed efforts
comes instead from the different contexts in which they
worked. The QCA analysis presented in chapter four
highlighted this context. The second part of this chapter
discusses how infrequently NGOs have operated under the more
favorable circumstances.
Many studies have concluded that the human rights movement
is most effective when the domestic organizations are able to
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form links with counterparts
Nemenzo, 1995, pp. 121-122;
p. 525; Garcia-Sayan
, 1992,
abroad (Sikkink, 1993 p. 435
,
Brysk, 1993, p. 259; Clark, 1995
p. 208). Links between local
r
activists and activists overseas 3^ce important for local
human rights NGOs because they allow them to exert pressure
on the international level and to receive additional
resources and protection. Human rights organizations should
be able to operate most freely and have the greatest
opportunity to be part of the process leading to greater
compliance in democracies or states in transition to
democracy, if ngOs cannot have an impact in these states, it
is unlikely they can have much of an impact in any state.
Yet this research has shown that there has not been much
success even in democratic or transitional states.
Human—Right s NGOs in States that Improved
To further understand the possible importance of human
rights organizations, it is important not just to know
whether or not they were active at the time of changes in
compliance but also to know the timelag between their initial
activities and improvement in government compliance. Coding
for the QCA analysis revealed that domestic and transnational
human rights organizations were active in only three of the
eight improvers before torture became less severe. Table 5.1
shows the year each improving state was first coded as having
NGOs and the year those NGOs first developed links to
international or foreign counterparts. It is sometimes
difficult to be precise to the year for when NGOs became
active or developed links, but this is the best estimate
given available resources. This information reveals both
Whether it is possible that human rights organizations were a
factor in eliciting greater compliance and whether
improvement is more likely after human rights organizations
have been active for a certain period of time. These
considerations are important when evaluating their usefulness
and estimating the possibility that the successes in some
states will be duplicated in others.
The majority of the states where the government improved
compliance did not have actively functioning human rights
communities prior to the improvement. Table 5.1 reveals that
in only three
-Argentina, Chile, and the Philippines- could
these groups have been part of efforts to bring about
government change, and that in each the local NGOs had also
developed links with overseas NGOs, iGOs and the
international media, in addition, the NGOs were very active
for fairly long periods before the improvement in state
practice; from 6 years in Argentina to 15 years in Chile.
While the earliest human rights organization in Argentina,
the Argentine League for Human Rights, was founded on
December 20 1937, domestic human rights organizations really
began operating in the mid 197 0s and became very
active by 1977. The Permanent Assembly for Human
Rights ( APDH ) , the Relatives of Persons Detained-Disappeared
for Political Reasons, the Ecumenical Movement for Human
Rights (MEDH), the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the
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Association of Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo were all
formed between 1975 and 1977
. The Mothers began
demonstrating in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, in April
1977; on the 15th of October 1981 seven human rights
organizations held the first joint demonstration in the Plaza
(Human Rights Internet, 1981 p. 75 ).
Table 5.1
Date of Change in Factors for Improvers
Impr
beg
Tran
beg
NGOs NGOs
links
Lag
NGOs
Lag
links
Argentina 83 82 77 80 6 3
Benin 90 90 90 no 0 _
Bolivia 82 82 *no no -
Chile 90 89 75 76 15 14
Ethiopia 92 91 93 no 0 _
Philippines 92 86 80 82 12 10
Suriname 90 91 90 no 0 _
Uruguay 85 85 *no no
*
- Previously existing NGOs unable to continue functioningduring era or military rule
Impr beg
- year improvement in compliance began
NGOs
- year NGOs became active
NGOs links
— year NGOs developed links
Tran beg
- year transition began
Lag NGOs — number of years active before improvement
in compliance
Lag Links — number of years established before improvement
in compliance
Chile, like Argentina, had well developed human rights
organizations by the late 1970s. New groups began forming in
1974, with the Association of Relatives of the Detained-
Disappeared. One of the most important was the vicariate of
Solidarity, established in January of 1976 under the auspices
of the Catholic Church (Dreifus, 1990, p.l62). m 1978, the
autonomous Chilean Human Rights Commission and the
Association of Relatives of Executed Chileans were
established and Relatives of Persons Executed for Political
Reasons first appeared publicly (Human Rights Internet, 1981,
p. 197). In 1983, the Plenary Assembly of Human Rights
Entities was created and the Sebastian Acevedo Movement
Against Torture was created to specifically address the
systematic torture of military detainees .
i
Domestic groups in Chile and Argentina were able to make
connections with overseas groups and have their reports
disseminated in Europe and North America. These Argentine
and Chilean groups attracted enormous amounts of
international media attention and developed links outside of
©s^rly on. The Mothers became the focus of
international attention in 1978 when foreign journalists
arrived for the world cup games (Human Rights Internet, 1990,
p. 118). The Grandmothers visited Canada in 1978, then
Western Europe and the United States. They filed petitions
with the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter
American Commission on Human Rights and in 1983, the
president of the Grandmothers addressed the UN General
Assembly (Human Rights Internet, 1990, p. 114). Argentine
human rights activist Adolfo Perez Esquivel won the 1980
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Nobel Peace Prize then went on speaking tour of the United
States. Support groups for Argentinean human rights
organizations sprang up in Latin America, North America and
Europe and Argentinean exiles established branches in cities
around the world. The Committee for Human Rights in
Argentina(CHRA) was organized in the UK in 1977 (Human Rights
Internet, 1981).
Many external groups worked on behalf of human rights in
Chile as well. Casa Chile, a foreign human rights group, was
founded in 1981 and sponsored a "Boycott Chile Goods"
campaign. The Chile Committee for Human Rights, another
external group, was set up in January 1974 and was able to
complement the mobilization of political support for human
rights in Chile (Human Rights Internet, 1990, p. 215).
The Philippines is the third state where active groups had
extensive connections with outside media and international
groups before torture decreased. The Philippines had one of
the most active human rights communities in the world even
under the repressive Marcos regime. The Civil Liberties
Union of the Philippines (CLUP) was actually organized in 1938
but became very active under martial law (Human Rights
Internet, 1981). Nemenzo (1995, p. 112) noted that 'people's
diplomacy', the Philippine mass movement and NGOs efforts
were a large part of the human rights movement. By 1989,
there were more than 80 human rights organizations in the
Philippines. Groups like the Task Force Detainees of the
Philippines, established in January 1974 by the Association
126
of Major Religious Superiors
produce printed publications
p. 16-18).
of the Philippines, were able to
,
the 'micromedia' (Mondez, 1988,
Filipino groups established links with groups abroad.
Groups in the Philippines set up hotlines with the foreign
media and established communications with human rights
organizations abroad (Nemenzo, 1995). Many Filipinos living
abroad helped to start solidarity groups. Local monitoring
groups channeled through them news about human rights cases
for dissemination to the media in their countries of
residence. Rosalinda Galong, a worker for the Philippine
Human Rights Information Center and the Task Force
Detainees writes of their success:
we had no problems.
. .getting the attention of andgetting space in the international media.
Moreover, a broad network of human rights and
solidarity organizations abroad.
.
.
relay (ed) the truth about the Philippine human
rights situation to a global audience (Galanq 1996
p. 48 ) .
V ^u.
In July of 1988, an international lawyers' forum, with the
participation of representatives of Asia Watch and several
other international organizations, was held in Manila to call
attention to the wave of assassinations and harassment of
human rights attorneys in the Philippines (Human Rights
Watch, 1988, p. 138).
In two other states, Uruguay and Bolivia, human rights
organizations already existed and had begun to develop links
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in the early eighties, but were unable to continue
functioning actively during periods of military dictatorship.
This did not mean that human rights activists had stopped
fighting the repression. As Luis Perez of Uruguayan SERPAJ
wrote in a letter to other human rights organizations:
moment... i continue working for thedefense of human rights in my own name. There isnot a decree that can impede this conviction andconsequential action. 1 am worried about thevacuum created by the prohibition of SERPAJ (HRIReporter, Nov. 1983, p. 210).
Human rights organizations became active in Bolivia in the
1970s. The Association of Relatives of the Detained-
Disappeared and Martyrs for National Liberation (ASOFAMD) was
founded in 1970 and the Comision Boliviana de Justicia y Paz
in 1972 as an official human rights organization of the
Catholic bishops in Bolivia. However, their activities were
severely curtailed in the 1980s. According to Human Rights
Internet, a U.S. -based organization disseminating information
for these organizations, "most Bolivian organizations which
were concerned with issues of human rights and social justice
were destroyed or forced to go underground, as a result of
July 17, 1980 military coup d'etat" (Human Rights Internet,
1981, p. 66). Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de
Bolivia ( APDHB ) was also unable to function; its offices were
closed by the military forces and Father Tumiri, its
president, was arrested with most of the other directors.
The majority of the leaders of The National Committee for the
128
Defense of Democracy in Bolivia which was founded in April
1980, were arrested during an attack on July 17, 1980 by
paramilxtary forces (Human Rights Internet, 1981, p. 66).
In Uruguay, NGOs were established after 1980 but were not
as active as in Argentina or Chile. The Mothers and
Relatives of Detained Disappeared Uruguayans was formed in
this period, but they were restricted in their attempts to
hold picket-lines and masses in churches. Human Rights
internet reported in 1981 that the severity of repression
prevented all of the local human rights groups from
functioning openly in Uruguay at that time (Human Rights
Internet, 1981, p. 79). There was only one independent human
rights NGO really functioning in 1983, Servicio Paz y
Justicia(SERPAJ)
,
the Uruguayan branch of the organization
founded in Argentina. However it was closed in August 1983
after it publicly criticized the military regime. According
to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, “the closing of
SERPAJ in August 1983, eliminated the only fully functioning
human rights organization in the country" (Lawyers Committee,
1984
,
p. 6 ) .
Bolivian and Uruguayan human rights organizations were not
able to maintain useful connections with the outside groups
at this time. According to the International Commission of
Jurists, “although the situation of human rights was very
serious in Uruguay, comparable in all aspects to that of
Chile... it was much less well known at the international
level." (quoted in De Brito, 1993, p.583) Human Rights
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internet stated in its 1981 directory that it was unable to
provide information on groups in Uruguay except to say that
none were able to function openly (p. 79) and could provide
information on only a few Bolivian organizations that were
not currently functioning (p. 66). There were however some
overseas groups working for human rights inside these
countries. CONADE ( Comite Nacional de Defense de la Democracia
en Bolivia) was operating in Washington DC. After the July
coup, offices affiliated to CONADE were opened in many cities
in the Americas and in Western Europe.
In both these states human rights organizations became
active again after the military government lost power and
state repression was reduced under the new civilian
government. From this point, there were efforts to reduce
repressive practices even further, to solidify gains so that
human rights abuses would not happen again, and to press for
punishment of past abuses (Roniger and Sznajder, 1997, p.
64). In Bolivia, these groups include the Oficina de
Asistencia Humanitarian Relief Organization, the Civic
Committee for Law and Bolivian Assembly for Human Rights. In
Uruguay, in September 1989, the National Coordinating
Committee of Organizations Defending Human Rights (CONADEHU)
was founded (Human Rights Internet 1990, p. 465). Other
groups to become active after the change were the Human
Rights Commission of the Uruguayan Bar Association and the
Committee of Experts for the Prevention of Torture in the
Americas
.
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While hu^an rights organizations in Bolivia and Uruguay had
never functioned at the level of those in the Philippines
Argentina, or Chile, they had started a process of developing
an active human rights community with links to activists
abroad. Uruguay and Bolivia at least had organizations with
trarned activists who were able to go abroad or underground
if they survived the crackdown.
The other states where the government improved compliance
had no history of local human rights organizations, while
individual activists and political groups raised human rights
issues, there were no actively functioning human rights
organizations. They developed during or after the transition
period.
When the opposition began to openly challenge the
repressive government in Benin they did use human rights
language and fight for greater human rights, particularly
political rights. The human rights movement worldwide had
clearly influenced the thinking of these activists (Novicki,
1991, p. 41). However, Benin did not have active human
rights groups working until after the democratization process
began and torture had begun to decline. Earlier efforts to
organize were put down by the government. A human rights
organization called the Support Committee for Former
Political Prisoners existed briefly in 1984 until its leaders
were all arrested in 1984 on the way to a meeting with the
president (State Department, 1985, p. 13). The main
opposition to the president formally inaugurated the Benin
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Commission on Human Rights on March 30 1990 to push for a
new government. Saidou Agbantou,
their purposes;
Its president, explained
We wanted to force tho 4.^
toward de^ocratizltfon Tnltlltights commission created hv
pushing the government along from dic4torLTnC°*
Tull <AftifarL°po^t^! M^y-
This was not a group that had been struggling for greater
respect for human rights in the period leading up to the
Change. Newer groups that have started since the change
rnclude the Association of Christians against Torture and the
League for the Defense of Human Rights in Benin.
Ethiopia did not have active human rights organizations
before the change occurred. Human rights activists admit
today there was little done to monitor or publicize the
horrors during the red terror of the late 1970s (Ethiopia:
Red terror relived" 1994). The development of a human rights
community began in the early 1990s with the launching of the
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRC) in November of 1991 and
the beginning of the Inter-African group and Forum-84
. By
1992 there were several new human rights groups Including
Forum 84 and the Ethiopian human rights council (State
Department, 1992, p. 1990). While they began activity before
the decline in torture, these groups did not at that time
form part of an active local human rights community.
In 1985, according to an OAS report, there were no private
human rights groups in Suriname, although some individuals
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and groups such as the Council o£ Christian Churches were
addressing human rights issues (OAS, 1985, p. 14). By 1988,
the Council of Christian Churches had become more active in
human rights work by reporting on violations by the military
(State Department, 1989, p. 741). On October 12th, 1987,
Moiwna '86 was officially registered. This group was named
after a village where the military massacred thirty-five
people, mostly women and children in November 1986. while it
was initially established just to investigate the massacre.
It developed into a general human rights group (Human Rights
Internet, 1990, p. 458). However its work was greatly
reduced after its director Stanley Rensch fled the country in
December of 1989 (State Department, 1990, p. 778). Several
NCOS were working in 1990 but at reduced levels of activity
because of threats. Stanley Rensch returned to Suriname in
October 1990 despite new threats in order to help Moiwana
continue its work (State Department, 1990, p. 778). By 1991,
they were more active and were operating much more freely
than they had previously. Although becoming active in 1991,
the human rights community in Suriname was still
significantly smaller and less active than those in Argentina
or Chile.
The situation in Suriname received some attention from
international groups like Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, but
far less than accorded to Chile and Argentina. There was
some awareness of what the domestic groups were undergoing
and support for their activities. In 1988, Stanley Rensch,
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director of Moiwana ' 86
,
was in Washington D.c. at the
invitation of the state Department. When he was arrested on
his return,
-a sustained barrage of international outcries
from governments and human rights organizations succeeding
gettrng him released after eleven days" (Price, 1995
, p.
446). They had connections enough to provide some
protection. However Surinamese human rights organizations
were just becoming active and had not at this time built up
in
©xtensive links with outside groups.
In sum, the human rights movement could not have been a
direct influence on change in most of the states that showed
real improvement. Five of these states began the
democratization process and moved toward greater compliance
without the presence of an active human rights community with
links to outside groups. Only in three was it sufficiently
active beforehand to be a factor in the change.
Human Rights NGOs in Non ImprovGrs
A careful look at the period 1979 - 1993 shows there has
not been greater success in changing government behavior as
more NGOs have come into existence throughout the world. By
the end of the period studied, human rights NGOs had spread
to every region in the world, although Africa and Asia were
behind other regions in the development of active human
rights communities.
It might be argued that the success in Argentina and Chile
stemmed from the size or maturity of the local human rights
movement. The infrequency of success elsewhere might mean
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only that other human rights organisations need time to
develop more fully, yet an examination of the democracies or
states in transition where the government continued to
torture demonstrates that frequent torture can occur even
where there have been active human rights communities for
fairly long periods of time. Table 5.2, showing the year
that NCOS began activity and formed transnational links,
demonstrates that some non-improving states have had active
NCOS with links to international counterparts as long as in
those states where the government increased compliance. Thus
the reasons for their lack of success involve more than a
development process that would be indicated by a time-lag.
By the end of the period studied, most of the states
included in this survey of non-improvers had active NGOs for
years and many of these domestic NGO communities had links
with outside organizations, while in Turkey and Venezuela
active human rights organizations had existed for only a
short time before 1993, in most of the Latin American
countries that did not improve the NGOs started almost as
©arly as in Argentina and the Philippines.
While the level of activity varies in the comparison
states, several had human rights communities as active as
those in Argentina and Chile. El Salvadorian groups were
active throughout the eighties
. Socorro Juridico
and Tutela Legal tabulated killings by government forces and
the paramilitary forces (Americas Watch, 1985, p. 39) The
Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners,
13-S
Disappeared and Assassinated of El Salvador
-Honsenor
Romero" (CoMadres) began documenting and publicizing human
rights abuse in 1977. They took over the Salvadoran Red
Cross Building and organized hunger strikes and
Date of Change in Factors for
NGOs Links
Lag
NGOs
Lag
Links
Bangladesh 80 84 13 9
Brazil 79 82 14 11
Colombia 79 86 14 7
Ecuador 82 no 11 -
El Salvador 78 84 15 9
India 86 87 7 6
Mexico 83 85 10 8
Pakistan 83 no 10 -
Peru 80 89 13 4
Sri Lanka 80 89 6 6
Turkey 87 87 12 -
Venezuela 81 no
Lag NGOs - number of years active before 1993
Lag Links - number of years established before
demonstrations (Stephen, 1994, p. 813). In Mexico, by 1993
^ore than 50 local groups were affiliated with two national
networks (Mexico's Hottest Industry, 1993, p. 16).
Human rights organizations became active in Venezuela,
Pakistan and Ecuador by the mid-eighties. Venezuela had
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fewer human rights NGOs than the other Latin American states.
In Pakistan, before the mid-eighties human rights
organizations were not particularly active. The Human Rights
society of Pakistan was not challenging government policy in
any way (State Department, 1984). m Ecuador, attention was
initially focused on abuse in other countries. This began to
change in 1982, when among other human rights activities, the
Catholic Church sponsored Ecumenical Human Rights Commission
became more critical of government policy and the Committee
of the Relatives and Friends of Prisoners was formed. By
1988 NGOs had formed a national network (Human Rights Watch,
1992, p. 210).
In many of the countries studied, the individual
organizations not only became active during the period
studied but also increased the amount of coordination and
cooperation between groups, in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian Front
for the Defense of Human Rights ( FEDHU) began holding an
annual forum in the summer of 1983 when 65 organizations
participated in a two-day forum to discuss the human rights
situation of Ecuador (Human Rights Internet, 9:3, p.464). in
1986, human rights organizations in Bangladesh formed an
experimental coordination council under the umbrella of the
Commission for Justice and Peace (CPJ) of the Catholic
Bishops
' Conference of Bangladesh and the Society for the
Enforcement of Human Rights set up a resource center to
collect and disseminate information on human rights to the
locally-based Bangladeshi community (Human Rights Internet,
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9-3, p. 425). in Mexico, the Comision Para la Defense de Los
Derechos Humanos (CDDH
) published the first issue of its human
rrghts newsletter, Mlsiva. in May 1988. Misiva was intended
to unify efforts in the struggle for the defense of human
rights (Human Rights Internet, 1988, p. 164).
The human rights movement has not been able to operate as
actively in all countries or regions of the world. Turkey
had active human rights organizations for the shortest period
of time. Human Right organizations were still, due to
government restrictions, unable to function as actively as
those in the other states. Restrictions have been severe and
human rights activists have tended to work in one large
organization rather than many separate organizations. They
could not operate at all after the 1980 military takeover and
in 1983, Turkey passed an Associations Law that meant it
would continue to be almost impossible for human rights
workers to organize (Siesby, 1988). There really was no
human rights community until the Human Rights
Association (HRA) received permission from the Ministry Of the
Interior to start operations in December 1986 (Human Rights
Watch, 1988, p. 192). Since then, it has continued to
function despite severe harassment and abuse. Several
branches have been closed by the government at various times
but, by 1993, this organization had forty branches throughout
Turkey (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 245). A few other
groups were established in 1986, such as the Association of
Families of Convicts and Detainees (TAYAD) and the Association
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for the Defense of Hu.an Rights in Turkey. This group began
with 98 renowned intellectuals who were pursued by military
prosecutors for signing a petition addressed to the
president, demanding respect for human rights (Human Right
Internet, 1987, p. 39)
.
Circumstances of Improved Comp i i
Since the amount of time that these NGOs existed and the
quality of the human rights movement cannot explain the
differences in compliance, the broader context deserves
careful attention. One of the factors, links with foreign
human rights organizations, was present even in most of the
comparison states that did not improve their compliance with
norms against torture, in only three of the states where
torture was practiced frequently were the domestic human
rights organizations not part of the transnational human
rights network. Ecuadorian, Pakistani and Venezuelan groups
had not by 1993 been able to take advantage of the resources
of oversees groups.
The other two conditions, absence of armed conflict and
presence of foreign pressure, have not been present as often
as transnational links. As Table 5.3 shows, quite a few of
the democracies where governments use torture did not
fulfill even one of these conditions.
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Table 5.3I
I Foreign Pressure and Armed Conflict
! Frequent Torture
in States with
state name
Bangladesh
Brazil
Colombia
Ecuador
El Salvador
India
Mexico
Pakistan
Peru
Sri Lanka
Turkey
Venezuela
Lack of Major
Armed Conflict
X
X
X
X
Lack of Minor
Armed Conflict
X
X
Foreign Pressure
X
X X
X X
X
X
Links
International human rights organizations, like governments,
often have only a certain amount of resources and must focus
on certain states
. Because of this
,
organizations in some
states have not been able to draw the attention of
organizations outside of the country. Venezuelan abuses have
received much less attention from INGOs than have abuses in
other states. Human Rights Watch published its first report
on Venezuela in 1993, but more recently has said it will put
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more focus on Venezuela (Human Rights Watch, 1994, pp. 135 .
136). However, throughout the period studied links between
states and transitional and international organizations
increased. New INGOs came into existence and older ones
increased their capabilities, a greater awareness of human
rights issues led to more support groups.
Local organizations in the other nine states have used
these links to attract foreign attention, to help connect
them to foreign publics, governments and IGOs and to attract
financial resources and training (Weissbrodt, 1984, Rodley,
1992, Wiseberg 1991). m many countries one of the most
important tasks is protecting local human rights workers.
Domestic NGOs make these connections not only through INGOs
like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch but also
through foreign-based groups set up specifically to address
the needs of a particular country, many of which are founded
by exiles and emigrants
.
Two important groups working for the benefit of Peruvian
rights were the Peru Campaign for Life and Peace operated in
the U.S., an exile group, and the Peru Support Group which
was founded in 1989 by Peruvian professors concerned with
human rights and operated in the U.S. and London (Human
Rights Internet, 1990, pp. 442-443). Info-Turk is a monthly
publication of political refugees in Belgium that has been
reporting extensively on human rights issues in Turkey and
since 1987, the Friends of Turkey a human rights group
founded by 170 politicians and intellectuals located in
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Pans, has been working toward greater political rights in
Turkey {Info
-Turk, 1987, p. 6)
The links developed by human rights organizations in many
of these states are comparable to those established in
Argentina and Chile. El Salvadorian groups were particularly
active in developing these links. The Co Madres was the
most active domestic Salvadoran group in creating
transnational links, in the 1980s, they traveled to Europe,
Australia, Canada, U.S. and Latin America (Stephens, 1994, p.
814). Friends of El Salvador committees were established in
U.S., Australia, Switzerland, Germany, Mexico and Canada
beginning in the mid 1980s. Other outside groups fighting
for human rights in El Salvador included the Action Network
for Emergency Support 84 - El Salvador (USA) the Comite De
Solidaridad Marti (USA), the El Salvador Committee For Human
Rights (UK) the National Labor Committee in Support Of
Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador (USA) and El
Rescate Human Rights Department (USA) founded in 1986 (Human
Rights Internet, 1990, pp. 291-292).
In Mexico, links with groups in the United States have been
particularly important. Local activists established links
with U.S. activists working on issues on both sides of
border. Some groups such as the Binational Center for Human
Rights work for the rights of those who live and work on and
across the border between the United States and Mexico (Human
Rights Internet, 1990).
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Outside groups have helped local organizations by
publishing reports on the situation abroad and by
disseminating the materials the local groups produce. The
major western group specializing in disseminating information
is Human Rights Internet, which abstracts information
provided by human rights organizations for its Human Rights
internet Reporter. In many states local human rights
activists have cooperated in the production of fact-finding
missions and reports. The human rights situation in Sri
Lanka was the object of numerous reports and fact-finding
missions by non-governmental organizations in the 1980s.
Local human rights groups were able to form contacts with
overseas groups to draw attention to the situation in Sri
Lanka. One of these overseas groups was the Chittagong Hill
Tracts Commission which is composed of a group of European,
Canadian and Australian NGOs (State Department, 1992, pp.
. In Bangladesh in 1984, both the Anti-Slavery
Society for Human Rights and Survival International issued
reports on repression in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (C.H.T.
)
(Survival International, 1984).
Overseas groups not only disseminate information to those
outside the country but also assist in disseminating it even
to those inside by way of citizens abroad. For instance,
India Alert (lA), founded in 1987 in the United States, helped
local Indian NGOs publicize their reports overseas (Web Page:
http: / /home. dti.net/foil/economy/ecolgy Zindalert.htm) . Two
of the most important foreign support groups for Brazil have
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been the Committee in Solidarity with the Brazilian People
founded in 1972, and Brazil Network, founded in 1987 to
disseminate human rights information and put Brazilian NGOs
in contact with foreign counterparts (Human Rights Internet
1990, pp. 184-185).
Local groups have also sought out the help of iNGOs to
represent local groups and activists to international bodies.
Local human rights lawyers in the Latin American countries
studied worked with overseas groups like Human Rights Watch
and the Center for Justice and International Law to bring
cases before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Human Rights Watch, 1994 pp. 88 & 131).
Many local human rights organizations received financial
support from overseas. Human Rights Information and
Documentation Service ( HURIDOCS
) for instance held training
sessions in both Pakistan and the Philippines in 1988
covering computer networking and documentation. Human rights
activists in most of these countries have had training
abroad. Mexican activists received training on human rights
documentation and Bangladesh human rights activists and
tribal leaders went to the United States for training.
Groups in some of these countries received funding from the
Ford Foundation and other U.S. institutions and also from
groups in Europe and the U.S. set up specifically to address
human rights issues is a particular country (Welch, 1995, p.
223 ) .
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The local groups do not make connections to foreign-based
ones without risk. Governments often do everything they can
top these links. The most drastic way for governments to
fight human rights movements is to imprison, torture and kill
the leaders or even the rank and file of these organizations.
For instance, between 1987 and 1990 Human Rights Watch
reported thirty human rights monitors killed (State
Department, 1990, p. 557). Human rights workers faced
particular danger in Brazil, Colombia and Sri Lanka. Most of
them faced harassment, such as mail being checked and wires
tapped. In some states human rights organizations are made
Illegal. However, this strategy is less likely to work in
democratic states.
Many times, much of the effort by oversees activists has
been concentrated on simply helping to keep local activists
alive, out of prison and functioning at some level. Human
Rights Watch considers protecting human rights activists one
of its principal responsibilities (1992, p. 27). Three of
the four activists who founded the Human Rights Commission of
El Salvador were killed in 1980 and the fourth in 1983
(Amnesty International newsletter xiii.5, p. 1). Overseas
groups attempted in various ways to highlight the extreme
dangers that human rights monitors face and to try and
provide protection (see generally Wiseberg, 1991).
International and foreign human rights organizations have
tried to protect local activists in several ways. One
strategy has been accompaniment or escorting. Peace Brigades
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international was founded in Canada in 1981 at an
international conference on nonviolence for this purpose.
Human rights activists from other countries, usually Canada,
the U.S. or Western Europe, have stayed at human rights
organizations and accompany activists in their activities.
The Idea is that repressive governments will be reluctant to
endanger the foreigners for fear of provoking their home
countries (Mahony and Eguren, 1997, p. i). the very least
the foreigners serve as witnesses when there is abuse. Their
testimony can bring pressure to bear on governments
persecuting local activists. Peace Brigades International was
in Sri Lanka in 1989 and El Salvador from 1987 to 1991. The
first accompaniment in El Salvador was by the Marin County
interfaith Task Force on Central America at the request of
the nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador
CDHES (Mahony and Eguren, 1997, p. 155). More recently, some
human rights and labor activists have tried the idea of using
tourists to protect protesters. Places that are commonly
visited by tourists are pamphleted and they are encouraged to
go to mass rallies with the hope that their presence will
provide some protection for the marchers (Wiseberg, 1991, p.
525)
.
strategy that has become more widespread is the use of
human rights awards. These are seen as good protection
because they draw media attention to activists and give them
some legitimacy. By 1981 at least ten awards were given out
in the U.S. (Human Rights Internet, 1982, p. 534). Two of
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the main ones are the Robert F. Kennedy award and the Reebok
award, in 1984, the El Salvadoran group COMA was the first
recipient of the Robert F. Kennedy human rights award
(••Refugee's Arrest at DC Church Incites Protests," Washington
Post, March 29, 1989, p. b7
,
. Human Rights Watch also gives
out human rights awards (Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 27).
in 1991, they honored Alirio Pedrozan, a Colombian activist
Who was disappeared in 1990, with an award designed to draw
attention to the dangers faced by human rights monitors
.
There are also awards given by the Council of Europe and
UNESCO.
Another strategy is to provide urgent action networks, like
SOS Torture, that can be immediately mobilized to draw
attention to the arrest or disappearance of human rights
activists. These networks are needed to quickly notify
people around the world that an activist has been seized.
Initially this was done by telegram and fax but now the
Internet is also a channel for this information. Human
rights activists want to get this information out quickly
because the danger of torture and death is greatest in the
first few days. In order to do this, these groups do not go
through the verification procedures that other groups like
Amnesty International do. If they believe that a report may
be true they act on it. This is obviously risky because
mistakes can and do occur. Governments use these mistakes to
publicly question the legitimacy of the organization and the
entire human rights movement. However these groups take what
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they know is a calculated risk in order to save lives
(Wiseberg, 1991 p. 533)
.
Armed Conflici-
Srnce many states using torture have some form of armed
conflict, not to be successful in this environment is a
serious handicap. Eight of the thirteen constant torturers
had armed conflict, five major and three minor. All five
states with major armed conflict were regular torturers.
in the Southeast of Turkey, a major insurgency has been
waged by the Marxist Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK) since 1984.
TWO thousand people were killed in 1992 alone (Freedom House,
92/93). An urban guerrilla group Dev-Sol (Revolutionary path)
operating in Istanbul, focused its attacks on police and
government officials and killed at least fifteen people in
1993 (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 243).
Sri Lanka has also been experiencing major armed conflict
and has at various points almost stopped being a functioning
democracy. The Tamil insurgency, a separatist movement which
began in 1983 in the North, is a conflict between the Tamil
^i^ority and the Sinhalese majority resulting in heavy loss
of life(Freedom House 93/94, pp. 512-513). Between June and
November of 1990, 578 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed, 673
civilians killed and by government estimates 2,000 Tigers
There were 320,000 civilians in refugee camps by the
end of that year (Country Report Sri Lanka, 1991.1, p. 7).
There have been efforts to end this conflict. In 1987
,
Indian forces entered the country as a peacekeeping force and
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attempted to disarm the Tamil Fighters. However, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and some other separatist
groups opposed the peace accord and continued violence
against the government and rival Tamil groups. The Indian
force was withdrawn in March 1990 at the request of Sri
Lanka’s new president Ranasinghe Premadasa. Fighting
continued at serious levels (Freedom House 1990/91, p. 338).
There was civil war in El Salvador from 1979 until 1992. On
December 14, 1992, the last contingent of FMLN guerrillas was
demobilized completing the process started on June 30th
(Amnesty International Report 1993). while the government of
president Alfredo Cristiani and the guerrillas of the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) signed a
peace accord in January 1992 and a cease-fire in the twelve
year civil war was reached in February, the fighting was
lii^gsring at low levels in 1993 (Freedom House, 1993,
p . 216).
India has through much of its independence experienced
major internal armed conflict. Muslim and Hindu clashes were
particularly bad in 1992 and 1993. In one week of July 1992
,
1,200 were killed and 5000 injured (Amnesty International
Report 1993, p. 154). India had within its borders three
significant insurgencies: in Punjab, in the former Assam
Province, and in Kasmir. Tens of thousands were killed in
separatist fighting (Freedom House 1990/91, p. 196). The
combination of conflicts leads to coding India as having
major armed conflict.
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The armed conflict in Peru was quite severe at times.
Sendero Luminoso started guerrilla warfare in Peru in 1980
and the Tupac Amaru Movement in 1984 (O.A.S., 1993, p.2-3).
Political violence in 1989 claimed 3,198 lives (Report of the
Peruvian Senate's Human Rights Commission). Between 1980 and
July 1992, 24,250 people were killed in political violence
(O.A.S., 1993 pp. 2-3) Despite the arrest of Sendero chief
Abimael Guzman and other leader on September 12, 1992,
violence on both sides continued (Freedom House 92/93, p.
410). Sendero and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA) both sought to control Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley.
On August 18, 1993, for instance, guerrillas seized twelve
Ashaninka villages and killed at least 62 people (Human
Rights Watch, 1994, p. 128).
Three states were experiencing minor armed conflict in
1992-93: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Colombia. In 1990 in
Pakistan, there was intergroup violence in Karachi and
Hyderabad which had begun in 1986 (Country Report, Pakistan,
1990.1). There were also violent clashes between the
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and its coalition partner the
Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz(MQM) and between the MQM and the police
(Country Report Pakistan, 1990.2, p. 10).
For twenty years there was insurgency in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts of Bangladesh by the tribal group, the Shanti
Bahini. Tension between settlers and the indigenous
population began in the 1950s with the building of a dam and
a huge reservoir. Thousands of the indigenous population
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were dispossessed of their land and received inadequate
compensation when the reservoir filled up. The situation was
made worse by a government policy of bringing non indigenous
settlers into the area (Country Report Bangladesh, 1992 1 p
11 ).
According to the Andean Commission of Jurists-Colombian
Section, there were more than 4,300 political murders in
Colombia in 1992 (Kirk, 1993, p. 664). The M-19 guerrilla
movement signed a peace accord with the Government and became
a political party in 1990. m 1992, the talks between the
government and the Simon Bolivian National Guerrilla
coordinating Board broke off after a insurgents launched a
major offensive (Amnesty International Report 1993, p. 96 )
and insurgency continued although at lower levels than in
Peru
.
This IS not a suggestion that human rights organizations do
not or should not attempt reform during periods of major
armed conflict. Human Rights Watch points out that they
continue to try and protect the rights of people where there
is armed conflict (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. xxvii). one
way is by trying to generate foreign pressure.
Foreign Pressure
One of the goals of human rights organizations is to
generate domestic and foreign pressure on offending
governments. Of course, there are differences among
organizations about whether generating foreign, in addition
to domestic pressure, is the way to achieve their objectives
and not all human rights organizations attempt to generate
foreign pressure. Even while struggling for a less
repressive government, they may agree with their government
that there should not be outside interference (Robinson,
1995, p. 371).
Human Rights Watch has emphasized how the U.S. government
does or does not provide foreign pressure to particular
states; each country entry in its annual reports has a
section on U.S. foreign policy toward that state, it has
been criticized for putting too much emphasis on the U.S.'s
role in pressuring others and not enough emphasis on working
thorough international organizations (Steiner, 1991 pp. 26-
27). Human Rights Watch has more recently widened its
criticism to look at pressure from other governments as well.
Given the potential importance of foreign pressure and the
ambivalent feelings of human rights activists, it is
important to explore the extent to which there has been
f*^teign pressure on governments that did not improve
compliance with norms against torture. In Brazil, Colombia
and El Salvador, human rights organization became active in
the same period as they did in the states where compliance
increased. However, in only one, El Salvador, was there any
serious foreign pressure to change human rights practice. In
the other two neither the local nor the transnational human
rights movement was able to generate enough pressure on other
states to make them change their relations on the basis of
human rights abuse.
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An extensive literature points out the problems and
inconsistencies of linking foreign aid to recipient
governments' human rights records (e.g., stokke 1995
,
Tomasevski, 1993). These inconsistencies become clelr when
one looks at the way pressure was applied or not applied in
the states studied here. Many rights abusing governments
discussed here have been regularly criticized by other states
using the language of human rights, and have human right
conditions included in treaties and loan agreements and
official statements and press releases. However, as the
following discussion illustrates, we often see condemnation,
or symbolic or very insignificant sanctions but nothing more.
There was foreign pressure in Brazil in the past, but no
pressure on the current government to come into greater
compliance with international human rights norms. U.S.
Military aid to Brazil was suspended in 1977 (Schoultz, 1981,
p. 264) over human rights, but aid recommenced in 1988.
There has been condemnation of the Brazilian government’s
human rights policy but little action following from it. The
latest condemnation was in 1993, when the European parliament
approved a resolution condemning human rights violations by
Brazilian military police (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 81).
The same pattern of talk but no action has been true for
Bangladesh. While countries have expressed concern over the
Chittagong Hill Tracts area, there have been no actions
following from the rhetoric. In Bangladesh most pressure was
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on other aspects of good governance (Kamaluddin, 1993, p.
70) .
conditions for loans may include demands for restructuring
that can work against government efforts to improve the human
rights situation. The 1993 drop in aid had more to do with
Bangladesh's faltering privatization program and the
government's failing to implement promised financial reforms^.
Tomasevski points out "Human rights conditionality has... been
added as another layer to the existing multiple
conditionality in aid which are not necessarily compatible
with each other" (1993, xiii). Some activists and
governments have argued that these other issues can work at
cross purposes to human rights issues (Human Rights Watch,
1992, p. 78). The focus is on economic control with no real
concern for human rights, although some allusion to human
rights is now included in most discussions of good
governance
.
The U.S. has refrained from putting any real pressure on
the issue of human rights abuse in Colombia because the
government has given the drug war high priority (Kirk, 1993
664). U.S. pressure on Latin American states to cooperate in
the annihilation of drug production and export may contribute
to repressive acts by the military and police. In 1993
,
the
United States Congress did, for the first time, place
Colombia on the list of states subject to special human
rights conditions for the disbursement of aid (Human Rights
Watch, 1994
,
p. 88 )
.
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Pakistan was one of the states that continued to receive
military aid despite bad human rights conditions. Security
affairs came before any concerns about human rights abuse.
Because of the Afghani war, the u.s. and Pakistan become
Closer in the 1980s. in 1981, the U.S. concluded a six-year
military and economic aid agreement in spite of reports that
the Pakistani government was mistreating political prisoners.
This action ignored Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance
act, which stipulated that aid be used "to promote the
expeditious restoration of full civil liberties and
representative government in Pakistan." Reagan
administration officials defended U.S. policy saying that the
Asian subcontinent was too complicated for the U.S. to
understand. They said that the U.S. government was not
qualified to dispute Zia's definition of the situation
without ever explaining in what way it was more complicated
than Latin American countries where pressure had been applied
(Americas Watch, 1984, p. 90). in 1989, foreign aid was at
record levels amounting to $2.6 billion (Country Report
Pakistan, 1990.1, p. 19). When in early October 1990, the
U.S. suspended all military and all new economic aid to the
country, it was acting under the terms of its nuclear non-
proliferation legislation not because of human rights abuse
(Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 173).
The United States government was more interested in the
economic benefits of NAFTA than with human rights abuse in
Mexico (Bryant, 1993, pp. 232-233; Human Rights Watch, 1994,
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pp. 18 19). There was some expectation that NAFTA
negotiations would be held up because of pressure on the U.S.
government but no real pressure occurred. There was some
debate in the U.S. about the Mexican human rights record
during NAFTA negotiations. Economic concerns took priority
over human rights. As in many other cases, those opposed to
sanctions pointed out that greater cooperation might allow
friendly diplomacy and improved human rights practices. u.S.
officials took the position that membership in NAFTA would
improve human rights in Mexico3. John Shattuck, the Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights, Democracy and Labor, at
a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, claimed
that adoption of the trade agreement would enhance human
rights in Mexico (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 119). There
was however during the time studied no concrete pressure.
The human rights situation in Peru provoked much debate and
little action. In the early 1990s there was a struggle
between Congress and the administration over funding to
Peru. Conditions were placed on U.S. funding to Peru in
1991, with Congress eliminating $10 million in assistance
that had been allocated to the Peruvian army (Human Rights
Watch, 1992, p. 318). There was a small amount of pressure
at the end of the period studied in Peru but it was temporary
and aimed at assuring democratic elections not overall human
rights practice.
When President Alberto Fujimori dissolved the Peruvian
congress on April 5, 1992, there were temporary
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repercussions. The Bush administration suspended all new aid
and approximately $25 million in economic aid and 15 million
in milrtary aid that had been appropriated but not disbursed
from fiscal year 1991, because members of Congress believed
that Peru had not yet complied with human rights conditions
mandated by law. The U.S. froze commercial military sales to
Peru and pulled out all green beret trainers working with
Peruvian anti-narcotics police but did not suspend police aid
worth $19 million a year (Americas Watch, 1993, p. 45 ). with
the exception of Japan, which reinstated a $53 million credit
on July 31 other countries did the same as the U.S. However,
foreign governments eased the pressure very quickly, in June
a World Bank loan for $400 million was approved, in
September, the U.S. was actively supporting an Interamerican
Development bank loan it had opposed just after the April
coup.
In February 1993, the Clinton administration set conditions
for its giving support through the Support Group of donor
countries. The Peruvian government agreed to the conditions,
including having a dialogue with Peruvian human rights
organizations (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 130). The
lengthy argument about Peru may have been one reason less
attention was paid to Colombia, Ecuador or Venezuela.
Economic reasons and ideological reasons have both
contributed to the impunity with which the Venezuelan
government has committed abuse. The U.S. government gave
Venezuela significant military sales and security assistance
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funds into the 1990s. This state has been regarded as an
important U.s. ally in the hemisphere because of stable
civilian governments and willingness to sell oil to the u.s.
(Human Rights Watch, 1994, pp. 134-135).
Economic reasons were also important in U.s. policy towards
Ecuador. President Febres Cordero, who was elected in 1984,
maintained a positive image with the international banking
and business community until his last year in office. Reagan
refused to criticize Cordero's human rights record publicly.
U.S. foreign aid grew throughout the Hurtado and Cordero
years reaching nearly 60 million in 1986 (State Department,
1986, p. 488).
Human rights abuse in Sri Lanka also provoked debate and
little action. Norway and Canada began reviewing their aid
to Sri Lanka in the eighties. Beginning in 1989, Canada
became more critical of the Sri Lankan government's human
rights record and stated that it was less willing to maintain
a large aid program. However, overall aid did not decrease
at this time (Gillies, 1992, pp. 51-52). The U.S. continued
supporting loans to Sri Lanka. In 1991 Western aid had
totaled a record $1,000 million despite criticism from
Canada, Germany and the U.S. (Country Report Sri Lanka,.
1992.1. p. 10). In February 1992, the Paris aid group, of
which the United States is a member, pledged a total of $825
million in financial support and did not explicitly link
future aid to progress in fulfilling human rights
recommendations (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 188). On June
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18, 1993, the Sri Lanka Aid Group gave a 15 million dollar
increase for 1994 (Country Report Sri Lanka, 1992.2, p 9 ,.
Even when local human rights groups are active and linked
to foreign human rights organizations, they are often unable
to inspire foreign pressure Relationships between local and
international groups are not without problems. Even the most
active human rights organization have difficulties that may
not be relieved and may even be aggravated by relations with
foreign-based and international NGOs
. if a local
organization is funded too heavily from abroad it can become
dependent on these funds for survival. Being dependent on
these funds can lead to control by the funding group
(Ambrose, 1995, p. Ill; Welch, 1995, p. 224). it may also
make them vulnerable to new government measures. Some
governments have either prohibited local groups from
accepting money from foreign sources or have severely
restricted their ability to do so (Robinson, 1995, p. 369;
Rodley, 1992, p. 206). This has heavily affected development
organizations, environmental groups and human rights
organizations. Another problem is that local human rights
NGOs can lose legitimacy with the population as a whole if
they are seen as too closely connected with outside
organizations (Steiner, 1989, p. 70). The links established
between local and international organizations can be used to
characterize international human rights groups as interfering
outsiders. Because this sentiment often exists anyway, and
many local human rights movement themselves have ambivalent
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feelings towards the international groups, this is not an
impossible task. The goal is to have the transnational human
rights movement and any looal organizations having strong
ties to outside groups lose legitimacy with local people.
The existence of armed conflict increases opportunities
for the government to discredit human rights activists by
trying to associate them with enemies of the state:
guerrillas when there is internal armed conflict, or
terrorists and subversives when there is not. For instance,
in Colombia, General Ramon Emilio Gil Bermudez, Commander of
the military forces described the activities of a Colombian
human rights monitor as part of an international campaign
waged by guerrillas (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 8).
While there is no easy way for human rights activists to
prove that they are working independently from any political
group, two factors contribute to making the governments
accusations more plausible. The first is that human rights
organizations have traditionally worked to alleviate human
rights abuses inflicted by government officials. They have
relied heavily on definitions of human rights as what people
possess that cannot be violated by governments. Some
organizations have seen their role as protecting the rights
of people from government abuse and have therefore focused
on that rather than on any abuses that other armed groups
may inflict. Steiner writes that before the 1980s NGOs
almost uniformly considered abuse by nongovernmental groups
outside the scope of human rights law (Steiner, 1991, p.
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58). The second reason is that opposition groups, including
violent ones, sometimes try to associate themselves with
human rights movements. There is some overlap in the goals
of opposition groups and human rights activists, while
certainly the means and stated goals are different they
often use the same broad language of liberation and human
rights-i. Thus the very success of the human rights movement
in influencing the terms of political debate has created
difficulty for activists.
These accusations by governments, along with a desire to
stop abuse by any group that effectively controls the lives
of people, even if that group is acting in response to
injustice, have led NGOs to widen the scope of their
activities since the early 1980s. Amnesty International
expanded its mandate in relation to opposition groups in
1991:
P®thaps the most far-reaching decision taken in
Yokohama was to expand Amnesty International's
mandate in relation to abuses committed by
opposition groups. Amnesty International has for
many years condemned the torture or killing of
prisoners held by opposition groups. It will now
additionally oppose other deliberate and arbitrary
killings and hostage-taking by armed political
opposition groups (Amnesty International Report
1992, p. 13).
Many activists and organizations began to address the abuses
perpetrated by the rebel movements ( see for example: Human
Rights Watch, 1994, p .xxvii; Amnesty International, Annual
Report, 1992, pp. 66-71). This will make the local human
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rights movement look more impartial and help to counter
government accusations
.
There can also be great tension between local human rights
organizations and international organizations. Local
activists sometimes feel that they are patronized by Western
groups and that they are not consulted before action is taken
so they end up working at cross purposes. They often accuse
INGOs of only being around during crisis, addressing only
short term problems and not being available for the long run
(Steiner, 1991, p. 27)
Generating any pressure against democratic or transitional
governments is particularly difficult, if a government
begins a transition to democracy, foreign pressure often
ceases no matter how abusive the new government may be. The
new administration is seen as an improvement and there is
fear that any pressure will destablilize it. Foreign
governments want to be able to claim a foreign policy success
and further investigations are against their political
interests. This tendency was mentioned in the last chapter
in discussing why improvement can only occur up to a certain
point but it also may mean in some of the worst cases of
torture that improvement will not occur at all.
However, these problems are no different than the ones
experienced by human rights organizations in those states
where there was success in changing government behavior. One
crucial difference seems to be the level of abuse. Human
rights issues only make it onto the foreign policy agenda
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when the worst levels of abuse get the most international
attention. Argentina and Chile had in common that they were
among the worst abusers, where the government practices
severe repression, it can become extremely dangerous for
local human rights activists to function, when they are able
to functron, however, they are more likely to attract
international attention. The international media and foreign
populations and governments are less interested when states
are abusing at lower levels, in those states where the human
rights movement was active and abuse was reduced to what is a
more common level of human rights abuse the improvements did
not continue. Attention is not focused on lesser levels of
abuse. The kind of international pressure that leads to
change is not sustained when there are no longer vast,
obvious human rights abuses.
The Argentine and Chilean governments engaged in
disappearances and mass killings along with torturing
systematically, in a world where there are so many
governments abusing it takes killings along with other human
rights abuse to get serious human rights pressure. A state
where torture is severe but not accompanied by mass
disappearances does not provoke as much or as intense public
outrage. If a government quietly goes about torturing
without killing at a massive level then it may still gets
criticism from lOs and NGOs but this will not lead to the
kind of public attention abroad that causes governments to
apply real sanctions.
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Conclusion
Chile and Argentina, if they are examples of successes of
the human rights movement, are not signs that the movement is
gaining in power and acquiring increased influence over
governments' practice. My findings show that even if one can
demonstrate that human rights NGOs were important in a few
cases, it is because of particular circumstances that have
not been often repeated. That is not to say that these
organizations were not important in saving the lives of or
improving the prison conditions of certain individuals or to
deny that they may have changed the terms of the human rights
debate. Clearly, they have done both. However, there is not
evidence that they can effect state behavior in anything
Other than very limited circumstances
.
One might argue that these human rights movements still
need more time to have further impact on states that have
moved to multiparty democracy and where the government has
lessened the amount of torture it uses, it is possible that
states where there has been some improvement will now have
greater human rights activity and be able in the future to be
in total compliance with international norms against torture.
However, the experience of those states that have had active
human rights organizations for many years does not point to a
trajectory of greater improvement in state practice as time
goes on. There have been NGOs for a long time in Argentina,
Chile and the Philippines. It took a large amount of
financial assistance and time for these states to achieve
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some level of compliance and human rights organizations have
found it very difficult to pressure the government to the
same extent they did before. The first opening should allow
them to function more freely and have the greater access
necessary to garner public support and influence policy.
However, even in Argentina, which is held up as a state that
had a really exemplary NGO system and network, they were not
able to bring about total compliance. After an initial sharp
decline, torture actually increased somewhat, not anywhere
near the level it had reached under the military government,
but still far from total compliancG.
After the worst is over, human rights groups have new
difficulties continuing their work as actively and
effectively as they did when the government was more
repressive. The greatest abuse can often be ended by a new
government that ceases a practice of deliberate systematic
torture. However to arrive at and to stay at very low levels
to torture requires deeper structural and cultural changes.
While NGOs certainly are aware of this, they have difficulty
getting these issues addressed. When the worst abuse stops,
there is less domestic support. Often, as was the case in
Argentina, people see the crisis as over and want to get back
to normalcy. This desire can cause resentment towards groups
that once enjoyed wide support. Roberto Garreton Merino, who
was the national legal director of the Vicariate of
Solidarity in Chile, has discussed this difficulty for human
rights organizations
:
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Human rights workers have reported similar problems in the
Philippines (Galang, 1996, pp. 49-50; Nemenzo, 1995, p. 123 ).
Human rights activists also have more trouble drawing
international media attention and foreign pressure, in a
crisis many domestic and overseas groups can work together
but afterwards rifts are likely to develop. The interests of
first and third world NGOs are most likely to be the same
when local groups are focusing on urgent rather than long
term issues. International human rights organizations often
turn away when the worst is over and redirect their attention
to other crises. This problem was discussed by local human
rights activists at a retreat sponsored by the Harvard Human
Rights Program:
in the transition period, all these international
groups drew back. . .Then we lost touch with those
organizations. That's terrible for us because
there is a kind of central decision, that when a
country starts a new process, there is no longer
any need for international action and support
(Steiner, 1991, p. 51)
.
Bolivia and Uruguay are examples of states where NGOs only
began to operate freely after the ouster of the military and
therefore states where one might expect to see further
improvement. Yet even in them there has not been a steady
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path to compliance.
®P®J^ating all along,
and then stagnated.
As in the states where NGOs had been
initial improvement tended to be sharp
Human rights organizations have lobbied for the
establishment of government structures to make sure that the
worst abuses could not happen again. Such offices do not
seem able to deal with the smaller scale abuses that have
happened under civilian governments. Human rights groups
also tend to focus on punishing the acts of previous
governments by fighting immunity laws. The idea is that
officials should see that following orders is not an excuse
for the kind of abuse that occurred under the military
governments. But again this focuses attention on the massive
disappearances that occurred in the past and away from the
lower levels of torture and brutality that are the current
reality. Human rights organizations have been struggling
with these issues as well but doing so with less support from
the population in general and less attention and support from
abroad
.
^This group grew out of an act by Acevedo who set himself onfire to try and gain freedom for his children. It held its firstdemonstration in September of 1983, in front of a secret Chilean
Secret Police(CNI) detention center. The group followed this with
other demonstrations intended to expose torture centers. Members alsoheld vigils and demonstrations in front of the Ministry of Justice and
other government buildings ( Wiseberg et al
. 19 p. 207).
For a discussion of conditionality in Bangladesh see:Hossain.
pp. 250-271
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obligation to "pLtaor Cooperation which includes anpro ect, enhance, and enforce basic workers' rights."
in AfrIS®
instance Welch- 3
,
1995 ) discussion of opposition groups
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Between 1979 and 1993, the human rights movement spread,
new organizations formed, many of those in existence became
larger and more active, and links among national, and
regional and international NGOs increased. There was also a
great increase in awareness of human rights issues and the
invocation of human rights ideals by governments, activists,
IGOs and insurgents. Yet this new rhetoric has not been
matched by an overall improvement in the way humans are
treated by their governments or much change in the extent of
torture. There was improvement in compliance with
international norms against torture in only eight states.
Some moved from frequent torture to only torturing sometimes
while others moved from that level to where torture was
practiced never or only occasionally. Yet in none of the six
states where torture had been practiced frequently was total
compliance sustained.
Even this modest amount of improved compliance is
noteworthy given that human rights involves a hard case for
compliance. This is a traditionally domestic issue where the
lack of incentive to cooperate, the absence of inter-state
damage caused by violation, the nonreciprocal character of
human rights treaties, and the difficulty in demonstrating
government responsibility for some human rights abuse make
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compliance with human rights norms much different and more
difficult than cooperation in other issue areas.
Sources of Compl 1
Domestic Factors
The QCA analysis used in this study provides another way
to examine some of the factors presented in the statistical
and case studies as promoting or hindering compliance. These
studies have emphasized the importance of domestic factors on
government respect for personal integrity rights (Henderson,
1991, 1993; McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Mitchell and McCormick,
1988; Park, 1987; Poe and Tate, 1994).
Both the cross-national study presented in chapter three,
and the analysis of selected governments' behavior in
chapters four and five, present evidence of the importance of
type of political regime. Previous studies have demonstrated
that democracies torture less than non democracies. This was
confirmed in analysis of state compliance from 1979 to 1993
,
which showed that only states moving towards democracy
improved compliance. However, all of these states had new
governments; no established democratic government that used
torture improved its compliance in the period studied.
Certainly, the observation that all the improvers were headed
toward democracy lends support to the argument that democracy
is important in lessening state repression. However, the
fact that established democracies did not improve their
compliance demonstrates that democracy is not sufficient;
democracies are not necessarily open to the human rights
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movement's efforts to
norms
.
increase compliance with human rights
This study also demonstrated that in many cases the
presence or absence of armed conflict distinguished
democracies or states in transition that complied from those
that did not. However, the QCA analysis reveals that while
there was never compliance during periods of major armed
conflict, minor armed conflict is not by itself sufficient to
understand why some democracies improved compliance and
Others did not.
While this study confirmed the importance of type of
government and the level of armed conflict it also
demonstrated that examining them in isolation misses an
important part of the picture of compliance. Domestic
factors alone do a poor job of explaining state behavior.
This study thus elucidated the contexts under which states in
transition or democracies improved their compliance and the
circumstances under which minor armed conflict might be
overcome
.
International Regimes
It IS clear that membership in one of the human rights
regimes addressing torture does not help to define the
context. Human rights activists and scholars have looked to
greater codification of human rights and to wider
participation in the specific multilateral human rights
conventions to increase respect for these rights. While
governments have engaged in some level of cooperation on
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issues Of human rights by creating and signing conventions,
there is no evidence that this membership has changed their
behavior. Conway Henderson (1988) argued that human rights
conventions were not affecting state behavior. This study
Shows that five years later, there was little evidence of
change in the area of torture. The three conventions against
torture have not been a major influence to increase
compliance in member states. Many of the states where there
was improved compliance were not members of the UN or
regional regime until after they had already improved
compliance, while many states that joined have continued to
torture at high levels. There is no indication that states
such as China and Turkey joined the UNCAT with any
expectation that actual compliance would be required. To
sign on to these conventions did not constitute a costly
policy because there was no expectation that the norms would
be enforced. Signing carried no more risk of sanction or
disgrace in the international community because when a state
receives pressure from other states it is regardless of
whether the target state is a member of conventions banning
the practice of torture.
Foreign Pressure
The analysis in chapter four showed the importance of
foreign pressure in providing the context in which states
improved compliance with norms banning torture. Minor armed
conflict was present in a configuration with a positive
outcome ( improved compliance) only when there was foreign
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pressure, m addition, the only situation where NGOs with
irnks to the international hu^an rights movement were part of
an equation with a positive outcome was when there was
foreign pressure. Further, when local NGOs were active but
there was no foreign pressure compliance did not improve
whether or not those NGOs had links and whether or not there
was minor armed conflict. However, the chapter five analysis
of the states that tortured widely demonstrated that foreign
pressure was not applied very frequently; only two of those
state received significant foreign pressure. Foreign
pressure cannot be the solution to human rights abuse if
states are not using it.
Some scholars studying compliance with international
obligations have focused not just on sanctions or specific
pressure but also on the importance of reputation. As Oran
Young has written, "A reputation for trustworthiness is one
of the most valuable assets that any member of international
society can acquire" (1989, p. 75). Human Rights Watch bases
some of its strategy on the belief that reputation matters.
We try to stigmatize abusive governments by
publicizing their conduct so governments realize
that they will have to call a halt to human rights
violation if they wish to regain their
international reputation (Human Rights Watch, 1992
p. 21 )
.
f
The analysis here suggests that concern for reputation is
not great enough to elicit full compliance with human right
norms. Rather, it gives credence to the argument that total
compliance with international norms is not expected only non
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compliance within established boundaries. Joshua Goldstein
U994, p. has argued that Irag^s invasion oi Kuwait was
xmmoral for going
..peyond the normal amount of cheating that
states get away with.- when it comes to human rights, it
appears that the amount of acceptable cheating is quite
large.
Human rights are violated so frequently that only the very
worst offenders like Chile are considered pariah. Violating
norms against torture is unlikely to affect treaty
negotiations in other issue areas except in the most
egregious cases when torture is combined with massive
disappearances or killings, in their broad study of
compliance, Chayes and Chayes
'
(1993, p. 197) observe that
even parties committed to human rights have different
expectations about compliance with human rights treaties than
with other regulatory treaties. This study confirms this
conclusion when it comes to norms against torture. Human
rights norms are not taken as seriously as many other norms.
NGOs
Many observers have emphasized the importance of local
human rights activists in efforts to secure compliance.
Recently, they have received attention not only for their
direct impact on government behavior but also for their
hypothesized impact on international relations. NGOs are
seen to be important in their efforts to call attention to
the existence of human rights norms, to promote those norms,
to conduct fact-finding, and to pressure for implementation
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(Brysk, 1994; Sikkink, 1993; WisebergsscoblG,
1991).
1976; Steiner,
This research focused specifically on one particular kind
of threat to personal integrity. The sole focus was on
whether the government in each state reduced its use of
torture. I did not explore whether governments decreased
other forms of human rights repression, nor did I focus on
other ways that human rights organizations may have had an
impact. However, this research can nonetheless contribute to
a broader discussion of the role of human rights NGOs in
increasing respect for human rights. The right to be free
from torture has been such a central focus of so much NGO
work that it is not unreasonable to use progress in
eliminating torture as one measure of the work of these
organizations
.
The exploration provided in this study of circumstances
under which some governments in states that are democracies
or in transition to democracy reduced the amount of torture
practiced and others did not yields insight into whether
human rights organizations could have made any difference.
It has shown that NGOs could only have been part of a process
of change under very limited circumstance. They have to this
point had, at best, only very limited success in what would
seem to be their main task, changing state practice.
Civil Society
Some analysts argue that NGOs influence government
behavior through their activities not only in domestic civil
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societies but in an emerging global civil society. Human
rights and environmental organizations are conceptualized by
some as
-new social movements-. These are defined by
Lorraine Elliott
,1994, p. 223) as organizations that
-speak
not for themselves, but in the interests of broader social
values." Together these organizations are supposed to be
creating a global civil society that can effect state
behavior. Gordon Christenson (1997, p. 33), provides a
typical example of their claims in writing that civil
society:
stands apart from the dominion of sovereign statesand international regimes. World civil society ismade up of individuals and groups in voluntary
association without regard to their identities as
DolitTc^^LH"^^
particular country, and outside thep ical and public dominion of the community ofnations. The voluntary associations of this worldcivil society include religious organizations,private business organizations, the information andnews media, educational and research organizations
and nongovernmental organizations.
Many scholars, focusing on environmental and human rights
issues write of the existence of a global civil society
(Wapner, 1995; Falk, 1987; Christenson, 1997; Otto, 1996;
MacDonald, 1997; Lipchutz and Mayer, 1997; Walzer, 1995).
Diane Otto argues that:
The growth of international civil society is both
reflected and bolstered by the ground swell of NGO
participation in international conferences. It has
introduced a new dynamic of embryonic participatory
democracy to the global community and to the shaping of
international law (p. 120).
While NGOs are often excluded from the official multilateral
negotiation and policy review processes, these scholars argue
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that they make a significant impact with their actions at
parallel conferences or counter-conferences or in their
informal influence at these conferences (e.g., Falk, 1987 p.
187; Claude and Davis, 1996).
This study provides additional evidence that transnational
links have been established in the issue area of human
rights. All twelve states where torture was practiced
frequently had active NGOs by the end of the period studied.
In nine of these twelve states, the domestic human rights
organizations were part of the transnational human rights
network. Local organizations in these states have, through
these connections, generated foreign attention, disseminated
their information to foreign publics, governments and IGOs,
receive financial resources and training, worked to influence
the policy of transnational organizations and received some
measure of protection for local human rights workers
.
There is greater communication between organizations from
states and they have gained greater influence in
international communication and interaction. It is important
that NGO have helped establish norms and that these norms may
have altered the language of state actors and their
interactions, but the establishment of these links can only
be successful, only mean something significant, if there is
change in governments' practice. While it is clear that the
links exist, it is not clear that they are having a
significant impact on most governments' human rights
practice.
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Change in Language
some analysts have claimed that the success of the human
rights movement can be partially measured in terms of change
in statements made by governments rather than just in
concrete improvements in state practice (Waltz, 1991
;
Sikkink, 1993; Brysk, 1993). The human rights movement has
helped to shape the discourse of states and the change in
language, it is claimed, indicates the existence of a
universally accepted norm and a changed attitude towards
sovereignty that may lead to a change in behavior.
Governments have become more willing to acknowledge that they
do have an obligation to improve their compliance with norms
against torture.
Clearly, language has changed. Governments answer
accusations that torture is practiced in their state by
denying the charges altogether, denying that the problem is
as serious as their critics claim, asserting that they are
making a genuine effort to change the behavior of officials,
claiming improvement has occurred and greater compliance will
be forthcoming and by making counter accusations against any
foreign government that accuses them. For instance, in 1991
President Fujimori acknowledged human rights violations by
Peruvian security forces but called them occasional excesses
(Amnesty International Report 1992, p. 213). Prime Minister
Turgut Ozal in an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal
(advertising section May 26, 1987) denied that there was any
torture in Oru prisons. The distinction between challenging
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the norm and challenging the accnracy of the accusation is an
important one. Denying that the abuse is occurring or
claiming that progress is being made is implicitly
acknowledging that the norm exists. Questioning the accuracy
of the accusation and the motives of those making accusations
of abuse is not the same as questioning the norm. John
Ruggie has pointed out that this trend is not universal:
[Cjertain governments accused of such violationshave gone to considerable lengths to deny orexcuse their behavior, thereby implicitly acceptinqthe legitimacy of the very rights they have been ^abusing, but other have largely ignorL externa?criticism and condemnation (1983, p. 100).
Scholars and human rights activists both claim that by
accepting the existence of a norm against torture governments
are demonstrating a changed understanding of sovereignty. By
accepting an international obligation to refrain from
torturing its citizens, a government is in fact agreeing to
limits on its sovereignty.
The view of scholars like Sikkink
( 1993, p. 141) that
acceptance of human rights doctrine is a powerful critique of
sovereignty can also be seen in the statements of human
rights activists
. Groups like Human Rights Watch have
claimed that there has been a very serious change in the way
sovereignty is viewed within the international system.
The tired formula that the way governments treat
their own citizens is an internal affair, not the
appropriate subject of international discussion,
lost resonance even among the governments most
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w«S!^"992? scrutiny (Human Rights
Thus, as Human Rights Watch continues:
(1992, p. 2 )
^ ^ global neighborhood
Yet many governments make clear that efforts by other
governments to do anything about violations of human rights
norms - even just drawing attention to them - are an
unacceptable challenge to their sovereignty. The Indian
Government, for instance, has strongly asserted the
prohibition of interference in internal affairs and rejects
human rights conditionality on loans and aid as a violation
of state sovereignty (Tomasevski, 1993
,
p. 11 ).
Many governments also manifest clear hostility towards
representations of NGOs, ingOs or iGOs who investigate and
report on human rights abuse. Turkish State Minister Ayvaz
Gokdemir, referring to three female members of the European
Parliament who were visiting Turkey in May 1995 for talks on
human rights and a proposed customs union with the European
Union, stated:
We are not going to release these traitors for the
sake of the prostitutes of Europe who have come to
us I do not even know as what. May God have mercy
on us and save us from these coalition partners
( guoted in European parliament press release, June
14, 1995).
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It is possible that the change in the language of
governments is a reflection of a change in attitude that will
lead to more compliance but changed language is not a sure
indicator greater compliance will occur. Rather than being a
step toward compliance, a change in language might be
undertaken to cover continuing torture. Ruggie argues that
universal rhetorical adoption of human rights terms ''obscures
rather than signifies any meaningful international normative
change (1983, p. 99). Just changing one's language may in
fact be enough to quiet international pressure. Governments
may not feel any need to then conform their behavior to their
words. Amnesty International points out that the Turkish
government was claiming that the walls of its police stations
would be "made of glass" at the same time as deaths from
torture were rising in 1992 (Amnesty International Report
1993, p. 4). President Collor stated in 1990 "We cannot and
will not again be a country cited as violent in reports by
Amnesty International... We will not allow the 'new Brazil'
to accept any form of disrespect for human rights" (Amnesty
International Report, 1991, p. 3).
Governments have grown more sophisticated in their
treatment of human rights issues. Many have hired public
relations firms to make their defense against accusations of
human rights abuse (Schoultz, 1981, p. 52-53, 65). The
Center for Public Integrity identified ten U.S. foreign aid
recipients which are serious human rights abusers and spent
$24 million on lobbying, legal representation and public
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relations in the US in 1991 and 1992 (Brogan, 1992). As
Wiseberg points out (p. 531) governments now produce reports
using all the appropriate international human rights
language and symbolism" at the same time they follow policies
of human rights abuse.
Changes in Foreign Poliny
NGOs have had some success at changing the foreign policy
of states providing aid to other states. Siklcin)c argues that
there was a "fundamental shift in the perception of long-term
national interests" and that NGOs were "influential in
introducing human rights ideas and reinforcing human rights
policies" (1993, p. 140). Thakur (1994, p. 153) points out
that this occurred in the 1970s when NGOs began to act as
"systemic modifiers of state behavior." Donnelly (1996, p.
391) argues that the conflict between human rights and
national security "has been substantially reduced". Rather
than only looking to the traditional economic and security
interests of the state, some governments have begun to make
human rights considerations part of their policy making
process. Many governments began to use the language of human
rights and to occasionally put sanctions on states that were
considered to be rights violating. In this period some
governments have made human rights considerations an explicit
part of their foreign policy. This policy effects their
decisions on bilateral and multilateral trade, foreign aid to
developing nations and more general diplomatic relations.
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However the actual change in donor governments has been
modest. AS discussed in chapter four, only two of the worst
torturers received any significant foreign pressure and it
was hardly of the scope applied against Chile or South
Africa, only in the worst circumstances have human rights
considerations had serious impact on decision making, m
other cases, human rights are brought up when these concerns
were congruent with other interests. Otherwise human rights
practice was often dealt with in only the most superficial
way. For example, as discussed in Chapter five, there was
condemnation of the Brazilian and Bangladeshi government's
human rights policy but little action following from it. m
Bangladesh most pressure was on other aspects of good
governance, in Colombia, the drug war had higher priority.
Security affairs came before any concerns about human rights
abuse in Pakistan, and the United States government was more
interested in the economic benefits of NAFTA than with human
rights abuse in Mexico. in some cases it seems that states
merely have a new language to use when pursuing state
interest. Thus, in reality, human rights organizations may
not have influenced state practice by changing the way
foreign policy is practiced to any great extent.
Though even inconsistent and weak pressure is a significant
departure from previous practice, arguments that this change
is the beginning of a wider change in how foreign policy is
practiced are difficult to sustain. The situations in which
governments have actually let the human rights practice of
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aid recipients influence their foreign policy decisions are
so constrained that the impact of hu.an rights organizations
on foreign policy has to be rated as real but very limited.
It is questionable whether new pressures have influenced
states to act against their immediate material self-interest
rn more than a few instances
. The examples of governments
giving human rights serious weight in policy decisions are
the exception to the rule, occurring in very particular
circumstances. There have been and probably will continue to
be occasions when serious pressure is applied but there is no
evidence that this is the wave of the future.
The true way to measure the success of these movements, to
see whether changes in language and state foreign policy are
an important step on the way towards a decrease in human
rights abuse is to assess how much success they may have had
in changing government behavior. In terms of how they have
actually reduced human rights abuse there are claims about
improvement in individual cases, improvement in a few states
and about more widespread impact and improvement.
Impact on Individuals
NGOs can also claim success in affecting the fates of
individuals in states where torture continued or even
increased. Human rights NGOs clearly have been able to
alleviate suffering in more than the eight states that were
identified in chapter three as improvers. In fact, saving
identifiable persons is a tangible goal of many NGOs. Amnesty
International reports often give names, ages and professions
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of people being abused and direct campaigns towards their
release (see Amnesty International Yearly Reports), while it
difficult to ascertain the impact that NGOs have had in the
release of a particular prisoner or in alleviating the
severity of torture that a prisoner suffers, most observers
and participants agree that there have been effects. Amnesty
will not itself claim that it was responsible for any
particular improvement (Amnesty International, World Wide
Web, http://www.amnestyusa.org/about/history.html); however
prisoners have reported that when the letters from Amnesty
International increased their conditions get better. Those
who become the focus of international attention, in many
cases, fare better than the ordinary detainee. As noted in
Chapter three, Stanly Rensch, director of Moiwana '86 was
released in 1988 from a Surinamese prison after an
international outcry made by Human Rights iNGOs and foreign
governments
.
This phenomenon is also noted by Robert F. Drinan ( 1994, p
1 ) who writes :
I personally witnessed the impact of an "urgent
action message" from Amnesty. In the 1980s I was
on a human rights mission in Chile—immediately
before Pinochet was removed from office by a
democratic election. The government in Santiago
had just imprisoned and sentenced to interior
exile a prominent physician because he had stated
openly that the government was engaged in
torturing political dissidents. Within a day
Amnesty had alerted over fifty nations to launch a
protest. The ambassadors of these nations In Chile
brought intense pressure on the Pinochet
government to release this political prisoner.
Within seventy-two hours the outspoken doctor was
back with his family.
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This kind of publicity, and at times even that which is
limited to national media, can stop someone from being
tortured or shorten the amount of time they suffer.
Another way that human rights organizations have had an
impact is by making secret practices public. They have
reduced the ability of governments to abuse in silence.
Secret detention centers are made public, the cases of those
who were meant to disappear quietly are publicized, graves
are exhumed and stories told. One of the most important
functions of human rights organizations has been to provide
information. To a great extent, the knowledge of abusive
practices on which iGOs and foreign government base policy
decisions comes from the work of these organizations. The
media also often relies on this information. This
information is important not only because it may be a
necessary first step in the process of changing state
behavior but also because it is important to victims and
their families. Many victims have expressed as one of their
primary goals the desire to let the abuse be known. This is
particularly true when family members have been disappeared.
Some argue that there is a problem with focusing on the
tangible satisfactions of differences in the lives of
individuals because it draw attention away from things that
are more import for a whole people or a society. However,
given the current state of human rights in the world,
analysts and activists are being most realistic when they
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base their claims on this sort of
Rosenau claims that:
success. For instance,
ofgLLrordefthrouXwh‘'“F°"°*°^ dimension
rights is preserved (1992^''p!' 5/6°'!'"'^''”
Cases of Improvement
My analysis does confirm that in some states torture was
used less in 1993 than earlier. The human rights movements
have been part of a process of change in Argentina, Chile and
the Philippine. In Uruguay and Bolivia, NGOs were operating
before a military crackdown but ceased to operate under
military dictatorships. However the impact of their initial
existence and continued work cannot be discounted. The
drastic improvements in government practice in Argentina and
Chile have given hope to the movement and provided material
to scholars looking to demonstrate the usefulness of non-
state actors. The improvement in another state held up as an
example of human rights success, the Philippines, is much
less impressive.
However, it has not yet been demonstrated that these
improvements are, rather than exceptional cases, the first
successes of a movement that can have widespread impact.
This dissertation has shown that these are virtually the only
cases where domestic NGOs could have had an impact on
improvements with norms against torture. As discussed in
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chapter five, as the movement has spread there has not been a
spread of greater compliance with international norms against
torture, in most states with active NGOs, human rights
activists continue operating, working to save lives and
reduce suffering without having had and broader impact on the
level of torture practiced in the country.
The pattern of improvement in the period studied suggests
that the efforts of human rights NGOs to end the practice of
torture can be successful where there is a broader movement
toward democratization. Torture was reduced significantly
only when the repressive government lost power and a
democratization process was undertaken. There was no
significant reduction in torture in states where the same
government continued to run the state. While a transition
did not guarantee that governments will stop torturing, such
a change in government does provide a necessary window of
opportunity
.
The comparison undertaken in chapter four between states
where the government improved compliance and the group of
states in democracy or in transition to democracy where the
government continued to torture shows that activists cannot
always take advantage of this window of opportunity. Human
rights groups have been present during a change toward
greater compliance when there is no armed conflict or when
armed conflict is declining and when there is a significant
amount of foreign pressure on the offending government. As
discussed in chapter four, these circumstances are not
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common, indeed most governments that are torturing
extensively are engaged in domestic armed conflict and are
rarely subjected to any serious sustained pressure.
Therefore it does not seem likely that the cases of
improvement will be widely duplicated.
Human rights NGOs have been most likely to gain allies,
both domestic and transnational, when the government abuse is
of the most extreme nature. Foreign pressure is unlikely in
other circumstances. When there is extreme abuse, not only
torture but also widespread killing or disappearance,
activists can more easily obtain and maintain the attention
of INGOs, foreign governments and the media. Governments can
torture at medium or even extreme levels as long as they do
not also engage in disappearances and killings. One reason
may be that torture is not as final and not as easily proven.
Forms of torture have changed in many places, particularly in
the late eighties and early nineties. While the methods and
practices of torture vary widely from region to region and
even from state to state, many torturers now use methods that
are very difficult to document. Implements such as plastic
bags and hard-boiled eggs are ordinary objects whose presence
can be explained away and their use leaves either no marks or
marks that disappear after a few days.
Claims of Greater Improvement
Steady improvement in only eight of the states studied in
the 1979-1993 period does challenge the most pessimistic
claims that governments are unlikely to improve their
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compliance with international norms on human rights. Though
the improvement is modest, it should be remembered that human
rights issues constitute "least likely" cases of compliance,
some governments do not regard improved compliance with human
rights norms as in their interest because it limits the means
they can employ for remaining in power, m addition, there
is little reciprocity among governments because one
government’s violation of its own people’s human rights does
not directly impinge on the material interests of other
governments. So far, only a few governments have come
(either on their own or via pressure by their own publics) to
regard human rights violations as a significant issue in
inter-state relations. The net result is a "culture of non
compliance" where even significant levels of human rights
violations are ignored, if not actually condoned.
At the same time, the modest level of improvement
challenges the more ambitious claims about the broader
importance of these movements in influencing government
practice. Ann Marie Clark, for instance, claims that:
[human rights and environmental] NGOs foster the
creation of an international public consensus on
principles of human rights and the environment that
tends to impel responsive states to adhere to new
legal and behavioral norms
( 1995 , 508 )
Yet the amount of attention devoted in the literature to only
a very few cases makes one wonder how large the pool of
"responsive states" Clark describes actually is. When
activists and scholars do discuss cases they only point to a
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very few cases that are to demonstrate the first fruits of
network labor. One repeatedly comes across reference to
Chile, Argentina and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines.
These are indeed cases of improvement, but there is of yet no
evidence that they are harbingers of a wider trend. This
dissertation has shown that when it comes to international
norms against torture it appears that the pool of improvers
is small.
Neither is it clear that the modest success can be regarded
as the result of insufficient time for NGOs to bring about
compliance. As argued in chapter four, the success rate of
human rights organizations in many states that have had such
organizations for a long time does not lead to great
confidence that greater improvement follows from more years
of existence. The trajectory of state practice does not
reflect an improvement over time, in addition, the pattern
in those states where there was improvement shows that this
improvement is not always the initial movement that leads to
eventual compliance. As discussed in chapter three, even in
Argentina NGOs were not able to successfully pressure for
total compliance. After an initial steep decline, torture
actually revived somewhat. In Uruguay and Bolivia, total
compliance was achieved for a few years but was not
sustained.
NGQ Goals
Some who write of human rights organizations find it
unacceptable to measure their success by whether there has
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been a reduction in repression. Welch argues that it is not
the responsibility of human rights organizations to correct
massive abuse. Their task is to document, publicize and
press for change but solutions are the responsibility of the
government (1995, n 2l p. 85). Brett argues that “to blame them
for failures is no more reasonable as does not take account
of what they are actually trying to do: to influence
attitudes, not govern the world"
( 1995 , p. no)
It IS undoubtedly true that human rights organizations
cannot be blamed for continued abuse. However, given the
time that has passed since the beginning of the human rights
movement and the claims of the political and social impact of
NGO activities, it is important to focus on when and under
what circumstances these organizations were part of a change
in government practice, other measurements of the impact of
human rights organizations such as changes in foreign policy
of aid-providing states and changes in state language are
important to the degree they lead to reduction in human
rights abuse. However, if the main goal of human rights
organizations, the reduction of human rights abuse, is not
achieved one may have to look to other strategies.
The fate of citizens still remains at the mercies of
governments as influenced by the domestic and international
context, particularly the domestic regime type and the level
of internal armed conflict. However, the comparison of
improvers to democratic or transitional non-improvers shows
that these broad factors do not fully determine the outcome.
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Governments have choice about whether, how, and how often to
use torture. Thus, an effort to apply social science
knowledge to the improvement of compliance with international
norms against torture should proceed along two parallel
lines. The first should focus, as this study has, on
identifying configurations of international level and
domestic level conditions that are most and least often
Identified with improved compliance and seek to identify
mechanisms for changing those conditions. The second should
focus on government motivations for using torture and seek to
identify ways that government interest in using it can be
reduced even in periods of armed conflict. Research that
took up this second line would benefit NGOs, IGOs and
governments seeking to improve human rights compliance around
the world by revealing why some governments persist in the
use of torture and suggesting where efforts to alter such
governments • perceptions and incentives would be most
effective.
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major armed conflict
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
democracy
high income
TRANSITION
COMPLIANCE
APPENDIX
CASE IDS FOR CHAPTER THREE TRUTH TABLES
- MA
- MI
- DE
- HI
- TR
- CO
Case IDs for
M M D H T C
A I E I R O
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 =>
0 0 0 0 1 C =>
table 3.1
0 0 1 0 0 C =>
0 0 0 0 0 C =>
0 1 0 0 0 C =>
0 0 1 1 0 C =:
0 0 0 1 1 C
™
tajkistan =0 djibouti =0
Iraq 0 sierra leone =0 sudan =0
-I
=0 a,erbaydzhan =0 lebanon =0oroaria u georgia =0
albania =0 namibia =0 cote d'ivoir=0 C.A R =0burkinafaso
-0 armenia =0 bulgaria =0
nepal =0 paraguay =0 romania =0 togo =0
mauritania
-0 thailand =0 Zambia =onigeria
-0 malawi =0 guinea =0
maoedonia =1 ghanaKazakhstan -1 Kyrgyzstan =1 tanzania =1 fiji =i
latvia
-1 Slovak =1 Ukraine =1 capeverL =1
mail II
comoros =1 benin =1 Surinam =1
botswana =0 Honduras =0 jamaica =0
ecuador =0 guyana =0 domincan re =0bolivia =0 el Salvador =0 pakistan =0
gambia =1 sao tome =1 st
. vincent =1
grenada =1 dominica =1 western samo=l solomanisla-1 micronesia =1 marshall isl=l Kiribati =1
costa rica =1 belize =1
Cuba —0 guinea-bissa=0 Swaziland =0 equatorial q=0bhutan =0 iran =0 syria =0 china =0 Haiti =0lordan =0 morocco =0 yemen =0 tunisia =0
Zimbabwe =1 Uzbekistan =1 Vietnam =1 tonga =1
maldives =1 lesotho =1
algeria —0 burma =0 chad =0 indonesia =0
mozambique =0 egypt =0 zaire =0
Uganda =0
laos =1 madagascar =1
argentine =0 greece =0 mauritius =0 portugal =0
italy =0 Cyprus =0 brazil =0 chile =0
mexico =0 Uruguay =0 Venezuela =0
malta =1 denmark =1 finland =1 norway =1
Sweden =1 Iceland =1 australia =1 Canada =1
newzealand =1 antigua =1 france =1
germany =1 netherlands =1 luxembourg =1
Switzerland =1 austria =1 belgium =1 Ireland =1
san merino =1 bahamas =1 japan =1 trinidad&tob=l
Singapore =1 st lucia =1 st kitts =1 barbados =1
malaysia =1
Hungary =0
estonia =1 slovenia =1
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0 0 0 1 0 C =>
0 1 1 0 0 0 =>
0 1 0 0 1 0 =>
1 0 1 0 0 0 =>
0 1 1 1 0 0 =>
0 1 0 1 0 0 =>
kuwait =0 saudia arabi=0
taiwan =0 Libya =0
bahrain =1 oman =1
brunei
=i
turkmenistan=l
nicaragua =0
belarus =0 gabon =0
qatar
-1 united arab =1
Seychelles =1 hong-kong = 1
ethioni?. -n
Philippines
-0 Colombiaiopia 0 moldova =0 congo =0 kenvac^eroon=0 russia =0 bangladesh 4
Senegal =0 guatemala =0 turkey =0papua new gu=0 India =0 sri lankaIsrael =0 spain =0
south africa =0
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Variable Names by Column
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DEMOCRACY
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Case IDs for table 3.2
M M D H T C
A I E I R 0
0 0 0 0 1 C =>
0 0 1 0 0 1 =>
0 0 0 1 1 C =>
0 0 1 1 0 C =>
0 0 0 1 0 0 =>
1 0 0 0 0 0 =>
1 0 0 0 1 0 =>
0 1 0 0 1 0 =>
0 1 1 1 0 0 =>
1 0 1 0 0 0 =>
albania =0
romania = 1
Ukraine = 1
lithuani a
hungary =0
estonia
Portugal
franee = 1
Luxembourg
denmark = 1
belgium = 1
austria = 1
belarus = 0
bosnia =0
Croatia =0
russia ==0
Spain ==0
turkey
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bulgaria =0
Czech
—1 poland =1 Slovak =1
Latvia =1
=1 macedonia =1
=1 Slovenia =1
=0 italy =0 Cyprus =0
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finland =1 norway =1 Sweden =1
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democracy
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COMPLIANCE
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- MI
- DE
- HI
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- CO
Case IDs for table 3.3
M M D H T C
A I E I R O
0 0 1 0 0 C =>
0 0 0 0 0 0 =>
0 0 1 1 0 C =>
0 1 1 0 0 0 =>
1 0 0 0 0 0 =>
0 0 0 0 1 c =>
1 0 1 0 0 0 =>
grenada =0 guyana =0
=0
=0 domincan re =0
= 1 St. Vincent =1
chile= 0 mexic= 0
honduras
-0 jamaica =0
dominica =0 ecuador
bolivia =0 el Salvador
costa rica = i belize
Cuba
-0 haiti =0
argentina =0 brazil =0
Uruguay =0 venezuala =0
Canada =1 antigua =1 bahamas = 1
=1 st lucia =1 St Ici-M-cs —IK ^
nir';=5 r;^ rrn a — n t i
^ K tts 1 baradosica agu
-0 Colombia =0
peru =0
Paraguay =0
panama =1 Surinam =1
guatemala
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Case IDs for table 3.4
MMSDHMRTC
aiteilero101000100 =>101000110 =>
oooooooic =>
00010000C=>
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~0 namibia =0 cote d ' ivoir =0
C.A.R =0 burkinafaso =0
lithuania =1 mongolia =1 macedonia =1
ghana =1 kazakhstan =1 kyrgyzstan =1
tanzania =1 fiji =1 mali =1
botswana =0 honduras =0 jamaica =0
gambia =1 sao tome =1 st. vincent =1
grenada =1 dominica =1 western samo=l
soloman isla=l micronesia =1 marshall isl=l
kiribati =1
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bahamas =1 japan =1 trinidad&tobago =1Singapore =1 st lucia =1 st kitts =1barbados —1 malaysia =1
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Case IDs for table 3.6
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00010000
00000000
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 10011000100011001
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0011100000010001
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0
0
1
c
1
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0
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=> honduras =
dominica =0
0 jamaica =0 grenada =0
St. Vincent = 1
=> Cuba =0
=> argentina =0
=> costa rica = 1
=> brazil =0
venezuala
chile 0 mexico =0 Uruguay =
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=> bahamas = 1 trinidad&tob=l
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=> nicaragua =0
=> peru =0
=> haiti -0
=> panama = 1 Suriname =1
=> Paraguay =0
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